Producing the internet and development : an ethnography of internet café use in Accra, Ghana by Burrell, Jennifer
 
 
 
 
Producing the Internet and Development: 
an ethnography of Internet café use in Accra, Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jennifer R. Burrell 
 
Department of Sociology 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 1
 
Abstract 
The United Nation's World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), that took place 
between 2003 and 2005, elevated the 'information society' to the level of 'gender equality' 
'environmental sustainability' and 'human rights' as one of the central Development tropes 
of our time. The concept of the network has come to figure heavily in the political 
discourse of both developed and developing nations and transnational agencies. These 
organizations employ statistics, academic theories, popular wisdom, and utopian visions 
shaped by Western experiences to extrapolate an expected impact of new technologies on 
the developing world. However, to date there has been very little on-the-ground research 
on the diffusion and appropriation of these technologies as it is taking place in developing 
nations and how this might challenge and reorient the expectations of traditional 
Development perspectives. 
This thesis seeks to provide such a response drawing on the experiences of Internet café 
users in Accra, the capital city of Ghana where an estimated 500 to 1000 of these small 
businesses were in operation. Departing from the categories and hierarchies favoured 
within Development circles, my approach is to look holistically at the way the Internet 
was produced as a meaningful and useful tool through the practices of users. The 
practices that defined the Internet in Accra encompassed not only individual activities at 
the computer interface, but also other formal and informal, collective and everyday rituals 
such as story-telling, religious practices, and play and socializing among youth. A similar 
production process was observable in the activities of the Development experts and 
government officials who arrived in Accra in February 2005 to discuss the role of 
networking technologies in socio-economic development at the WSIS Africa regional 
conference. The activities of both groups reconstituted the Internet, Development and the 
relationship between the two, but along very divergent pathways. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
Technology in Representations of ‘Africa’ 
 
 Representations of ‘technology’ and those of ‘Africa’ in European and American 
media spheres tend to fall towards opposing extremes.  While the former serves as a 
symbol of affluence and progress whose newest forms are thought capable of bringing 
total societal transformation, the latter is still often imagined as the ‘dark’ continent, lost 
in time, non-productive, and abysmally poor.  With the recent arrival and rapid (if 
uneven) diffusion of the Internet and mobile phones in certain spots on the continent, 
media narratives have been forced to reconcile this imagery.  Many have turned to the 
rhetoric of Development suggesting that the intrinsically progressive character of these 
technologies just might bring this stagnant and struggling area of the developing world 
into economic growth and prosperity1.  This thesis challenges such a juxtaposition of 
imagery along with its implications of unidirectional causality through an account of 
Internet cafes in Accra, Ghana that explores the dynamics of user agency.  In 2004 it was 
estimated that 500 to 1000 Internet cafes had been opened in this urban capital city 
(Foster et al. 2004) mostly through the small-scale entrepreneurial efforts of locals.  
There has been very little attention paid in the mass media, in the development industry, 
or in academic work to the active role citizens of developing nations are already playing 
in bringing about technology adoption in places like Ghana and other African nations.  
Their efforts have been mostly invisible within Western discourses on technology and 
development. 
Over the past decade powerful transnational institutions such as the United 
Nations, the World Bank, the International Telecommunications Union, and the G8 have 
begun to promote the value of new technologies such as mobile phones, computers, and 
the Internet to Africa and other parts of the developing world in a growing ‘technology 
for development’ movement.  These devices are considered significant as distributors of 
information distinguishing them from past waves of techno-optimism in the development 
industry that prompted investment in projects ranging from industrial dams to modified 
home stoves.  Such concerns have been propelled forward by the concept of a ‘Digital 
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Divide’ that relates a prosperous, technologically-advanced West to ‘Africa’ that in 
comparison appears nearly untouched by such modern commodities.  For example, a 
document titled ‘Open Access for Africa’ published in 2005 through the United Nations 
ICT Task force, begins with the assertion that, “the absence of modern tools for gathering 
information and communicating is particularly evident on the continent of Africa” 
(Dufborg 2005, pp. iii).  This statement is a lead in to descriptions of various low-cost 
connectivity systems that are promoted as possible solutions.  This rhetorical setup is 
carried throughout the text and by each of the many contributing authors.  Technologies 
appear only where development interventions have been initiated and are downplayed or 
ignored outside of the institutional sphere of influence. 
A contrasting image comes from my fieldwork in Accra, Ghana where I found a 
society revelling in the presence of new technologies, not its absence or inadequacy.  The 
Internet and particularly mobile phones were making an impact in unexpected ways that 
evaded an explicitly ‘development’ focused framing.  Much of this diffusion was taking 
place through open market forces and the efforts of locals.  There is growing evidence 
that Ghana is not alone in this respect.  Processes of technology diffusion and 
appropriation (of the Internet and mobile phones in particular) have been documented in 
Senegal, Tanzania, Nigeria, Uganda, and Rwanda (Gueye 2003; Mwesige 2004; Donner 
2005; Mercer 2005; Smith 2006; Molony 2007).  Notably in Accra, patterns of 
technology diffusion did not follow predictably according to the wealth or Westernization 
of the population.  Mamobi, for example, a very poor, densely crowded neighbourhood in 
central Accra was very media rich.  Although the area lacked basic, reliable infrastructure 
for distributing clean water and dealing with sewage and garbage, every home I visited 
had a television set.  Numerous communication centres offering telephone service, kiosks 
selling mobile phone recharge cards, Internet cafés, and videography shops on the streets 
of Mamobi did a brisk business.  Poverty and technological enthusiasm existed side-by-
side without apparent contradiction. 
What explains the disjuncture between the worldview of the Development text 
and these observations from the field?  In her book Performing Africa, Paulla Ebron 
refers to “The Africa” as “a term that collectivizes Africa and marks the importance of 
representations that fix the continent as a homogeneous object” (Ebron 2002, pp. 1).  It is 
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worth considering, as she does, the many purposes such a conceptual object serves to 
those who employ it.  She highlights both dystopian and utopian engagements with a 
continent that for some represents a failure to modernize and for others represents the 
successful evasion of modernity and its corrupting and constraining forces.  In the UN 
document quoted above, this discursive object – ‘Africa’ – (conflated with a real 
geographical location) is put to use to claim a lack of technology access and competence 
in African societies.  This ‘Africa’ proves useful (as it has many times before) as, “a 
metaphor of absence…against which the lightness and whiteness of ‘Western 
Civilization’ can be pictured” (Ferguson 2006, pp. 2).  Such a metaphor wipes the 
continent clean of ‘technology’ to be reclaimed as a gift of the West extended under 
certain conditions.  It preserves the role and furthers the interests of development experts 
who wish to play a central role in provisioning technology access. 
A silence on emerging and existing technology practices in ‘Africa’ in Western 
discourses relates to the powerful association between Africa, poverty, and development 
in the West that makes it difficult to speak about the continent at all (outside of certain 
small specialist communities) without explicitly addressing issues of development.  By 
difficult, I mean that to speak about the mundanity of everyday life in Africa, of TV 
watching habits or fashion or football fandom lacks a discursive anchor and therefore 
seems to lack relevance.  To analyze everyday technology use in Ghana in a way similar 
to how researchers study technology in industrialized societies in the West seems 
frivolous and marginal in light of the widespread public representations, particularly 
within the media, of ‘Africa’ as a continent in extreme crisis.  How can one speak of 
computers when people are starving?  This message of misplaced priorities is heard even 
among the techno-elite who might otherwise be expected to champion technology for all.  
For example, Bill Gates commented in 2000, “The world’s poorest two billion people 
desperately need healthcare, not laptops” (Helmore and McKie 2000).  The necessity of 
speaking about ‘Africa’ through the lens of poverty and development has a strong impact 
on representations of Africans.  Inhabitants of the continent are portrayed two-
dimensionally as either barriers to development (i.e. corrupt politicians, warlords) or as 
development stakeholders.  As Escobar points out, development literatures have 
historically failed to portray citizens of developing countries as fully realized human 
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beings with agency, cognitive powers, and multi-faceted aspirations that extend beyond a 
development framework (Escobar 1995).  This is not an argument against the reality of 
crisis on the continent.  There are indeed problems of poverty, violence, and 
governmental breakdown in numerous regions.  In terms of technology, the diffusion of 
the Internet and mobile phones in the U.S. and Western Europe as well as throughout 
Asia has so far reached far more individuals per capita than it has in the countries of 
Africa.  The point, however, is that the notion of the entirety of the African continent as a 
place where the material forms we associate with modernity are ‘absent’ creates an 
exaggerated asymmetry that has a long history of use in rhetorical strategies that are 
meant to benefit the interests of Westerners.  Ghanaians themselves expressed how this 
asymmetry has a negative effect on how they, as Africans, are perceived outside of the 
continent.  It also has consequences for how and to whom development funds are 
allocated. 
A similar invisibility of technology practices taking place throughout the African 
continent has, for a long time, been the case in academic disciplines but for wholly 
different reasons.  In anthropology, holistic studies of everyday life in non-Western 
societies were historically the modus operandi.  In the past, by seeking out remote 
societies, ethnographers were able to find differences and diversities in systems of 
kinship, work, exchange, religious ritual, the supernatural, etc. in human societies.  
Through juxtaposition with their home society in the West, anthropologists were able to 
generate innovative new forms of social critique.  In light of this academic project, to the 
extent that societies were interconnected (i.e. by shared media and imported goods) and 
therefore potentially derivative was uninteresting to scholars.  Subsequently, the field’s 
methodological underpinnings have undergone major changes for many reasons, not the 
least of which was the criticism that this focus on difference was a way of constructing an 
‘other’.  It also reflected a nostalgia for an imagined purity and authenticity that relied on 
the fictitious notion of autonomous cultural origins (Rosaldo 1989; Gupta and Ferguson 
1997).  The culturally hybridized and rapidly urbanizing cities of the southern 
hemisphere did not at first hold much appeal or even seem to be methodologically sound 
sites for fieldwork.  The study of ‘modern’ practices including technology consumption 
 9
that were often concentrated in these urban settings could become a focus only after this 
changed.  
By contrast, technology has been examined, debated, and documented as a social 
phenomenon in the West from the very birth of the social sciences, from the industrial 
revolution all the way to the dot.com boom.  Such attention has yielded an abundance of 
primary documents that prevent the vast technological past of the Western world from 
being either remote or invisible to contemporary analysts.  Technology in the West has 
been a major preoccupation in public discourse; in the mainstream media, in government, 
and in academic work in the social sciences.  Technology has served as a central image in 
various domains of life and death from modern warfare to modern medicine.  It has been 
employed in visions of capitalist efficiency and advantage in the business world as well 
as tied to improvements in convenience and cleanliness in home life through domestic 
technologies.  Technology has played a leading role in the totalizing, teleological 
mythologies of the rise of Western civilization.  The innovation and diffusion of these 
tools have been treated as tangible, material evidence of the triumph of Enlightenment 
thinking in the West (Misa et al. 2003) and as a source of nationalistic pride (Marvin 
1988; Hughes 1989).  Various phases of technological development have been described 
as leading periodically to total economic and social reorganization creating new eras and 
societies: the Industrial society, the Atomic Age, the Information society, the Network 
society (Bell 1974; Castells 1996).  The prominence of this powerful mythology has 
generated great interest among artists, writers, and intellectuals many of whom have 
described equally universal and epic visions of the role technology would play in the 
downfall of humanity2.  The well-documented history of debate about technology in 
popular and academic forums in the West has built a solid foundation of source materials 
accessible to academic work.  A corresponding documentation of technology 
appropriation and use, of both indigenous and foreign innovations, was lacking until very 
recently in discussions about ‘Africa’. 
By focusing on the emergent adoption and use of Internet cafés in Accra, Ghana, 
this thesis documents what is present rather than lamenting what is absent at one 
particular spot on the African continent.  This is not, however, an attempt to show how 
use of the Internet is evidence that Ghanaians are no different from Westerners.  This is a 
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common way that critics overcompensate in questioning the media and development 
trope of ‘Africa in crisis.’  For example, an American technology expert working in 
Ghana spoke about the misrepresentation of ‘Africa’ in an interview where he 
commented that, “…so much is wrong in terms of how Africa is represented.  Yeah there 
are terrible things going on in Africa, but it’s one part of Africa and there’s probably 
90% of Africa that’s just boring and like everywhere else.  You know, supermarkets and 
airplanes flying around.”  Notably, his choice of examples were equally unrepresentative 
of ordinary life in Ghana where few of the people I encountered were able to do much air 
travel (and if they did it was certainly not treated as boring) and none bought food at any 
of the city’s supermarkets that catered primarily to expatriates.  Similarly, in a 
development context, existing users of ICTs in developing countries are sometimes 
described as ‘elites’ (i.e. Mwesige 2004).  This serves as a way of dismissing their forms 
of technology use by implying that they are the members of society who either lack 
significant problems or are essentially westernized and can therefore be expected to use 
technology in already established ways.  This thesis seeks to navigate an alternate path 
that does not succumb either to an absolutist identification or non-identification between 
Africans and Westerners in the dialogue over new technologies. 
The process of Internet appropriation in Accra had its own trajectories that could 
not be readily identified by Western templates.  Through the use of the Internet, 
Ghanaians developed new knowledges about the technology.  These new knowledges 
arose from the unique intersection of forces – global, local, virtual, symbolic, and 
material that define the particular milieu of technology consumption in Accra.  The 
chosen fieldsite has some distinctive and novel properties and is a place where issues of 
technology appropriation have not previously been explored by researchers.  But the 
contribution this thesis attempts to make does not rest on a simple comparison, noting 
Ghanaians alternate and unexpected interpretations of technology in contrast to a more 
dominant Western world of high-tech development and dissemination.  It also looks at 
processes of connecting or disconnecting that were enacted between these Internet users 
and the Western world through activities such as Internet scamming.  This study draws 
upon models of post-coloniality and other theories that are fundamentally relational.  This 
approach brings out some of the implications for ‘development’ practice advancing the 
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concept of ‘socio-technological momentum’ (in Chapter 6) as a little used resource of 
existing technology expertise and motivation among users.  Looking at the enactment of 
connections and disconnections also addresses issues central to technology studies (in a 
sociological vein), particularly the matter of international technology ‘transfer’ and the 
consequences of uneven processes of technology diffusion within and between societies.  
This unevenness is taken up in the concept of the ‘Digital Divide.’  While I’m 
sympathetic to the focus on social justice in this debate, the tendency to reduce this to 
economic and technical concerns, issues of technology provisioning, and matters of 
public policy has resulted in the neglect of some important, related processes.  I will 
argue that a particularly intractable dimension of this ‘divide’ is found in the breakdowns 
and dysfunctions of cross-cultural interaction within the new connections made possible 
by the Internet.  This thesis will document several processes through which access or lack 
of access, connection or disconnection is produced and enforced socially by both nearby 
and distant social agents. 
There is a relevant body of theory in the field of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) and related work on consumption theory that has not yet been connected to issues 
of ‘technology and socio-economic development.’  Work in these areas model the 
relationship between developers, users, and technologies in various ways.  In relation to 
socio-economic development issues, it is the activities and agency of the targeted 
beneficiaries of development interventions, the ‘users’ and potential users that is 
particularly under-theorized.  To address this problem, this thesis will explore the matter 
of user agency and technology appropriation in a part of the world that has frequently 
been the target of various forms of development assistance.  This work is facilitated by a 
framework for thinking about user agency that is inclusive of a broad range of practices 
carried out by these ‘users,’ from the hands-on manipulation of the machine to the work 
done to define the Internet in church sermons, rumours, and other social processes.  This 
framework will be elaborated in the following sections. 
 12
  
Dimensions of the Empirical Case 
 
To begin, it is useful to highlight some of the distinctive characteristics of this 
fieldsite as a space of technology appropriation that mark it out from previous case 
studies in STS.  One main concern addressed by past research is the question of how 
technologies end up taking on their particular material form and identity and in what 
ways this is a social process.  The choices researchers make about what cases to examine 
affect the theories that are consequently derived.  From case to case, these studies vary 
according to what space they occupy in (at least) four dimensions: (1) the particular 
technology under examination (2) the posited roles and relationship between ‘users’ and 
‘developers’ of the technology and other groups (3) the technology phase (development, 
early use, or widespread diffusion) (4) the location(s) of the study (laboratory, home, 
office, leisure environments, online, etc.).  Researchers have been able to develop and 
critique theories by altering these dimensions in their own empirical studies thereby 
illuminating some of the assumptions underlying previous work.  They work with 
different definitions of technology and different models of the ordering that exists 
between technology developers, users, and the rest of society.  Consequently these 
critiques build on past work, in part, by showing how much more variation there is in the 
terrain of technology development, diffusion and use than was previously supposed.  
According to these dimensions, several characteristics of the Internet café scene in 
Accra make it a distinctive subject of empirical research.  First, it is a case of technology 
transfer, a study of a set of imported technologies designed largely in the West with one 
set of ideas about users moving into and being used in a wholly unanticipated locale.  
This set of imports includes end-user products: the desktop computer, computer monitor, 
accessories, and software.  It also includes infrastructure technologies such as networking 
equipment (routers and servers), network software, as well as the standards that define 
the Internet.  Howes taking a consumption theory approach describes this movement of 
goods across borders as a disruption in the cycle of production-exchange-consumption 
such that, “the culture [goods] ‘substantiate’ is no longer the culture in which they 
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circulate” (Howes 1996, pp. 2).  The consequences of such a displacement are quite 
unpredictable.  The end-users of the Internet in Accra specifically were at a great social 
and geographic distance from and maintained no direct communication with those who 
originally designed these imported technologies.  Furthermore, these users were not 
considered part of what the high-tech industry defines as the market for such 
commodities.  This particular process of technology distribution contrasts with many 
previous studies that have examined how through various mechanisms including 
marketing, public debate, and user research, developers and users have been able to exert 
a reciprocal influence. 
Those who employ these foreign high-tech commodities in Accra including local 
ISPs, telecommunication company offices located within Ghana, and Internet café 
owners are all positioned as consumers in some sense.  At the same time, within Ghana 
this chain of providers alternately play a role as developers of the Internet for the 
Ghanaian market.  Foreign corporations responsible for developing and supplying the key 
pieces of equipment needed to access the Internet were notably absent.  There was no 
local Intel advertising campaign or sales office in Accra and no Apple store.  Instead, 
local intermediaries including small-scale resellers and diasporic family social networks 
played a primary role in equipment provisioning largely outside the purview of these 
corporations.  These informal technology supply methods were embedded in the moral 
economy of diasporic families.  A lack of documentation of these circulations meant that 
much of the electronic equipment that ultimately ended up in Ghana would be accounted 
for in marketing data as British or American technology consumption.  This was another 
way that the technology adoption practices of Ghanaians were rendered invisible. 
Another characteristic of the Internet in Accra is its early phase of diffusion.  The 
Internet remains something of a novelty and its future entrenchment is still quite 
unpredictable.  The newness of the Internet in Ghana means that many hold onto the 
enticing possibility that it might yet effect a total transformation of society.  In 
industrialized nations, by contrast, much of the utopian thinking about the Internet’s 
revolutionary potential has settled into the mundanity of checking e-mail and shopping 
online, practices embedded in ordinary daily routines (Bakardjieva 2005).  Access to the 
Internet has diffused extensively in the West becoming almost universal, while in Ghana 
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it remains a way of distinguishing oneself from one’s peers as a more cosmopolitan and 
connected individual. 
Nearly universal access to the Internet in the West vs. its recent arrival in Ghana 
is a matter of concern from a ‘development’ perspective where the differential in phases 
of diffusion is conceptualized as the ‘Digital Divide.’  The way the ‘Digital Divide’ is 
conventionally conceived places a frame around the ‘negative space,’ the gaps and 
absences in the developing world thereby discounting and ignoring emerging and existing 
technology practice in places like Ghana.  Such a framing excludes consideration of users 
and local technical competency.  This divide was conceived in the beginning (although 
this is now changing) as a binary between those who had access to technology as opposed 
to those who did not.  This thesis, taking a relational perspective, looks instead at the 
complexity of representations and interactions within established connections, 
particularly between Ghanaian Internet users and non-Africans online.  Internet users in 
Accra found in inhabiting these virtual spaces that they were forced to make 
accommodations to meet with the already established norms and social practices in 
cyberspace.  When they did not they faced sudden, often unexplained exclusion.  The 
delayed diffusion of the Internet in Ghana meant that Internet users in Accra encountered 
spaces of interaction online that have already been staked out and normalized before their 
arrival. 
A final distinguishing feature of this study is the particular technology under 
examination.  The Internet is a particularly thorny ‘object’ to define.  It evades any 
conventional definition of a technological artefact.  The Internet fits a number of 
definitions.  It can be described as a language outlined by a set of documents (called 
RFCs3) that are maintained by an international body.  The standards contained in these 
documents, their distribution, and importantly the global agreement and adherence to 
these standards by technology manufacturers, service providers, and system 
administrators are the seed that generates the coherent Internet that users interact with.  
The Internet is also, in another sense, a vast assemblage of servers and routers all 
communicating with one another in this language.  The mutual comprehensibility of the 
language spoken by a server in the U.S. and another one in Timbuktu, Mali is the 
infrastructure that paves the way for a system of global communication and information 
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distribution.  The realization of the Internet also depends on the individuals and 
organizations who participate in this system providing content, offering themselves as 
chat partners, etc.  These descriptions of the Internet give only a small picture of this vast 
and complex technology, but point out the extreme contrast between the Internet and 
other types of technologies studied in the past by social scientists, such as the bicycle or 
microwave that are more ontologically apparent having a perceivable weight and 
substance.  Unlike the Internet, those objects are multiple and (typically) individually 
owned.  The open-endedness of the Internet, the way its collective material development 
is delegated worldwide amongst people who might or might not identify themselves as 
either developers and/or users and its dual status as both tool and place (Poster 1995), 
culture and cultural artefact (Hine 2000), media and object (Silverstone et al. 1992) tests 
the parameters researchers use to define technology. 
 
Un-defining Users, Developers and the Boundaries of the Technological Object 
 
The direction this research took was guided by questions about the capacity for 
these users to change the technology itself.  Through what processes were they able to do 
so, on what scale was this change effective, and what exactly was the Internet they 
produced?  And reciprocally, what capacity did the technology have to change its users, 
through what processes, and who in the end was the ‘user’ it produced?  In the course of 
exploring these questions, notions of ‘technological change’ (a term that proved to be 
malleable enough for these purposes) had to be redefined as well as the relationship 
between ‘users,’ ‘developers,’ and the technological object.  A question foregrounded by 
a concern with socio-economic development was whether this ‘user’ was someone who 
considered themselves to be living under better (or even different) conditions with the 
incorporation of the Internet into their everyday lives.  And how did users model 
‘development’ and relate technology to this model?  I was similarly concerned with limits 
on the capacity for these users to act and effect desired outcomes through an engagement 
with the technologies and what form these limits would take – whether human, 
technological, mental, or institutional.  Addressing questions of ‘socio-economic 
development’ via an examination of this ‘co-construction of technologies and users’ 
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(Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003) was intended to yield a reinterpretation of debates about 
‘technology for development’ and the ‘Digital Divide.’ 
The peculiarities of this particular fieldsite as described in the previous section, 
made many existing theories of ‘user agency’ inapplicable.  Therefore, in order to 
proceed with this analysis I sought to devise a framework borrowing and incorporating 
various points of theory into a conceptualization of what constitutes technological change 
and the users’ role within it.  The outcome is a much broader notion of the role users play 
in constructing technology than most existing models.  The coherence of the concepts of 
‘change’ and ‘user agency’ employed in this thesis rely on a particular way of defining 
the technological artefact that rejects conventional thinking about its boundaries as self-
evident and fixed.  This ambiguity of the Internet as an ‘object’ has already been raised in 
the previous section making a theoretical argument along these lines easier to envision.  
The purpose of this framework is to define the spaces and modes of action that can (and 
should) be attended to in order to understand how users alter technology directly and 
indirectly, individually and collectively. 
This framework for examining user agency draws, in part, from Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) that proposes a symmetrical relationship between all actors in socio-
technical processes including humans and non-humans (Callon 1999)4.  Certainly this 
radical symmetry extends to the roles of developers and users.  The genealogy of such a 
perspective can be traced back to the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) model 
(Pinch and Bijker 1984; Bijker 1995) and its reconsideration in feminist studies of 
technology.  The SCOT approach made an early contribution to models of user agency by 
asserting that users or consumers of a technology could effect technological change and 
were not merely passive recipients of the fruits of technical progress.  Users played this 
role by persuading developers to enact desired changes.  The archetypal example was that 
of the bicycle, whose pneumatic tires were the outcome of public debate (carried out in 
newspapers among other venues) over safety (Bijker 1995).  This notion of technological 
change referred to the creation and arrangement of internal mechanical components and 
not to what a technology symbolizes or how users choose from among a range of 
possibilities the technology presents.  Ultimately, the power to make physical changes to 
a technology was conceived as the province of developers working in a formal role.  
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Hughes in a similar theory of technological systems extends this capability to a number 
of roles including engineers, managers, politicians, and financers (Hughes 1987).  All of 
these roles are those of formally recognized and legitimated decision-makers.  The SCOT 
and systems approaches introduced a notion of user agency that modelled an 
asymmetrical relationship between the roles of user and developer. 
Feminist approaches in technology studies were some of the first efforts to look at 
spaces of technology consumption and to question the privileging of formal development 
environments in studies of technology development.  This shift in focus was a 
consequence of the fact that, “…women as a sex were distant from the laboratories, 
drawing offices and board rooms from which decisions about new technologies were 
emerging” (Cockburn 1992, pp. 36).  Cowan, for example, studied the ‘consumption 
junction’ referring to the point where consumers made decisions for or against the 
purchase of a particular technology from among a range of options (Cowan 1987).  She 
highlighted a form of consumer-driven technological change focusing on how and why, 
from a constellation of technologies, some items become accepted and some are rejected 
and forever disappear from the market.  Feminist researchers also expanded the canon of 
technologies under study to include domestic technologies such as microwave ovens 
(Cockburn and Ormrod 1993) and stoves (Cowan 1987) that were disproportionately 
used by women.  The study of microwave ovens was spread across several domains and 
locations of technology development and change and looked at the process chaining 
together engineering work, test kitchens, retail spaces, and homes (Cockburn and Ormrod 
1993).  The effect of these efforts was an expansion of the spaces and actors considered 
relevant to the success or failure of particular technologies. 
Studies of technology consumption, particularly of the time period just after a 
technology is first encountered by consumers, demonstrated that these spaces could be 
dynamic and unpredictable like the inventor’s workshop, scientist’s laboratory and other 
sites of technical work and innovation that, up until that point, were more commonly 
studied.  In both spaces of technology production and consumption individuals seek to 
create knowledge and build systems through the manipulation of materials.  This work in 
spaces of technology consumption forwarded a broader definition of technological 
change as a matter of choices made by users about a world of products rather than just the 
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material evolution of a single item.  This redefinition of ‘change’ was an important 
inaugural step towards more direct questioning about how to define the boundaries of a 
technological object. 
Cowan’s argument for the ‘consumption junction’ drew on a network approach 
(with reference to ANT theorists) to demonstrate how a study centred on the consumer 
could produce a wholly different understanding of who and what is responsible for the 
way technology development and diffusion processes take place.  While early work on 
Actor-Network Theory often involved the study of people in formal development roles, 
such as scientists and engineers, it proved to be a particularly flexible theory that was 
illuminatingly applied to diverse settings from scientific innovation in 19th century 
microbiology (Latour 1984) to the maintenance and use of water pumps in Zimbabwe (de 
Laet and Mol 2000).  A SCOT approach by comparison circumscribed processes of 
technological change to a brief window of time.  Strictly adhering to SCOT principles, 
one would presume that Internet café users in Accra were incapable of impacting 
technological change.  Their lack of influence would be attributed to their delay in access 
to a point in time after formal development phases have completed and to a lack of 
communication with developers working in a formal role.  Since ANT presumes no such 
a priori roles for user and developer both laboratory work and the spaces of Internet use 
in Accra, Ghana can be studied in the same way.  The principle of symmetry incorporated 
into the framework that guides this analysis treats the construction of knowledge and 
artefacts as taking place through the same activities regardless of where the ‘actors’ are 
located and regardless of their role. 
The thinking that blurs a distinction between developer and user is in line with 
recent trends in technology design that have further challenged a hierarchy or asymmetry 
between roles.  Programmers, particularly of networked software, now often delegate part 
of the development process to users.  How the role of user and developer and the 
relationship between the two is performed also relates to the particular technology under 
consideration as has been noted by Akrich (1992) and de Laet and Mol (2000).  For 
example the design of software to manage a nuclear power plant will not be akin to the 
design of a multiplayer online gaming environment.  The former will by necessity be 
quite regimented and focused on predicting, controlling, and minimizing all possible user 
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choices to avoid deadly mistakes whereas the latter will be designed to maximize choice 
so that the game will be self-sustaining and endlessly creative and absorbing.  
Programmers now often intentionally provide space for alternate and unpredicted 
interpretations and material changes through use5.  Technologies designed for this sort of 
extensibility depend on a relationship of cooperation between developers and users rather 
than a feedback cycle in which limitations on users are further extended and refined (i.e. 
Woolgar 1991a).  Much of what makes up the Internet can be characterized as extensible 
since it is comprised of a large set of open standards, a hallmark of the technology.  The 
recent preponderance of extensible systems is evidence of a shift in thinking away from 
planning models of human action in user-interface design that were notably critiqued by 
Suchman (1987).  Such thinking resulted in innumerable artificially intelligent, expert 
systems including the notoriously unhelpful (although certainly cute) Microsoft Clippy.  
Developers in many circumstances now actively provide ‘construction tools’ for users 
hoping and celebrating the way users take it in previously unimagined directions. 
The movement towards collaboration in network environments and of extreme 
user configurability, as described above, still suggests a relationship where technology 
developers are gatekeepers who delegate power to users or withhold it from them.  To 
fully incorporate this principle of symmetry in the activities of users and developers 
requires a redefinition of the technological ‘object’ and its boundaries.  The notion of 
relational materiality from ANT builds on the assertion of symmetry in roles by 
explaining how different positions within socio-technical orderings can be considered 
symmetrical.  By adopting this property of relations, the activities of ‘user’ and 
‘developer’ can be studied as precisely the same sort of work. 
The concept of relational materiality in ANT (Law 1999) asserts that a single 
object has a definition and identity exclusively through its association with other entities 
and the object is therefore boundary-less.  The term ‘entity’ is applied to technologies and 
to all humans and non-humans in the material and natural world.  No entities 
meaningfully exist in isolation, but only as part of an assemblage (Callon and Law 1997; 
Latour 2005).  These assemblages are what make a computer a tool for household budget 
management to one user and a tool for testing factory equipment to another.  Users 
fundamentally construct the technology through the work they do configuring and 
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assembling it with other entities.  Through this configurational work, users act as 
‘heterogeneous engineers’ (Callon and Law 1997) to bring a particular technology 
together with other technologies, materials, people, media, etc.  We perceive such an 
‘object’ as detached from its surroundings and as having characteristics that are intrinsic, 
but this is a perceptual simplification and these characteristics are a product of relations.  
Through the concept of relational materiality, the object is turned inside out.  The work 
that produces it is understood as taking place externally to what we perceive as the 
object’s boundaries.  Technological change through this concept of relational materiality 
is not limited to ‘technical’ work or only to the activities that have to do with configuring 
mechanical components in the object’s interior. 
Adopting ‘relational materiality’ into the framework that guides this research 
means that the methodological object can be understood as the larger system constructed 
by users that the computer and Internet is made a part of.  Lally provided an example of 
this approach in her study of domestic computer use where she described how various 
objects (including computers) were brought together by inhabitants in the home in order 
to construct a, ‘machine for living’ (Lally 2002).  The computer was defined not simply 
in terms of its components: the motherboard, the hard drive, etc. but in relation to other 
items in the home.  This configurational innovation should not be understood as the 
make-do strategy of disempowered technology consumers who were blocked from truer 
methods of invention.  Suchman makes an observation that supports the symmetrical 
treatment of ‘users’ and ‘developers’ when she points out that among insiders to formal 
development processes in the high-tech industry there was an awareness that, “’new’ 
technologies comprise reconfigurations, extensions and other modifications of elements 
already in circulation” (Suchman 2005, pp. 381).  Technological change can be 
accomplished through the configuration of a single object (as in setting the preferences 
on a piece of software) and it can involve bringing the technology together with other 
entities (Fleck 1999; de Wit et al. 2002; Lally 2002; Shove 2003; Suchman 2005).  It is 
not a supportable assertion to distinguish technology ‘developers’ as building ‘from 
scratch’ from ‘users’ who ostensibly do not.  All participate in the work of reconfiguring 
and assembling.  In keeping with this model of the users’ role, the analysis carried out in 
this thesis works to identify the various entities that Internet café users ‘assemble’ to 
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define the Internet and, more importantly, to describe the practices, unfolding over time, 
through which this  ‘assembly’ work is carried out. 
One implication of turning the technological ‘object’ inside out to understand the 
productive capacity of users is that fieldwork need not be chained to the machine or even 
the immediate environment of its use.  A practice that alters any part of the assemblage 
(although we may perceive it to be external or even distant from the ‘object’) can 
redefine the technology.  The researcher may follow connections and circulations 
extending out from the perceived ‘object’ into entirely new spaces.  The relationship 
between a technology, its users and society is not defined solely at the human-machine 
interface.  Engagements with the machine interface, as understood through this 
framework, are not given a special material privilege over other forms of activity. 
The need for a broader framing (and a challenge to the special privilege accorded 
to direct human-machine interaction) was confirmed by observations from an early 
period of fieldwork.  In a series of interviews, I was told stories by Internet café users 
about how the Internet worked and what it was useful for that did not at all match their 
personal experiences at the computer interface, as they themselves admitted.  A model of 
how ‘big gains’ could be realized by making contact with foreigners through the Internet 
circulated in rumours and other forms among Internet users.  Users seemed to believe 
whole-heartedly in such a model and acted in accordance with this belief in their 
activities at the Internet café and their forays online.  They did so without any direct 
experiences with the machine that would fully validate such a model.  Therefore other 
modes of engaging with the technology were clearly informing the construction of utility.  
I was able to locate various forms of social interaction between people (including 
rumours and schoolyard play among youth) that played a role in constituting the Internet.  
Where conflicts existed between personal experience and these models of the technology, 
users often showed a preference for the models.  This upended the notion that direct 
manipulation of the technological artefact had a special material concreteness that would 
make it the privileged mode for users to gain an understanding of technology and its 
utility. 
One consequence to this research of the move out and away from the user 
interface is that the work of constituting the Internet in Accra came to be understood as a 
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collective, social process taking place amongst users and non-users rather than taking 
place only or primarily through an individual’s direct manipulation of and reasoning 
about the machine.  Studying these social processes further supports the symmetrical 
treatment of users and developers by showing how ‘users’ as well as non-users do more 
than interpret technology for themselves, they also produce the technology for others.   
There is an opposing model of the relationship between users and developers that 
needs to be addressed to clarify the conditions that make it possible for the activities of 
‘users’ to be considered a production of the Internet, not just for themselves, but for 
others.  An alternate model maps developers and users onto a distinction between 
production and consumption.  In such a model, developers as ‘producers’ make decisions 
that are materialized through a manufacturing apparatus that replicates and disseminates 
artefacts to many consumers.  Each product bears the developer’s mark, materializing 
their design decisions in precisely the same way.  Users, by contrast, situated as 
‘consumers,’ make their own interpretations that redefine the ‘object,’ but do not produce 
it for anyone except themselves.  This distinction is implicit in the concept of ‘technology 
as text’ (Woolgar 1991a; Woolgar 1991b; Akrich 1992, Akrich and Latour 1992) that 
addresses how designers imagine users and inscribe them into the material form of a 
technology.  Users in turn, interpret and may subvert these inscriptions through a process 
of de-scription.  There are limitations with any metaphor and the image of textual 
immutability and linearity in the ‘technology as text’ model.  The Internet, by contrast, is 
literally a text continually being made and remade by ‘users’ for one another.  A common 
critique of the ‘technology as text’ model is that it closes off a reciprocal capability for 
inscription by users for developers or for other users (Mackay et al. 2000). 
What goes unstated in an argument where users are treated as interpreters only 
and not producers of technology is the legitimation of one particular apparatus of 
technology manufacturing - assembly-line and digital duplication processes.  These 
processes facilitate an exact and universal replication from a developer’s prototype.  Yet, 
not all commodities are made in this way and the Internet, as a totality, cannot be 
considered an output of just this one form of production.  The ‘symbolic investment’ of 
technologies as well as user configurations and contributions to centralized databases are 
all examples of how a commodity is ‘produced’ in multiple ways.  The assembly-line 
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does not produce all of the technology, but only a part.  To preserve an understanding of 
‘users’ as producers of technology, the scope of technological change must be considered 
variable.  Users often do not have access to these universal mechanisms of production 
and they consequently produce the technology for a subset of other users.  How to 
understand this scope and its limits will be worked out in the substantive body of this 
thesis and revisited in the conclusion through the concept of “technology cultures.” 
Woolgar’s consideration of the ‘moral order’ between user, developer, and 
technology is a useful bridge between Science and Technology Studies proper and a 
recent interest among those studying technology with broader theories of ‘consumption’  
(i.e. Silverstone and Hirsch 1992; Lie and Sorenson 1996; Mackay 1997; Miller and 
Slater 2000; Lally 2002; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003; Monteiro 2004).  Woolgar describes 
as a “moral order” the particular relationship between users, developers, and 
technologies, perceptions of how firmly bounded they are (or should be), and ways of 
attributing characteristics as well as “rights and responsibilities" to these entities 
(Woolgar 1991a, pp. 66).  There are different implications for the entities in one ‘moral 
order’ versus another.  Woolgar goes on to work out one such order in the way 
technology developers imagine and ‘configure’ users in their technical work seeking to 
circumscribe users’ activities.  His effort is, in part, to show how the machine itself 
participates in defining social relations through its material form.  Social scientists and 
historians who study technology also construct moral orders through their writing.  In 
fact, their arguments can be understood as attempts to show the importance of figures 
who are missing and marginalized in conventional accounts, a strategy of retrospective 
empowerment via text.  In reviewing a number of these orderings I have argued that these 
efforts went far, but sometimes not far enough to anticipate how the users of Internet 
cafes in a West African capital city might also serve as agents of technological change. 
Research in the domain of ‘consumption studies’ is concerned with ways of 
understanding the ‘moral order’ acted out in production-exchange-consumption relations.  
There is a similar compatibility between ‘relational materiality’ in ANT and an 
engagement with semiotics that can be found in two leading exemplars, Bourdieu’s 
Distinction (1984) and Douglas and Isherwood’s The World of Goods (1979).  The focus 
of such work was originally on the acquisition and possession of objects, symbolic 
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display, and of exchange relations.  In relation to the study of ‘moral orders’ of users, 
developers, and technologies, what marks out this work is its concern with how the 
‘social self’ is produced through relations with material goods.  Bourdieu’s account, for 
example, describes the production of class distinctions through consumption practices.  
This ‘moral order’ centres not on the commodity (as STS studies of technology 
development often do), but on the ‘user/consumer’ and how that role is produced through 
relations with commodities. 
The turn to consumption studies acknowledges that technology is a particular 
form of material culture, one that could be consumed in ways both similar and different 
to clothes, food, sacred objects, cars, fine art, and less tangible ‘materials’ like 
information or media imagery.  This particular approach to technology studies has 
forwarded, from the very beginning, a more active conceptualization of the individual 
consumer.  This approach evolved, as Miller points out, in a very general sense as a 
reaction to Marxism and to theories of structuralism in anthropology that viewed 
members of society as essentially without agency, as acting out an a priori social 
structure (Miller 1987).  This role for consumers moves beyond acknowledging consumer 
choice.  What is done by consumers with an object after purchase is examined as a rich 
practice, a creative process of appropriation.  However, the role of consumers in this 
process is not without limits.  Although they can act or can interpret objects and media in 
multiple ways, this does not mean they are faced with limitless opportunities or are not 
faced with constraints or counter-forces exerted by more powerful actors.  Ultimately an 
inability to move into a desirable relationship with a technology or any other commodity 
remains a real possibility (Miller 1987; 1988). 
Studies of technology that apply theories of consumption work also with a broad 
definition of technological change that understands ‘symbolic investment’ as another 
important ‘production’ process that constitutes technology.  The meanings imbued in 
technological artifacts are changeable and may be altered by users and other groups.  
They can be expected to vary over time and over the demographic and cultural terrain of 
technology appropriation.  This again highlights how the scope of technological change 
can be thought of as variable.  A common approach is to analyze how the news media 
and advertising attempts to construct technologies for users (Haddon 1992; Hubak 1996; 
 25
Mackay 1997; Lally 2002).  Lally, for example, looks at the way advertisements of the 
Apple personal computer attempted to reframe the technology through domestic imagery 
to encourage consumers to think of it not as an office machine, but as a robust device 
supporting sociable, home-centred family activities (Lally 2002).  But it is not only the 
representational domain of advertisements and other texts where symbolic work is done 
on and with technologies.  Early theories of consumption focused on how commodities 
themselves serve as a physical instantiation of cultural categories (Douglas and 
Isherwood 1979; Bourdieu 1984; McCracken 1988).  The meanings invested in objects 
may bear an arbitrary relationship to what is known about the objects materiality and its 
practical uses, although this distinction is problematic and has been too often 
overextended.  A more integrated reading of technology’s symbolic and social role, 
practical uses, and material imperatives will be proposed as part of the framework that 
guides this research. 
Consumption approaches altogether question an active/passive dichotomy that 
divides developers and users.  They also break down an absolute division between the 
technology and the user arguing that they are interdependent entities.  They place a 
central focus on how the social self is constructed through relations with the material 
world.  Therefore in the quest to understand how the ‘user’ is reciprocally constituted by 
technology, the models proposed by theories of consumption prove useful.  Consumption 
is the process, “by which society reappropriates its own external form – that is, 
assimilates its own culture and uses it to develop itself as a social subject” (Miller 1987, 
pp. 17).  This is a process of co-construction where both the user and the commodity 
develop.  Miller’s argument does not fuse the two, but it does question a too clear 
distinction between human and non-human entities and any assertions of unidirectional 
causality, supporting neither the social construction of artefacts nor the technological 
determinism of social behaviour. 
Consumption studies propose a model of technology acquisition and use that is 
not reduced to a pure instrumental utility grounded in material imperatives.  This 
approach is focused on ‘meaning,’ technology’s role in relations between people, and 
more specifically, the processes of establishing social status.  It explores a particular set 
of ‘moral orders’ that are of special interest to social scientists (sociologists and 
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anthropologists in particular).  Yet there is a static feeling to those particular approaches 
in ‘consumption studies’ that conceive of the material world simply as a carrier of 
cultural meanings casting off all other roles.  A more recent trend in consumption studies 
seeks to reunite meaning with purposive action steering away from the passivity of 
notions of symbolic display and the tendency in past approaches to overemphasize the 
acquisition and exchange of commodities and neglect the complexity and particularity of 
their functionality and use.  The research on practice in consumption theory (Shove 2003; 
Warde 2005) moves the focus into a post-acquisition phase noting that “consumption 
occurs within and for the sake of practice” (Warde 2005, pp. 145).  This approach, by 
centering on practice, is able to overcome a tendency to treat the utility value of 
technology as absolutely distinct from its sign value.  The consumption of a commodity 
constitutes the user not simply through proximity to a possessed object and its attributed 
meanings, but in the temporal activities of using it.  And practices generate and frame the 
motives that drive consumption. 
Drawing from these practice theories of consumption, this analysis of Internet 
café use in Accra focuses on documenting, in each substantive chapter, different practices 
that play a key role in how users make sense of the Internet.  Up to this point I have 
spoken about the work users do in ‘assembling’ systems that come to define the Internet 
without elaborating on what that means except to suggest that it can take place ‘outside 
of’ and in relation to the artefact in question rather than exclusively through alterations 
within the object’s perceived boundaries.  The verb ‘assembling’ itself sounds much 
more mechanical and instrumentalist than the processes of making meaning and 
informing action that will be analyzed in this thesis.  Processes that ‘assemble’ orderings 
are highly varied.  It is not a matter of purchasing, corralling, or otherwise acquiring 
things into a static, atemporal collective.  These processes unfold over time through 
coherent practices.  Their order and situational logic is illuminated by the narratives 
people produce that draw out how they see the relationship between ‘things’ in their 
world and how they correspondingly act.  People understand relations in all sorts of 
widely-recognized patterns.  ‘Cause and effect’ is one of these patterns.  They can 
descriptively elaborate on affiliations distinguishing, for example, between ‘love,’ 
‘seduction,’ and ‘witchcraft.’  Ideas about ‘witchcraft’ (to take one particularly ‘local’ 
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example) arose from time to time in Accra demonstrating how different groups model 
human behaviour in quite unique ways.  This thesis will examine and describe several 
forms or genres of practice unfolding over time that came to define the Internet in Accra.  
Importantly, this definitional work is accomplished, in part, through the mass media and 
in forms of face-to-face communication that (Spitulnik 2002) refers to as ‘small media’ 
where people negotiate a new technology outside of direct interaction with the machine.  
That kind of work also impacts what users choose to do at the machine interface and what 
options they close off from consideration.  Speech about technology is an integral part of 
the embodied and material activities that will be explored in the substantive sections of 
this thesis.  It is incorporated into the flow of activity that alters and redefines the 
Internet. 
The framework for understanding ‘user agency’ in this thesis draws from these 
recent insights into how consumption takes place within practice.  It also takes seriously 
Sahlins argument that efforts to act come down to matters of “meaning” that precede 
utility (Sahlins 1976) and this thesis will show how through practices, the way humans 
act in coherent ways in the world, this meaning is developed.  Sahlins argues against 
integrating the social and material by merely showing how material objects are used in 
social relations (i.e. to define social status).  Both practice theories of consumption and 
Sahlins’ work focus on the issue of use and the characterization of ‘utility.’  Sahlins takes 
on the issue of utility by noting that this dimension of an artefact cannot be read from 
material properties alone, but is derived from its “cultural encompassment.”  This means 
that the processes undertaken by Ghanaian Internet café users yield and manipulate 
“meanings” that in turn define functionality (rather than being additional to it).  By 
centering on the way ‘meaning’ is determined and linking this to the question of utility 
there is no longer a need to distinguish between ‘symbolic’ and ‘practical’ uses of a 
technology.  They are ultimately part of one continuous and self-reinforcing process.  To 
do this also requires a deft touch with language and speech treating them as part of 
technology appropriation processes rather than as a separate and privileged domain of 
‘symbolic’ work. 
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The Role of Language in the Production and Circulation of Meaning 
 
This thesis places a central focus on users’ attempts to construct the Internet as a 
meaningful tool in Accra, but at the same time seeks to redress the way meaning is 
treated in some theories of consumption.  One problem is the artificial separation of an 
objects ‘utility’ from its communicative, symbolic role (Sahlins 1976).  This distinction 
has been drawn in two main ways, one that favours the material and one the symbolic.  
One argument is that ‘utility’ arises from the concrete materiality of an object alone and 
the symbolism that comes to be attached to the object is merely an obfuscation of its 
utility (Slater 1997).  A similarly problematic, but opposing distinction is found in 
consumption theories that put aside the specific materiality of objects in considering their 
social role (i.e. Douglas and Isherwood 1979; Bourdieu 1984).  Instead objects are 
described as substantiating ideas or values that are seen as bearing an arbitrary 
relationship to the material form of the object.  Miller (1987) suggests that this tendency 
arises from an overextension of linguistic methodology to the study of material culture.  
He notes that language by its very nature associates arbitrary signs and sounds with 
things, ideas, and meanings.  However the material world with its particular concreteness 
can not be treated in the same way.  Supporting this point, Miller notes that humans can 
perceive distinctions amongst objects in the material world in a much richer way than can 
be expressed by language.  
Where symbolism is treated as detached from materiality and functionality, 
technology is thought to have a bearing on expressive identity only through a static 
notion of display.  Following from this distinction, some examinations of technology that 
draw on consumption theories have misleadingly positioned identity in opposition to 
action (i.e. Lie and Sorenson 1996; Monteiro 2004) and technology’s sign value as 
disconnected from its utility value (i.e. Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003).  Yet, new and 
complex technologies like the Internet highlight the importance of more closely 
considering the issue of utility.  The uses of the Internet are non-obvious to those 
encountering it for the first time and are part of what users determine through a process of 
sense-making and appropriation.  In Ghana, rather than being external to utility, what the 
Internet symbolized (futurity, wealth, foreignness) shaped perceptions of this 
functionality and consequently affected patterns of use. 
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A common approach to addressing technology’s meaning is through the analysis 
of communication about technology, for example through textual and image analysis of 
advertisements (Hubak 1996; du Gay et al. 1997; Lally 2002; Nakamura 2002).  This 
work is used to illustrate a world constituted through language, but does not connect this 
to how these meanings are consumed and redeployed in everyday practice, what bearing 
they have on the technologies they represent or the users they speak to.  To counter this 
detachment between technology representation and technology practice, throughout this 
thesis I will pay particular attention to what instances of language, particularly speech 
acts, do to the Internet and to users.  What meanings about the Internet circulate amongst 
Internet users in Accra and by what mechanisms do they reach these users?  How are they 
deployed and with what material outcome?  The purpose of asking these questions is to 
bring these language-based acts back into the range of actions taken in relation to a 
technology instead of treating them as a separate representational world.  Research in 
media studies has demonstrated the unpredictability of how audiences appropriate and 
deploy the text and imagery of TV, newspapers, radio, or online sources (Miller 1992; 
Silverstone 1994; Ang 1995; Ginsburg et al. 2002).  Not all media messages are received 
by individuals or interpreted in the same way.  Media representations do not travel intact, 
but are taken apart, selectively remembered, and reinvented. 
Language was explicitly described as an important tool by Internet users in Accra 
in a variety of domains.  Speech, in particular, held multiple roles in the process of 
Internet appropriation.  In interviews, Internet users recalled speech events that took place 
online and offline.  One type of consequential offline speech act was the rumours told 
about Internet fraud.  These rumours emerged as a particular media form that Internet 
users relied on to make sense of this secretive and ephemeral phenomenon that many had 
little direct experience with.  Online, a conversational style of speech rendered as text 
was the central format for social interaction.  Chat interfaces were the primary tool used 
on the Internet, particularly among teenage and twenty-something users. 
Language was used as a social sense-making and information sharing mechanism 
among Internet users and was also perceived as a form of power.  This power came from 
both language competency and language style.  Competency was the ability to speak 
English which meant the ability to be comprehended by powerful and resource-rich 
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foreigners online or offline.  Style was a further dimension that involved adeptness with 
the language.  The ability to persuade was part of style and was something expressed, for 
example, in the careful selection of words to woo a love interest.  Language and speech 
as power also related to common forms of spiritual practice in Accra highlighting 
parallels in the ritual aspects of Internet use and religious practice.  Through ritualized 
speech acts in traditional religions, spirits could be summoned to work on one’s behalf.  
Furthermore, one’s enemies, witnessing these speech acts against them, could be cowed 
into submission.  In Pentecostal Christian churches throughout Accra, speaking in 
tongues was evidence of deep faith.  In all cases speech acts registered a force, having 
effects both on social relations on the human plane of existence and in the supernatural 
realm.  Therefore language and speech tied together human, virtual, and supernatural 
spheres in Ghana. 
The matter of language style has been highlighted in post-colonial studies.  Franz 
Fanon pointed out how linguistic mannerisms and dialects taken up by citizens of French 
colonies were a way of manipulating identity.  He saw the adoption of colonial languages 
by colonial subjects as a way of “assuming a culture” that had once subjugated them.  
The rejection of the local language was therefore a form of self-hate that divided the self.  
The continual use of a particular language can have the effect of working over the 
speakers identity, independently of what is actually being said (Fanon 1967).  In 
accordance with Fanon’s observations, Ghanaian Internet users sometimes employed the 
discourse of ‘African crisis’ to seek sympathy.  Among Internet scammers this was a 
common scamming strategy that sometimes led to conflicted feelings about performing a 
false and unflattering identity for what they perceived as the ignorant and narrow 
presumptions of foreigners.  Language as expressed in the speeches made and documents 
written in the development industry is interesting for related reasons.  Its silence on 
matters of existing technology practice in Africa and vociferousness on matters of 
technology’s potential is connected to rhetorical strategies, but ones that take advantage 
of a representation of Africans as lacking and helpless. 
An Actor-Network Theory approach to describe the work Internet users do is in 
many ways compatible with a closer consideration of how various acts of speech are 
deployed to constitute a new technology.  When Internet users speak about the Internet or 
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when they speak to chat partners on the Internet or even when they speak in other 
domains this does something to the assemblages they are building with the Internet.  
There is some precedence in the ANT literature about what instances of language 
accomplish (Latour 1987; Callon 1991).  In Latour’s discussion of scientific papers he 
illustrates how, through the associations constructed in sentences, an assertion can be 
rendered less or more factual.  When authors refer to other scientific papers as supporting 
their argument, the author recruits allies.  In contrast, by associating a scientific ‘truth’ 
with its origins in a laboratory process it can be rendered less factual. 
Theorists have made efforts to reconceive ANT outside of the scientist’s 
laboratory and inventor’s workshop as a more general theory of the social (Law 1994; 
Latour 2005).  The social, in a nutshell, is defined as the associations between non-social 
entities.  Through these associations ‘assemblages’ are built that are heterogeneously 
composed of humans and non-humans.  These assemblages do things like prove scientific 
facts (Latour 1987), create a new law, or form something tangible like a bridge (Suchman 
2000).  However, Latour argues that the social is only fleetingly visible and only at the 
moment when new associations are being made, when the assemblage is unstable.  
Studies of science and technology take place in dynamic and unstable environments 
where associations are constantly being formed and altered, therefore by ANTs 
definition, the social is often visible in these spaces.  This is a contrast to previous 
sociological work in more stable, unchanging environments that has relied on a priori 
categories (such as class, politics, or the market) to understand and define social 
phenomena.  Latour calls this past approach the sociology of the social and argues that a 
sociology of associations (aka Actor-Network Theory) despite its origins in science and 
technology studies provides a way of rethinking all other domains of sociological 
investigation (Latour 2005).  His argument directs sociologists towards examining points 
of change where previous assemblages are breaking down and new ones are in the 
process of being built. 
Although ANT approaches and some theories of consumption both draw from 
semiotics, the relationality of ANT does not treat the material world as only a language-
like symbolic system.  Instead it re-centres the material world as a force with a bearing on 
matters of the social.  ANT is both notable and controversial for including non-humans – 
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machines, animals, texts, institutions, parasites – among the entities that constitute the 
social.  Non-humans are described as full members of society endowed with a force and 
an ability to act just as humans are.  This claim was founded on the observation that 
social order and social effects could not be explained purely as an outcome of the 
activities of the human body such as speaking, fighting, and touching.  Law notes that, 
“…some materials last better than others.  And some travel better than others.  Voices 
don’t last for long, and they don’t travel very far.  If social ordering depended on voices 
alone, it would be a very local affair” (Law 1994).  The extension of social order across 
greater expanses of time and space relies on texts, machines, and other durable non-
humans.  Therefore to understand social orderings, the materiality of things cannot be 
minimized.  ANT also re-centres everyday action as the matter of social study.  Actor-
Network Theory proposes that assemblages must be constantly performed to accomplish 
their social effect.  On the matter of meanings expressed through language this 
emphasizes that what is expressed is not as important as when and where it is expressed 
and the effect of these linguistic acts. 
However, critiques of ANT have particular relevance to the study of Internet café 
use in Accra.  Descriptions of how the social is constituted are accomplished by tracing 
the relationship between entities forming an assemblage.  Yet, whatever is excluded from 
the assemblage is treated as irrelevant.  This is true from a perspective within the 
assemblage, but not from the viewpoint of the excluded.  In this case of technology 
transfer, the emergence and diffusion of the Internet initially took place without the 
inclusion of the individuals in Accra and their delayed inclusion is of material 
consequence.  Star highlights this as a problem of membership, where from one 
perspective an assemblage looks stable, but from another it does not (Star 1991).  
Furthermore, ANT in its rejection of a priori social categories is also inadequate to the 
task of explaining or addressing longstanding patterns of difference and disadvantage.  It 
provides no language with which to address issues of gender (Cockburn 1992).  And 
similarly it provides no language for issues of race.  ANT suggests the social inertia of 
something like race-based disadvantage or prejudice could be an effect of durable non-
humans that carry social orderings across time and space. 
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One way this thesis attempts to address issues of race and prejudice without 
throwing ANT over entirely is by doing ANT-style description of Internet use in Accra 
that is not limited to ultimately successful assemblages, but also attends to failed attempts 
and to disconnects.  Internet users narrated both what they attempted and what ultimately 
they were able or unable to do with the Internet.  The matter of failed assemblages as they 
constitute exclusions touches on issues of race and disadvantage.  The experiences of 
Internet users in Accra include cases where they were refused membership (such as in 
online environments) and where their attempts to recruit allies were rebuked with an 
explanation that pointed to race and nationality.  One significant disconnect addressed in 
this thesis is between Internet users and development institutions (chapter 6).  These two 
separate assemblages produce and are produced by distinct and contradictory circulations 
of meaning about the Internet. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The elements of a theoretical framework for understanding user agency that were 
outlined in this chapter were developed throughout the research process working back 
and forth between the theoretical literature and field data.  These insights shaped the 
working dimensions of the fieldsite and helped to define primary research questions.  
This study of Internet cafés in Accra, Ghana ultimately is a study of technological change 
brought about by users.  The framework that guides and supports this assertion starts with 
a symmetrical treatment of the activities of users and developers.  Their activities are 
both fundamentally capable of constructing technology.  Drawing from Actor-Network 
theory and the notion of ‘relational materiality,’ the work of constructing technology is 
defined as taking place outside of the perceived boundaries of the ‘object’ in the way it is 
assembled with other ‘entities’ through various practices.  The process of enacting these 
associations defines the object.  This work is carried out by users both ‘inside’ the 
Internet in its many cyberspaces as well as ‘outside’ of it.  The scope of this technological 
change is not universal, but users do have the capacity to construct the object for other 
users.  Users are not limited to interpreting the technology for themselves alone.  The 
 34
scope of the changes they are capable of enacting and who exactly they produce the 
Internet for will be a focus in following chapters. 
As a particular instance of technology, the Internet lends itself particularly well to 
this exploration of technological change through use.  Its lack of clear boundaries is 
apparent.  It fails the definition of ‘object’ from the very beginning.  The Internet is an 
assemblage of global scope made up of millions of computers and people, routers, 
servers, modems, telephone and cable lines, and most importantly standards that define 
how these computers can talk to one another comprehensibly.  It also is not an ‘object’ 
whose existence can be attributed to a clear and finite set of developers.  It is as much 
defined by the cyberspaces that are an output of the textual work of millions of users as it 
is by its infrastructure. 
By proposing an alternate ‘moral order’ between developer, user, and technology 
through a symmetrical approach, questions of marginalization and of the ‘Digital Divide,’ 
issues of how race and racism relate to technology appropriation can be considered anew 
following from the experiences and social commentary of users.  It is therefore an 
attempt to reset the research agenda on ‘technology for development’ issues.  A new 
order proposes new ways to think about these important social issues in ways that go 
beyond the question of access to technological artefacts or an assumed dependency upon 
‘gatekeepers’ in the corporate high-tech sector to create appropriate technologies for 
these citizens of the developing world.  By flattening the field in this way, the full extent 
of what users are able to do with the technology for themselves can be examined 
uncovering, at the same time, some of the hard and immutable limits. 
The following chapters in this thesis are primarily dedicated to examining the 
assemblages that users build or seek to build, their ‘machines for living’ (Lally 2002) that 
incorporate the Internet.  The term ‘living’ refers to both matters of subsistence and 
matters of fulfilment.  The question of technology appropriation is a question of where 
and how users place the Internet within those self-made systems.  It is also a question of 
what existing resources users are able to bring into association with the Internet.  The 
resulting ‘machines’ provide insights into how Internet users in Ghana (most often in 
their teens and twenties) envision ideal lives for themselves and how they go about 
pursuing these ideals.  Through their construction of the Internet they seek wealth, 
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business and migration opportunities, spouses and education.  If they are school-aged 
boys they seek admiration and camaraderie from their schoolmates.  Through ‘machines 
for living’ Internet users construct their identity as they want it communicated to others. 
The relentless focus in this thesis on the capacity for and limitations of user 
agency on the matter of technological change is, in part, a strategy for resisting a 
‘development’ framing of the issues.  This ordering attributes a predictable and universal 
determinist force to technologies.  It constrains the agency and potential for insight 
among citizens of developing nations by absorbing and reconfiguring it to accord with 
Development truisms.  As noted at the beginning of this chapter, this way of ordering the 
world has rendered invisible existing technology practices in ‘Africa’.  The topics given 
primary weight in this thesis are not defined according to the priorities set forth by 
development, but reflect issues collaboratively raised and discussed in interviews with 
Internet users in Accra.  There are substantive chapters therefore on youth identity, fraud, 
and religion and not on favoured development subjects such as health or democratization.  
Development priorities are established according to an intra-institutional logic that 
Internet users in Accra do not participate in.  Instead, through the experiences relayed by 
these Internet users, an alternate narrative about the Internet and about Africa is 
produced. 
 
 
1 A selection of recent media reports juxtapose imagery of an archaic ‘Africa’ with the transformative 
potential of the mobile phone.  They include, “In War-Torn Congo, Going Wireless to Reach Home: For 
Poor, Cellphones Bridge Digital Divide” (July 9, 2006) Washington Post.  IEEE Spectrum Online refers to 
Africans “dialing into the 21st century” in an article titled ‘Africa Calling’ published in May 2006.  Also 
“Phone Revolution Makes Africa Upwardly Mobile” (March 4, 2006) Times Online - 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2068420,00.html and “The Real Digital Divide” (March 13, 
2005) in The Economist.  On the BBC website there is, “Rural Africa Joins Mobile Revolution” (December 
6, 2004) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4036503.stm  
2 Brey (2003) points to Marx, Weber, and Habermas.  Also Marcuse and Simmel (on the tragedy of culture) 
are theoretical reference points.  None had sufficient imagination to foresee technologies move from tool of 
capitalist production to consumer entertainment product and from commodity to network. 
3 RFC stands for ‘Request for Comments’ 
4 This is not to be confused with the ‘principle of symmetry’ in early work on the Sociology of Science 
which suggests that the knowledge claims of scientists be treated in the same way whether they are 
successful or unsuccessful (Bloor 1976) rather than treating successful claims as the product of ‘objective’ 
reason and unsuccessful ones as the product of social, political, or economic forces.  This idea of symmetry 
was extended by Pinch and Bijker (1984) to the consideration of technologies that succeed or fail. 
5 see Howard Rheingold’s book Smart Mobs (2002) for a multitude of examples of ‘users’ as creators of 
technology.  Other recent examples of this trend include Wikipedia and weblogging.  The latter is an 
extension by user/developers of the capabilities of the language of web page design – HTML.  While the 
rapid diffusion of network connectivity certainly has pushed this movement in technology design and 
                                                                                                                                                 
development along, there are earlier examples as well as efforts to analyze the flexibility of technological 
artefacts in the hands of users.  For an example in an African setting see de Laet and Mol (2000) on their 
analysis of several designs of water pumps in Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 2  Methodological Issues in an Urban and Virtual Fieldsite 
 
A significant feature of my fieldwork experience was the striking way that I was 
approached, shouted at, beckoned, and greeted ‘obruni, obruni’ (meaning white 
person/foreigner) everywhere I went in Accra.  While these greetings were almost 
universally friendly they prompted an uncomfortable sense of conspicuousness.  This was 
partly due to the urban setting of my research where I continually encountered new 
people and never became an expected part of the setting.  On a daily basis I was asked to 
explain myself, my reasons for being in Accra, my profession, my country of origin.  I 
was often asked, ‘what is life like in America?’ and ‘How do you find Ghana?  What do 
you think of Ghanaians?’  When I attended social events, the proceedings were altered by 
my presence.  I was seated in the front, sometimes on a stage and pulled into dances and 
fund-raising rituals.  Once at a youth group event I was asked to give an impromptu 
motivational speech.  So much for being ‘a fly on the wall.’ 
The overwhelming amount of attention I experienced and the eagerness with 
which I was approached indicated two things that had methodological consequences.  
First, it forced a reconsideration of what was meant by my role as ‘participant’ in the 
fieldsite.  I could not realistically think of myself as having an equivalent role to those I 
was studying since I had been assigned the role of foreigner from the moment I entered 
the field.  This had a significant effect on the way people interacted with me, the subject 
matter they chose to speak to me about, and the way they spoke and presented 
themselves.  Therefore, my methods and analysis needed to incorporate a full and direct 
engagement with all of the ramifications of my heavily connoted position as a young, 
white, unmarried, foreign woman within the fieldsite.  The knowledge about the Internet 
gathered in interviews and observations in this alternative participant role was therefore a 
‘situated knowledge’ (Haraway 1991). 
The general interest among Internet users in Accra in what was foreign points to 
the second methodological issue of defining the fieldsite in spatial terms.  The challenge 
was to be reasonably specific about the fieldsite while taking into account the seemingly 
external or mobile forces that were part of the way Internet appropriation and use was 
defined in Accra.  The attention I received and the questions I was asked such as ‘what is 
life like in America?’ reflect the outward-looking orientation of many of the people I 
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encountered in Accra.  The everyday lives and aspirations of Internet users, in particular, 
were oriented by virtual and imagined geographies, that of cyberspace, as well as mythic 
notions of America and Europe.  The material world and the mediated messages that 
urban residents of Accra encountered and were surrounded by came from diverse, 
ambiguous, and/or multiple locales near and far.  They incorporated these materials into 
the construction of their idealized identities.  This meant that the spatial terrain of this 
research could not be conceived of in conventional terms as a bounded fieldsite where 
cultural forms could be explained and analyzed referring only to phenomena fully 
contained within narrowly specified territorial boundaries.  Studying the use of Internet 
cafés did not mean studying only what went on within the Internet café or within the city 
of Accra.  Instead it was a social phenomenon that transgressed the boundaries of the city 
and country. 
To address these methodological challenges of space and perspective I have 
defined my fieldsite as a heterogeneous network.  This network included portions of the 
Internet, but also the road network of Accra, and the social networks of Internet users that 
were connected by a multitude of communication technologies.  To conduct research in 
this fieldsite as network, I positioned myself at various fixed points starting with Internet 
cafés.  I intercepted the flow of messages and goods through the network, many coming 
in digital form through the Internet, but also along more traditional routes such as rumour 
networks.  Furthermore I studied the network by moving with people along roads 
between fixed points in the city.  This also involved addressing my role as foreigner by 
examining the position in the network that was allotted to me by Internet users and others 
I encountered in Accra.  While the fieldsite as network is a continuous whole in the sense 
that one can get from one point in the network to any other point it is also a partiality 
since the points in the network (in fact, in any heterogeneous network) expand infinitely 
outward and a decision must inevitably be made by the researcher about how far to 
follow these connections. 
The advantage of defining the fieldsite as a network is the ability to cover a vast, 
but continuous terrain while remaining relevant and specific to the social phenomenon 
under study.  The result of the study conducted in this way is a rich, holistic 
representation of the social phenomenon.  At the same time this representation avoids the 
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mistake of conflating holism with completeness since the network is conceived of as 
extending beyond the specific points, intersections, and circulations that are examined.  
Therefore the network as fieldsite strikes a careful balance, making it possible to develop 
rich forms of knowledge while avoiding the oversimplifications of completeness and the 
false dichotomy between local and global. 
 
Strategies Underlying the Selection of Internet Cafés as a Fieldsite 
 
Internet cafés were the starting point of this ethnography of a network.  So it is 
necessary to explain how they were selected and why Internet cafés in Ghana specifically 
were chosen.  From the very early stages of this research it has been conceived of as an 
ethnography.  This decision was based partly on a desire to maintain continuity with 
other similar studies of Internet appropriation in order to be able to contribute to some of 
the themes generated in these studies (Silverstone and Hirsch 1992; Turkle 1996; Miller 
and Slater 2000; Lally 2002).  It was also partly an effort to diverge from the 
methodological approaches of past technology for development studies that employ pre-
determined survey categories and universal ‘readiness’ indicators in their research efforts.  
These processes impose a structure that creates blind spots to incongruous local 
situations.  They also tend to focus narrowly on particular projects through feasibility 
studies, needs analysis frameworks, and other highly structured research practices that are 
peculiar to development circles.  Consequently, much less energy has been directed 
towards understanding existing patterns of technology diffusion and related processes of 
communication and information management in the developing world.  Therefore an 
ethnographic approach was employed as part of an effort to formulate a critique of the 
development literature. 
I am interested generally in the appropriation of the Internet throughout Africa.  
However it was necessary to narrow my focus down considerably by selecting a fieldsite 
that would be manageable in scope.  In the interest of contributing some new insights to 
the literature on this issue I sought a fieldsite that had the potential to challenge much of 
the received wisdom about Internet use in Africa.  Firstly, that the Internet was not being 
used to any notable degree in Africa.  Secondly, that if it was being used it was only 
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through the philanthropic efforts of development projects largely funded by foreign 
capital.  Thirdly, that beyond development projects, the Internet was only being used by 
the most wealthy and privileged members of society.  These are the presumptions implicit 
in a number of texts produced by the UN and its connected agencies and in much of the 
academic literature on technology for development in Africa. 
The bulk of my fieldwork took place in Accra, Ghana’s capital city, however I 
began with a period of preparatory research conducted on technology use among 
Ghanaians living in London.  I did 17 interviews that took place, in most cases, in the 
interviewees home.  I also participated in a variety of social events including a hometown 
association and a clan association meeting.  I went to a Sierra Leonian wedding with a 
Ghanaian couple, I attended church services at a Charismatic church with a dominantly 
Ghanaian membership and I went to the Notting Hill Carnival where Afro-Caribbean 
ethnicity and cultural traditions are publicly celebrated.  This work was not drawn on 
heavily in this thesis1, but does inform some of the analysis related to migration and 
migratory aspirations.  Following this preliminary work I relocated to Accra to begin an 
extended study of Internet cafés and the owners, operators and users who inhabited these 
spaces. 
Accra emerged as a good location to conduct this type of research for several 
reasons.  It was logistically feasible since Ghana was an open society with a stable 
government that has escaped much of the violent upheaval of its neighbouring countries.  
In addition English was widely spoken in the urban capital.  Mainstream media reports 
indicated that Internet and mobile phone use were in a significant upward trend in Accra.  
One article described how hundreds of small Internet cafés were cropping up throughout 
the city2.  Several other articles highlighted unconventional technology development 
projects being implemented in Accra that provided an alternative to traditional 
government and NGO technology access programs3.  Geekcorps was one of these 
projects.  It was conceived of as analogous to Peace Corps but focused on providing 
technology experts from the West to educate, train and assist Ghanaian businesses.  The 
second was BusyInternet, a large Internet café that was guided by a social mission to 
bring technology access and training to the masses, but was also being run to generate a 
modest profit in order to sustain itself.  While these media reports suggested a variety of 
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interesting activities taking place in Accra, the development literature did not reflect an 
awareness of these trends.  For example, while a certain segment of this literature argued 
for the importance of deregulating the telecommunications industry, there was little 
attention being paid to the outcomes in places, such as Ghana, where this deregulation 
had by and large already taken place. 
Despite these indications of rising technology use, Ghana was far from being a 
particularly prosperous African country, like South Africa or Egypt.  In fact it was among 
18 countries that the World Bank has identified as a Highly-Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) and targeted for debt relief.  Therefore the Internet in Ghana was a case of 
technology appropriation under conditions of widespread poverty, but in a generally 
peaceful setting with few government restrictions on information access.  It therefore 
presented a counter-example to the presumed link between economic prosperity and 
technology use. 
Public Internet cafés had the potential to counter all three of the presumptions 
about the Internet in Africa mentioned above.  The sheer number of Internet cafés in 
Accra (estimates suggested there were somewhere between 500 and 1000 (Foster et al. 
2004)) indicated significant and widespread Internet use.  The fact that they were 
privately-owned and run as for-profit businesses indicated technology use outside of 
development interventions.  By charging hourly rates they provided access without 
requiring any financial overhead potentially attracting customers who were not wealthy. 
Internet cafés in Accra therefore presented an opportunity for exploring how far 
Internet use had penetrated urban society in Ghana beyond the domain of the wealthy, 
well-educated elite by offering a less expensive and less restricted form of Internet 
access.  It was a priority of this research to ascertain (if possible) a social discourse on 
ICT use that was not determined by the most privileged members of society alone.  More 
expensive forms of Internet access including private connections at home and in offices 
were available in Accra and it is important to emphasize that Internet cafés were not the 
only locations where Internet access was available.  However, in defining the fieldsite, 
sites of private technology consumption have been purposefully excluded from 
consideration.  The likely consequences of excluding Internet use in homes and 
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businesses is the inclusion of fewer elites in this research and less emphasis on the part 
the Internet plays in formal, professional-class medium and large businesses in Accra. 
The spaces and places within Accra where my feet have literally tread serve as a 
useful starting point for describing the fieldsite in concrete terms.  First and foremost, I 
spent time in a variety of Internet cafés.  There were logistical reasons for this as well as 
reasons discussed above that related to my research questions and the existing literature 
on Internet use and international development.  Internet cafés served as an ideal place for 
exploring the issue of Internet appropriation because they were publicly accessible sites 
of concentrated interaction with new technologies making it easy to recruit people for 
interviews and observe behaviour online and offline.  Internet cafés served as a home 
base and meeting point for further explorations into the surrounding neighbourhood 
where I sought to better understand the lives of Internet café users by following them to 
their homes, churches, and businesses.  Beyond these enclosed spaces, I also spent time 
hanging out and passing through the streets and other interstitial spaces.  I travelled to 
and from these urban sub-spaces through the larger city on foot, by tro-tro4, and by taxi. 
Ghana’s capital city is composed of a variety of neighbourhoods with large 
differences in demographic characteristics.  These differences stem from Accra’s 
particular history of migration trends, urban planning (or lack thereof), ecological 
changes, agricultural history, and political episodes among many other factors.  In this 
context of urban diversity, my guiding principle in selecting Internet cafés and interview 
subjects was to explore the greatest possible range of Internet users and uses.  In one 
sense my ethnography was multi-sited; I intended to select 4 Internet cafés (but ended up 
frequenting 6) in various neighbourhoods to yield a maximally diverse set of users and 
uses.  This was based on the presumption that Internet cafés largely drew their clientele 
from people living or working nearby. 
The demographic profiles of the first two neighbourhoods where I selected 
Internet cafés to study exhibited striking dissimilarities.  The first café was located in an 
area on the outskirts of Accra named La Paz that was not densely populated.  Residents 
on average were neither particularly wealthy nor poor in relation to the rest of the urban 
population.  The Internet café was located on a partially paved road.  Only people living 
nearby frequented this Internet café since it was near no major attractions, main roads, 
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markets, big businesses, nightclubs or tourist sites.  The neighbourhood was interesting as 
a fieldsite that was somewhat bounded, where the everyday lives of Internet café users 
were typically contained within the neighbourhood.  There were fewer strangers 
circulating through this area of La Paz than was the case in more urban settings. 
A second Internet café named Mobra International Ventures was situated just off 
a busy main road in a neighbourhood called Mamobi located in central Accra.  Mamobi 
was a more densely populated and poorer area and was home to a more ethnically diverse 
population composed of Akan people (from central and coastal regions of the country) as 
well as people who had migrated from the north of Ghana.  It was also home to a 
significant Muslim population.  In contrast to the café in La Paz, the one in Mamobi was 
in a visible and accessible position near the main road and drew many non-residents who 
were travelling through the area.  Despite the significant demographic differences 
between these areas, there were also essential similarities in both the users (typically 
young men) and the uses of these cafés.  Use was largely limited to using chat software or 
e-mail to communicate with foreigners or family living abroad. 
Due to the lack of diversity among Internet users and uses in these two Internet 
cafés I decided to take an alternate approach to select two more cafés5.  These two cafés 
were located within larger organizations.  The third café, BusyInternet, was the largest 
and, arguably, fastest in Ghana and was part of a social enterprise that sought to provide 
technology access, education, and the exchange of information and ideas to generate and 
support a high-tech industry in Accra.  BusyInternet provided 100 Internet-accessible 
terminals as well as conference space, printing services, office space, and an attached 
restaurant and bar (see figures 2 and 3).  It was not only the largest, but also the most 
expensive Internet café in the city charging 12,000 cedis per hour (approx 70p), about 
twice the typical rate of the small Internet cafés.  It was located on a main road in an area 
with financial firms and many large and medium sized businesses in the technology and 
media industries.  BusyInternet attracted a large number of foreigners including tourists, 
missionaries, businesspeople, students, and NGO workers.  Besides foreigners, I 
observed more middle aged people and more women at BusyInternet than at the other 
cafés.  Beyond the diversity of users, there was also a much broader set of Internet uses 
taking place at BusyInternet ranging from researching business ideas to playing games. 
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I selected a fourth Internet café at the University of Ghana at Legon campus.  This 
café was located in a women’s dormitory and attracted a more highly educated, wealthier, 
and predominantly female clientele.  Like BusyInternet the range of Internet uses was 
quite broad although school research was quite common.  So too was chatting with 
foreign pen pals, reading about broadcast media (such as TV shows), as well as 
multimedia activities such as downloading ring tones for a mobile phone. 
In late January of 2005, some controversy over my presence at the café in 
Mamobi emerged.  Suspicion was circulating among customers that I was conducting 
covert research on behalf of the American government as a CIA agent.  As a result, the 
owner indicated (in so many words) that I should discontinue my visits to the café.  I 
obliged and began frequenting another café named FocusNet on the border of Mamobi in 
an area called Kotobabi.  I added a third café in the Mamobi area named Lambos not far 
from the first that was also located on the main road running through Mamobi.  These 
three cafés were very similar in layout, price, décor, and clientele and I will group them 
together by referring to them as the ‘Mamobi cafés.’  An example of the modesty and 
minimalism of Internet café interiors in La Paz and Mamobi is shown in figure 1. 
In contrast to the cafés in Mamobi and La Paz, BusyInternet and the café at the 
University were interesting because they were embedded within centrally run and well 
coordinated organizations.  At both BusyInternet and the University café, there were top-
down efforts on the part of the café management to provide connections between the 
Internet and various additional services.  Furthermore, both cafés had explicit missions 
that were carried into day-to-day operations either by the customers and their interests or 
through more top-down efforts.  In the case of BusyInternet a close connection between 
the Internet café and the organization was a given since the café by and large was the 
most visible and dominant component of the organization.  In the case of the University 
café this was more open to question since the University was not, by any means, defined 
by the café.  Compared to the cafés in La Paz and Mamobi, these two cafés also had a 
better technical infrastructure with better trained staff, newer computers and faster 
Internet connections making certain forms of high-bandwidth use easier.  The 
organizational connections, unique missions and variety of services had the potential to 
lead to different forms of use and attract more atypical users. 
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 My initial 8-month fieldwork period was followed up by an additional three 
weeks of fieldwork in February 2007.  I was able to reconnect with some of the people I 
had interviewed during my initial stay in Accra.  Additionally, I conducted interviews 
primarily with affluent families about their use of video to document social events such 
as funerals and to mediate relations between family in Ghana and abroad.  The purpose of 
this research was to initiate a broader examination of the urban communicative ecology 
(Tacchi 2006).  Data from this recent trip contributed to a more comprehensive societal 
picture of how Ghanaians see themselves in relation to the West.  In the context of this 
thesis research, these family interviews and home tours also provided some perspective 
on the relative non-affluence of many Internet café users and their families who were 
initially interviewed for this project.  Families that employed the services of a 
videographer typically enjoyed an unusual degree of mobility, a widely dispersed family 
social network, and material affluence that included ownership of land and accumulation 
of electronic goods.  At the same time, they struggled with financial limitations and less 
than ideal family arrangements that involved great periods of absence from the homeland 
and distance between immediate family members.  Video practices were an attempt to 
reconcile such absences.  These practices represent yet another heterogeneous network of 
technology, infrastructure, and social formations. 
 
The Fieldsite as Network 
 
In one sense my fieldsite was the city of Accra since all of the Internet cafés I 
studied, homes I visited, and roads I travelled during my fieldwork phase were within the 
city or its suburbs.  However, the city is paradoxically both too complexly heterogeneous 
(too inclusive) and too geographically limited (too exclusive) as a unit of analysis.  It is 
too inclusive in the sense that it is composed of layer upon layer of intersecting and 
overlapping activity.  Most of this activity, however, had little relevance to my main 
research interests.  In highly complex spaces such as cities it is impossible to define the 
fieldsite with such geographical boundaries and then attempt to study everything that falls 
within.  Instead a way to more selectively define the fieldsite is necessary, outlining its 
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social and material shape within the city, making the social phenomenon visible within a 
complex social space. 
The boundaries of the city are also too exclusive since a variety of locales, 
institutions, and people near and far have a direct bearing on the appropriation and use of 
the Internet in Accra.  For example, the foreign chat partners of Internet café users, their 
family members living abroad, and the immigration regulations of countries such as the 
U.S. and U.K. are among the many external and yet relevant constitutive forces that 
define Internet use in Accra.  Therefore the fieldsite must be defined without relying on 
broad territorial boundaries that are too imprecise to define the contours of the social 
phenomenon. 
The example of the city introduces some of the problems of spatial complexity 
that are central to defining a fieldsite in studies of contemporary, urbanizing, media-
connected societies.  The term ‘fieldsite’ refers to the spatial characteristics of a research 
project, the stage on which the social processes under study are acted out.  For 
ethnographers, defining this space is an important activity done before fieldwork 
commences to identify where the researcher should ideally be located as a participant-
observer.  Once fieldwork concludes, an ethnography cannot be written without at some 
point defining this spatial terrain where the social phenomenon under study took place.  
This is both an act of exclusion and inclusion indicating what the research does and does 
not cover. 
However, the inclusive/exclusive work of defining the fieldsite has become 
significantly more difficult in the past few decades as many assumptions about 
ethnography as a methodological approach have been called into question and as other 
disciplines have begun to apply ethnographic practices to new domains.  In this trend 
towards reflexivity, ethnographers have questioned the traditional reliance on a 
methodological oversimplification that constructs the fieldsite as a bounded space 
isomorphic to a whole culture and conceived of as self-contained (Gupta and Ferguson 
1997).  In the anthropological tradition the place of fieldwork was frequently a village.  
This simplification has proved to be particularly untenable in new ethnographies of the 
media, cyberspace, migration, and global institutions such as the United Nations and 
multi-national corporations.  All are examples of phenomena that leave a complex and 
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ever-changing footprint on vast geographic spaces.  Some studies of cyberspace in 
particular have taken this idea to the furthest extreme arguing that this space is 
incompatible with notions of geographic spatiality (Batty 1997).  Instead cyberspace is 
described as an alternative geography existing on a separate virtual plane.  This is often 
tied to the post-modern claim that Cartesian space has been entirely transcended in our 
current era (Harvey 1990). 
Beyond the issue of boundaries, the notion of cultures as internally homogeneous 
has also been called into question.  Hannerz argues that cultures vary in complexity and 
that various aspects of culture may have an uneven impact on members of a society 
(Hannerz 1992b).  In this process of calling into question both the boundedness of culture 
and the homogeneity of its diffusion, researchers have shifted from a notion of culture as 
essentially stationary to culture as constituted by intersection and flow (Appadurai 1990; 
Hannerz 1992b; Marcus 1998a).  In this newer conception, movement and mobility of 
objects, of individuals, of ideas, of media, and of the fieldworker herself are attended to, 
uncovering insights missed by studies that assumed culture was spatially fixed. 
This study of Internet appropriation and use is a study of culture, not of a whole 
culture, but rather a particular socio-technical phenomenon as it is complexly articulated 
with various cultural forms.  The difficulty of bounding this social phenomenon arises 
from several conditions.  Firstly, the subject matter is the Internet, a global network of 
machines, information, and people and yet the Internet is too vast be studied as a whole.  
Secondly, this is a study of everyday life in Accra that, beyond the Internet, is lived in the 
broader context of daily interaction with a material and media culture that has ambiguous 
and/or multiple origins.  The distinction between local and foreign goods and media is 
often blurred.  Strategies of naming intentionally render the local more global and the 
global more local.  For example, it is common for businesses and churches to include the 
prestigious term ‘international’ in their name despite the fact that they have no branches 
abroad.  In contrast, region specific advertising (i.e. for soap or beer) purposefully rubs-
out an indication of the foreign source of many products re-inventing them as local 
through imagery and narratives about family, gender, work, and recreation.  These 
ambiguities of origin may be intentional or accidental, either way they serve to thwart 
those efforts to describe culture that employ a dichotomy between local and global. 
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These examples illustrate how everyday life in Accra is oriented towards the 
external world, but furthermore that local and global are meaningless as distinct 
categories.  What was once firmly external has been pulled into the city incorporated and 
hybridized into an infinity of new cultural forms (i.e. language, advertisements, music, 
clothing styles).  Many ethnographies of cultural change while acknowledging that even 
remote cultures are not hermetically sealed have tended to reassert this disjuncture 
between local and global.  They have often valorised these cultures as indigenous and 
pure, bravely weathering and accommodating or resisting the onslaught of foreign 
systems (Gupta and Ferguson 1997).  The mistake in this approach is that it remains 
committed to the notion that cultures have autonomous origins and that these origins can 
feasibly be identified.  It treats cultural change as a new phenomenon in the history of 
global societies.  Marcus proposes that ethnographic accounts must begin to treat cultural 
change in a more complex way acknowledging that cultural formations are defined (not 
just affected) by mobility and circulation (Marcus 1998a).  The construction of these 
formations must be examined as a process that relies on a diversity of resources near and 
far.  This is how the appropriation of the Internet will be treated in this work. 
To reconcile these spatial complexities I have conceived of my fieldsite as a 
network composed of fixed and moving points including spaces, people, and objects.  
This particular fieldsite as network heterogeneously connects a variety of already familiar 
networks such as the Internet, Accra’s road system, phone networks, and the social 
networks of Internet users.  Importantly it treats these networks as interconnected and 
includes only those portions of these existing networks that are relevant to the study.  
Therefore only part of the Internet and part of the city are incorporated into the fieldsite.  
The fieldsite is defined by the connections that can be followed from the Internet café. 
In a ‘fieldsite as network’ the point of origin, the destination(s), the space between 
and what moves or is carried along these paths is of interest.  This is essentially what 
Marcus describes as multi-sited ethnographic research, “designed around chains, paths, 
threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer establishes 
some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited logic of association or 
connection among sites that in fact defines the argument of the ethnography” (Marcus 
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1998b, pp. 90).  He proposes several techniques for defining these paths by, for example, 
following the movement of people, things, metaphor, or story. 
Defining the fieldsite as a network is a strategy for drawing the social 
phenomenon into view by foregrounding it against the social complexity of its urban 
setting.  To foreground is to draw the contours of the phenomenon distinguishing it from 
the competing and intersecting activities also taking place within the spatial field that is 
defined more traditionally by the territorial boundaries of the city.  The term ‘contour’ 
best describes the outcome of this act of foregrounding by indicating that greater 
precision is achieved than would be obtained relying on the boundaries of the city, the 
country, etc.  At the same time this term preserves the quality of irregularity and the 
notion that the social phenomenon is outlined rather than detached from its context. 
One advantage of defining the fieldsite as a network is that it maintains the 
continuity of the space without presuming proximity or even spatiality in a physical, 
Cartesian sense.  It therefore rejects the disjuncture of local and global.  Along these lines 
Strathern notes that, “a network is an apt image for describing the way one can link or 
enumerate disparate entities without making assumptions about level or hierarchy” 
(Strathern 1996, pp. 522).  Continuity implies a sense of holism, but not homogeneity or 
unity.  Instead continuity implies connection.  The continuity of a network is evident in 
the way that any point can be reached from any other point. 
Another advantage to studying the fieldsite as a network is the way a rich and 
holistic account of the phenomenon under study can be generated without making claims 
to completeness.  It is holistic in acknowledging and examining the diverse and 
heterogeneous connections of the fieldsite, but not in the sense of treating the fieldsite as 
a self-contained system.  As proposed in Actor-Network Theory, anything and anybody is 
a network and not only a network, but an infinite network.  Referring to these things or 
people by a single term hides how additional meanings emerge from the collective of 
connected entities that compose it.  Following from this notion, an Internet café is defined 
by all the technologies inside of it and the people and media moving through it.  Those 
technologies and people and media and their movement in turn are defined by 
government regulations, weather systems, other people, and an infinite number of other 
connected forces.  The connections can be followed indefinitely from one place or object 
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or person to another.  Researchers therefore, in studying networks make a decision about 
how far to follow the connections and in what direction. 
To study the fieldsite as a network the researcher must also make a strategic 
decision about what positions to take within the network.  In this study, I sought to trace 
out the fieldsite using Internet cafés as a starting point.  From the Internet café I oriented 
myself in two different directions.  First, by tracing paths through the city defined by 
Internet users to get a sense of their everyday lives.  For example, I followed a young 
woman from the Internet café where she chats with her foreign husband to the market 
where she is apprenticing with a hair dresser in preparation to her move abroad to the 
Western Union office where she receives money from her husband earmarked for the 
purchase of a flashy new mobile phone.  This approach provided a richer sense of the 
interconnections between Internet use and other aspects of Internet users’ lives. 
However, there is also the issue of more distant locales and of spaces more 
geographically ambiguous than the city.  The Internet, its virtual spaces, and the 
geographic places it links together should of course not be neglected as a second direction 
that can be taken by tracing virtual connections from the computers in the Internet café.  
One approach would be to follow messages from their origins in the Internet café to their 
destinations at the points of Internet access for chat partners in any number of countries.  
However, this was not feasible.  Instead I took a second approach as advocated by 
Marcus to study a single site with an awareness of its multi-site context (Marcus 1998b).  
I interpreted this to mean that the Internet café should be treated as a point of intersection 
where the Internet as an idea was produced in part by the conversations and circulation of 
information through these computers.  Studying this point of intersection meant 
maintaining an awareness of the connections from this site to other distant sites as well as 
tracking the movement of real and digital objects and people circulating through the café 
including their history of travel. 
Internet cafés can be thought of as spaces that have momentarily captured people 
and materials from global flows and are sites through which global (particularly digital) 
flows are constantly circulating.  As a point of intersection the digital objects and the 
messages they bear can be intercepted as they move through particular computers before 
the eyes of their recipients in the Internet café.  This provides a way to avoid the 
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unwieldiness of expanding the fieldsite to include whole other countries.  What is most 
relevant in the context this research is what it is from these distant locales that makes its 
way to these Internet users via the Internet or other channels.  What do Internet users do 
with what they receive?  How do they manipulate, redirect or make sense of these items?  
The origins or circulation record of these objects, if available, is also of interest although 
as I have previously acknowledged this is, in many cases, ambiguous. 
Distinct from the fieldsite as a space of research, but no less significant from an 
analytical perspective was the way spatiality was perceived by Internet users.  These 
perceptions produced socially imagined spaces that were significant because they guided 
the aspirations, Internet encounters, and everyday lives of Internet users.  For example, 
Ghanaians constructed a notion of cyberspace and who was in it from their experiences 
and other sources of information.  From conversations it became clear that many Internet 
users conceived of chat rooms, dating websites, and other online spaces designed for 
mixing and mingling as providing access to a diverse mixture of individuals, but 
primarily from wealthier developed countries.  They expected that philanthropists, 
potential business partners, and wealthy older people would have the time and inclination 
to hang out in chat rooms, not just young people.  Based on their experiences, however, 
they tended to encounter teenagers and twenty-somethings in these spaces.  The 
particular technical configuration of chat rooms where the bodies of participants were 
concealed, where ambiguous screen names were used, and where an unknown number of 
individuals could be ‘lurking’ without speaking facilitated such speculative imagination. 
This conception of cyberspace relates to the broader social imaginary of Internet 
café users, “the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit 
together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations 
that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations…the way ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings”  (Taylor 
2002, pp. 106).  By using the term ‘surroundings’ Taylor defines a sense of spatiality 
within this concept.  Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined communities’ is defined as a sense 
of belonging to a larger community of whom one only ever meets a few of the members 
(Anderson 1983).  This concept is contained within the social imaginary.  Ghanaians in 
various ways conceived of themselves as members of global cosmopolitan communities 
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and they valued the Internet for the opportunities it provided in expressing this belonging, 
transcending their location.  In the sense of spatiality as imagined by Internet café users 
in Accra, Internet use went along with the idea of being part of something global – being 
a member of a global community.  This was often paralleled or worked in conjunction 
with being Christian, another form of membership in a global community.  In fact 
Christianity was often used as a common ground for finding like-minded individuals in 
cyberspace as a way to transcend differences of ethnicity, race, and location. 
Geographic territories, places such as foreign countries, were also imagined by 
Internet café users.  Their fantasies were constructed partly from what they encountered 
in mediated form through Internet chat partners, websites, the news media, music videos, 
TV shows, movies, stories told by Ghanaians returned from abroad, encounters with 
foreigners in Accra, and rumours.  The United States as a real space had an impact on the 
appropriation of the Internet in Ghana, most tangibly as the material source for many of 
the technologies that make up the Internet, but also in terms of government regulations on 
foreign immigration that constrained the mobility of most Ghanaians.  However, the 
United States was also a space that was constructed in the social imagination of Internet 
users in Accra as a desirable destination for education and employment and a source of 
enormous wealth.  Certainly the effect of imagined spaces constructed from media 
representations was a result of how frequently they were mistaken for the real thing and 
correspondingly acted upon. 
Imagined spaces are products of sense-making.  They emerge from a process of 
creating spatial order out of partial information.  These imagined spaces are part of the 
fieldsite itself as well as being a product of the fieldsite.  They were produced by Internet 
users through their attempts to put together something coherent out of the messages they 
received about ‘real’ or ‘virtual’ geographic spaces, messages travelling through e-mail, 
television, migration networks, rumour networks, etc.  The sense of spatiality developed 
by Internet users informed their actions and what they put back into the cultural flows 
that define the fieldsite.  As Latour notes, “spaces and times are traced by reversible or 
irreversible displacements of many types of mobiles.  They are generated by the 
movements of mobiles (Latour 1988, pp. 25).”  Examining the way Internet users spoke 
about spatiality, how they explained membership in communities across geographic 
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spaces, and the borders they defined to divide up space is one component to 
understanding how they received and understood the cultural flows that constitute the 
fieldsite. 
I selected Internet cafés as a starting point for research into the appropriation and 
use of the Internet in Accra, but never with the intention of limiting this research to what 
went on inside those walls.  They served strategically as a public space for meeting 
people to interview.  Internet cafés were focal points, points of circulation and 
intersection from which I was able to expand outward tracing the contours of the social 
phenomenon of Internet use.  I accomplished this both by following the movement of 
Internet users through the city and by intercepting the flow of media through the Internet 
as it arrived in the Internet café.  This made it possible to narrow the scope of the fieldsite 
considerably while still acknowledging how forces from various locales near and far 
registered an impact on the setting. 
 
Interviews and Observation 
 
Those who inhabited Internet cafés generally fell into one of three main roles.  
First, the Internet café owner was the person who had acquired the financial capital to 
start the business and was therefore usually overseer of the café’s operations.  The second 
role was the Internet café attendant.  At smaller cafés there were usually two attendants 
working at the same time.  Their responsibilities included keeping track of the time users 
spent on the computers, handling payment, helping users to get online and navigate the 
Internet, and dealing with basic computer problems.  Some cafés also provided a few 
additional services such as typing and burning CDs.  The third group were Internet users 
who made up the bulk of my interviewees.  I interviewed 60 Internet users in total, 9 
Internet café attendants, and 6 Internet café owners. 
I used Internet café attendants and owners as an initial point of contact at each 
Internet café and usually began by interviewing the individuals in this role.  During or 
after the interview I requested permission from the owner to approach users in the café 
for interviews.  When the owner was out of the country or impossible to contact I 
sometimes obtained permission from the Internet café attendant.  My overall intent in 
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recruiting interviewees was to seek maximum variation of Internet users and uses.  I 
began by approaching individuals at random usually visiting the cafés before noon trying 
to arrive at these air conditioned oases before it was too hot outside.  The random 
approach was initially successful, but as time wore on I found I had talked to quite a few 
young men and that I was hearing a lot of repetition in my interviews.  Most of these 
users were seeking pen pals and meeting people in chat rooms.  In order to generate 
greater variation I made two changes to my recruiting strategy.  First, I started arriving at 
the cafés later in the day, often after dark to get a good mixture of people working 
different shifts, unemployed people and students.  My second strategy was to use a 
snowball sample asking Internet café attendants and users if they knew of anyone who 
was doing something ‘interesting’ with the Internet. 
Using this approach I completed 75 interviews (see table 1) recording 61 of these 
on tape.  In the case of about a dozen of the people I interviewed I was able to develop a 
certain amount of rapport that made it possible to meet the individual again on several 
occasions to watch them use the Internet, to meet their family, and perhaps even meet at a 
third location such as a workplace.  However, many of my requests for interviews were 
evaded or refused.  Those who I had arranged to interview sometimes simply neglected to 
show up.  With many of these individuals I rescheduled the interview only to be stood up 
once again.  I learned in my other interviews and casual conversations that some of the 
Internet café users thought I might be working for the CIA.  I can’t say for sure what the 
rationale was for those who refused interviews, but I presume it was related to this fear or 
a more general suspicion about my intentions.  It is likely that some of the people who 
refused to be interviewed were engaged in or knew about illegal Internet activities or 
refused to talk to me out of a sense of community solidarity. 
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Sky 
Harbour 
at La 
Paz 
Mamobi 
cafés 
BusyInternet 
on Ring 
Road 
Volta café 
(U. of 
Ghana at 
Legon) 
Misc. 
cafés Total 
Unknown 2 1 3 0 0 6 
age 11 to 20 0 10 2 1 0 13 
age 21 to 30 12 10 12 8 2 44 
age 31 to 40 2 3 3 0 1 9 
age 41 to 50 0 0 2 0 0 2 
age 51 to 60 1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Men 13 19 14 4 2 52 
Women 4 5 8 5 1 23 
       
Total 17 24 22 9 3 75 
 
Table 1 - interviews by age, gender, and Internet café affiliation 
 
I was also able to interview a number of Internet users who admitted to doing 
Internet scams or fraud.  These interviews had to be specially arranged outside the normal 
flow of recruiting and interviewing since these admissions never came out in the course 
of an ordinary interview.  This was likely due to a lack of trust, the desire of Internet 
users to represent themselves positively, and/or the rareness of these activities.  To 
arrange these interviews I relied on an intermediary.  I hired a young Ghanaian man who 
was a very active Internet user to do this recruiting.  He convinced some of his friends 
who were doing these activities to sit down and talk to me.  His trustworthiness amongst 
his own friends and his trust in my intentions made these interviews possible.  He also 
spent time late at night at Internet cafés identifying people who appeared to be doing 
scams or fraud.  His presence in cafés generated less suspicion than my presence making 
it possible to initiate contact with scammers he had not previously met.  Some of these 
people whom he approached randomly at Internet cafés refused to speak with me but 
spoke at length with my research assistant and so I have also relied on his field notes 
from those encounters. 
In the case of Internet scammers and fraudsters, ethical issues were central.  Many 
were quite concerned that speaking with me could do them harm in some way.  I 
reassured them that I was interested only in information, not bringing them to justice, but 
I also made it clear that I planned to incorporate the information they communicated to 
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me into publications that would potentially be available to anyone.  This meant that their 
scamming strategies could be made public to an extent.  My research assistant did the 
same and with this awareness a few refused to speak to me.  Both with Internet scammers 
and ordinary users, I made clear my affiliations with the London School of Economics, 
my status as a PhD student, my intention to publish the material I gathered in interviews 
and observations as a thesis and in journals or at conferences.  I also expressed my 
commitment to make the names and any identifying features of the people I interviewed 
anonymous through they use of pseudonyms.  Additionally, I provided contact 
information for myself so that these individuals could follow up with any concerns and 
questions via phone or e-mail.  This approach seemed successful and my interviews with 
the small number of recruited scammers were lengthy and richly detailed.  The attitude of 
these scammers during the interviews was cautious, but open. 
At the end of an interview with both scammers and other Internet users, I 
sometimes requested a second meeting to observe their use of the Internet.  These 
observation sessions were specifically arranged to take place after the interview because 
it provided an opportunity to confirm some of what they said in interviews and also 
because the likelihood that they would consent to and be comfortable with me observing 
was higher after we had spent time talking and developed a certain level of rapport.  
Among those I interviewed I was able to observe 20 people using the Internet for around 
one hour.  I usually was able to do this only once.  I would have liked to spend more time 
observing the Internet use of those I had interviewed, but logistical constraints made this 
difficult.  Few Internet users came to the café regularly enough to make it possible for a 
spontaneous meeting and I was visiting cafés in four different areas in and around the 
city.   
Much of this thesis focuses on the ways the Internet was talked about in 
interviews, but this was also connected to what I saw through observation and what users 
described as their experiences on the Internet.  Often a single observation session 
generated great insights and clarity about the nature of the relationships Internet café 
users were carrying out online and their style of communication.  I was able to get a sense 
of how intimate the relationship was based on the frequency of communication and what 
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was said in online conversations.  I also better understood how tech savvy the Internet 
user was and how capable they were with written English.   
Beyond these intensive observation sessions I also spent hours observing Internet 
use while hanging out in Internet cafés.  This provided plenty of information about what 
Internet applications were most popular (Yahoo e-mail, chat clients and chat rooms) and 
least popular (online games, information searching).  Beyond that I also captured browser 
history records in these cafés (where it was possible) to see what websites were being 
visited.  This combination of interviews, observation of Internet use, and visits to 
secondary sites important to the users’ everyday lives is the basis of my understanding of 
users’ personal histories and relationship to the Internet. 
Who I did not interview has had an effect on the direction this research has taken.  
I did not interview successful Internet scammers due to a lack of access.  This lack of 
access is certainly related to judgements of risk.  For scammers to reveal their proven 
strategies and/or potentially be arrested (if their suspicions about my secret identity as 
CIA agent proved to be true) is counter-productive to their aims.  Therefore the pervasive 
sense of failure surrounding scamming activities in this thesis relates to this 
methodological issue and reflects the difficulties of scamming, the small number who are 
doing it successfully, and my lack of access to them.  This research also does not include 
an extended engagement with non-users.  An alternate approach would have been to 
choose one neighbourhood and one Internet café and to talk to both users and non-users.  
However, due to the logistical limitations of time and my own labour power and in order 
to seek out the most diverse range of Internet users possible I opted to look at several 
neighbourhoods and at users only.  Some of the context of non-use was obtained through 
family interviews, however, ultimately this perspective is underrepresented in this 
ethnography.  The perspective of non-users would have provided some insights into 
failed appropriation and rejection of the Internet as well as some indication of local 
perceptions about Internet users from a standpoint external to these activities. 
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The Voices of Internet Users in Accra 
 
The use of qualitative interviews accomplished one of the central goals of this 
research which was to identify a social discourse on computing technologies (the Internet 
in particular) that was being produced by Ghanaians themselves rather than by 
technology or development experts on their behalf.  The ways in which this discourse 
was distinct from or reorganized established institutional discourses provided a challenge 
to development discourses on ICTs that currently dominate thinking about the role of the 
Internet in Ghana and other African nations.  Hegemonic discourses shape and constrain 
the way many non-Africans and people in positions of power talk about the Internet in 
relation to developing countries like Ghana.  Uncovering a discourse among Internet 
users in Accra provided some insights about where they stood on the issue of technology 
access.  In a sense I sought to ‘give voice’ to a group of people by providing textual and 
temporal space for this social discourse in journals and at conferences that might 
otherwise be allotted to the more dominant development themes.  Providing this platform 
would ideally result in a better understanding of the ways that technology access 
initiatives emerging out of a development discourse on ICTs are short-sighted in relation 
to the needs and interests of citizens of one particular developing country. 
My intention, however, was to go well beyond the particularities of the 
development debate over technology access to look at the multitude of meanings 
Ghanaians ascribed to new technologies and their sense of self and society as it was 
evolving in the new millennium.  I recognized that Ghanaians could not be merely 
reduced to “development agents” and found in interviews that they did not generally 
conceive of themselves in this way.  The diffusion of Internet access is indicative of a 
continuing amplification of mobility and connectivity that is being both embraced and 
resisted in various ways in Ghana’s largest urban centre.  Therefore in writing this 
ethnography I intended to provide a response to what Hannerz described almost two 
decades ago as the surprising absence of, “a post-colonial ethnography of how Third 
World people see themselves and their society, its past, present, and future, and its place 
in the world; a cultural analysis of their fantasies and of what they know for a fact 
(Hannerz 1987, pp. 547).” 
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However, in this day and age, ethnographers can no longer make the claim that 
they are transparently ‘giving voice’ to marginalized communities without being accused 
of either naiveté or the desire for some form of domination over those they claim to 
understand or empower (Spivak 1988).  Disciplines that rely heavily on qualitative 
research now recognize that to transport voices from one locale to another requires an act 
of translation by the ethnographer from its multitude of sources to the cultural milieu of 
its destination.  This destination is often an academic setting where empirical data must 
be couched within theory and make reference to the debates and priorities set by 
members of the discipline.  This is a process of mediation.  In light of these (and other) 
realities of fieldwork, the neutrality of the ethnographer has been convincingly refuted in 
the debate over cultural representation and methodology extending from anthropology in 
the 80’s and 90’s. 
Many influences produced the complex and contradictory social discourse on new 
technologies as it was composed by the multitude of voices I encountered in the field and 
that I attempted to textualize in my interview transcripts and fieldnotes.  One of the 
particular factors I wish to examine was how my presence as a non-African, unmarried 
female played a significant role in what was said and how it was said.  This was 
sometimes apparent in small ways.  For example, I noticed how upon being introduced, 
most Ghanaians offered their Christian name to me.  I did not realize until later that some 
people were offering me names that they were not called by on a daily basis.  I became 
aware of this when one young man corrected a friend who repeatedly called him by his 
Ghanaian name in my presence.  This was an example of one way the people I 
encountered made an effort to bridge social distances when speaking to a foreigner. 
In the classic notion of fieldwork, where the object of study is a remote village 
that is treated as a synecdoche to the culture as a whole, the relationship to the outside 
world is elided, treated as essentially limited and inconsequential as I addressed in the 
previous section on defining the fieldsite.  In this context there could be few connotations 
attached to the arrival of a foreign researcher.  He is merely a curiosity.  Nigel Barley’s 
fieldwork account in The Innocent Anthropologist is an example of this way of rendering 
the foreign researcher.  He explains how among the Dowayo people of northern 
Cameroon his presence was tolerated because his bumbling attempts to master the 
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language and fit into the community were such a source of amusement (Barley 1983).  
There was no sense of portent or promise attached to his arrival in the village.  Few 
ethnographers arrive at their fieldsite anymore so innocently and so unmarked.  Media 
exposure is one way foreigners are marked before their arrival.  In contrast to Barley’s 
account, Diane Nelson notes that upon her arrival in Nebaj, Guatemala when she gives 
her name, crowds of children begin chanting ‘Diana, queen of the lizards!’  At first 
wondering if this was the product of anti-imperialist education in the area, she later learns 
that ‘Diana, queen of the lizards’ was a character in an imported science fiction show 
they had watched on television (Nelson 1996).  Similarly, my arrival in Accra was met in 
short order with chants of ‘obruni, obruni (meaning white person/foreigner)’ a term that 
was also imbued with many meanings.  I discovered that much was presumed about me 
by virtue of my being foreign, American in particular.  This meant that I was not entirely 
a mystery, and to an extent I had already been ‘figured out’ before I even spoke. 
Presumptions about foreigners could be intractable blocking any efforts to alter 
these representations.  A former colleague, a middle-aged white man with gray hair, came 
to Ghana for a short time to visit my fieldsites.  While in Accra, he was practically 
hounded by young Ghanaians who ‘recognized’ him as someone from the American 
embassy.  Once returned to the U.S. he had a Yahoo chat conversation with a man he had 
met in person at BusyInternet.  In the conversation dated from June 2005 the chat partner 
asserted, “well i think u don't want me to be friend with you but i know 
you  in the counter 3  of the us embassy.”  He replied, “what do you mean 
‘friend.’”  His Ghanaian chat partner ignoring the comment added, “es coz u just 
don't [want] me to know  that you work  at  the US embassy, [but] you 
have to know  i am not  a kid.”  There seemed to be no way for my colleague to 
convince these young Ghanaians of his actual affiliations.  They expected him to conceal 
his valuable connection to the embassy and presumably his ability to sway decisions 
about travel visas.  His troubles reflect how foreigners were often approached in Accra 
not as people to understand, but as instruments for acquiring opportunities. 
The idea that media exposure, both fictional forms such as soap operas and non-
fictional forms such as international news, build up shared, imagined notions of what 
foreign locales and foreign people are like is well established.  In a place like Accra, 
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however, media exposure was only one source of contact with ideas about foreigners and 
foreign lands.  There were many expatriates who lived and worked in Accra affiliated 
with embassies, NGOs, multinational corporations, as well as small business owners in 
the tourism industry, those doing research (like myself) and those who had met and 
married Ghanaians taking up permanent residence in the country.  People I interviewed at 
the Internet cafés mentioned encounters with foreigners in a variety of public spaces 
including the beach, in night clubs, at restaurants, or on the street.  The high number of 
Ghanaians who have left the country meant that ideas about foreigners were also 
constructed through experiences abroad or through contact with family or friends in the 
diaspora. 
The various spaces where it was possible to establish contact with foreigners were 
frequently perceived (particularly among young Ghanaians) as spaces for networking and 
opportunity seeking.  This search for contacts is related to Marcus’s notion of complicity 
in fieldwork.  In one of the various definitions of complicity he explores, he recognizes 
that the people encountered while in the field, the informants, may see some benefit in 
cooperating with the fieldworkers questions and intrusions.  He describes this as an, 
“acknowledged fascination between anthropologist and informants regarding the outside 
’world’ that the anthropologist is specifically materializing through the travels and 
trajectory of her multisited agenda” (Marcus 1998c, pp. 101).  However, an inhabitant of 
the fieldsite may envision a positive outcome from having this foreign contact that is 
much more pragmatic (such as paid employment or educational assistance) than a mutual 
interest in generating knowledge. 
Contact with foreigners was a central focus of Internet use in Accra.  The content 
of my casual conversations in Internet cafés as well as more formal interviews often 
centred on relations with foreigners, as so many Internet users sought to make and collect 
foreign contacts in chat rooms and through pen pal or dating websites.  Their explanation 
of these relationships and their attempts to befriend and gain favour with these foreign 
contacts made it abundantly clear that they had their own projects of personal 
development in mind that heavily shaped the conversations they had and the words they 
chose to use with their foreign chat partners.  To have these contacts was a source of 
pride, often for reasons that they could not explicitly verbalize.  However, some more 
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explicitly linked the possession of foreign contacts to the potential to travel abroad, to 
initiate business endeavours, or to receive gifts.  In this way gaining foreign contacts was 
an attempt to build social capital that would lead to personal development.  I was not 
exempted from this social capital building activity and found that many of the Ghanaians 
I had met would later propose joint business endeavours or request small or large gifts or 
assistance with education or foreign travel. 
In interviews with the few Internet fraudsters and scammers I made contact with I 
also realized that the way Internet users in Accra performed their identities online for 
foreign contacts at their most extreme could run counter to their personal beliefs, values, 
interests, and even basic facts about their life (gender, employment, etc).  Instead online 
identities were constructed entirely to gain the sympathy and trust of the foreign contact 
who was the target of the scam.  These identities read purely as they were performed said 
little about the real life of the performer, but were rather constructions for the foreigners 
gaze as it was imagined by the performer.  This extreme disjuncture between online and 
offline self-representations, between what Internet users say and what they believe should 
not be mistaken for the norm.  I had the benefit of maintaining ongoing relationships with 
many Internet users and visiting them in several different sites that helped me to confirm 
correlations between their lives and technology uses and what they told me in interviews.  
However, in the case of fraudsters and scammers the Internet was a tool they used to push 
self-representation to the furthest extreme, evidence of an interest in complete flexibility 
of self-presentation as a strategy to persuade others. 
My sensitization to this particular issue of subjectivity led me to focus much of 
my attention on analyzing the effects accomplished by performances of speech made by 
those who were part of the Internet café scene whether these performances were made 
face to face or mediated in chat rooms or other Internet spaces.  In particular, I have 
sought to examine what these performances indicate about ideas of personal success in 
urban society in Ghana and how these ideas make material or symbolic use of the Internet 
and other technologies.  I have also sought to examine what these performances indicate 
about perceptions of the foreign gaze that emerge as of central importance in many uses 
of the Internet.  These alternative ideas about personal success are a commentary on how 
development and notions of success are conceptualized in the development literature. 
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This approach to analyzing performance without equating speech and belief has 
provided a way to escape the facile approach of trying to connect what interviewees say 
with what they ‘really, truly’ believe, a project that has grown meaningless in light of the 
post-structuralist critique of fixed, essentialist notions of identity.  By acknowledging the 
potential for multiple identities, these voices produced in the presence of foreigners such 
as myself or foreign contacts met online cannot be conceived of as a mask covering some 
true underlying voice.  Instead they reflect the contemporary situation in Accra where the 
perceived necessity of relating to the ‘outside’ is part of how people create their ideal 
selves and work towards uniting their everyday selves with this ideal.  This pressure to 
alter identity is also significant as an indication of the shifting of societal norms and 
beliefs by the necessity of economic self-interest and survival in what people perceive to 
be a globally connected era. 
In the process of understanding speech as performance I have also come to 
understand that many Internet users in Accra perceived speech to hold great power.  They 
conceived of the art of choosing words and expressing themselves through speech as a 
powerful tool of persuasion.  They understood that speech was not just the way to make 
thoughts, beliefs, information held in the brain accessible to others, not just a way to 
externalize what is internal, but a way to exert a force, to effect activity in another.  They 
consciously understood speech to be a potential force.  For example, in explaining how 
men successfully wooed foreign girlfriends Kwaku notes, “…some of them can use loving 
words to tell the person they love you ….  The person will fall in love with you, so 
whatever you tell the person, the words, they don’t use any magic, but it is the words that 
you use because words are powerful.  So if they use that words it will change people’s 
mind.”  This way of perceiving speech as force is a theme that carries through this thesis. 
As researchers continue to enter fieldsites weighed down by local definitions of 
foreignness, the role of participant will need to undergo a revision.  In the ideal of 
participant-observation the researcher becomes a member of the community, a participant 
in everyday affairs to the extent that this is possible.  Traditionally this meant 
participating as a fellow villager while still retaining something of an outsider’s 
perspective as an observer.  This positioning required that members of the society under 
study continue to treat the researcher as an innocent, untaught in the ways of the society 
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and needing continual explanation.  A new participant role for researchers can be 
illustrated by a television show that recently debuted on American network television 
called, “Thank God You’re Here” that showcases an improvisational theatre game.  On 
this show one actor (the ‘outsider’) enters a room where a group of actors (the ‘insiders’) 
have already determined his role.  The outsider is incorporated into a scene by the group.  
He in return must guess his role and properly act it out based on the behaviour and 
reactions of the insiders.  The outsider may enter an apartment to discover he is a 
plumber, or a conference room to discover she is presenting a real estate development 
project.  Similarly, an ethnographer finds upon entering the fieldsite that, as in this 
improvisational exercise, she is already part of it.  She has been given her own position in 
the network albeit in a role different from the people she is studying.  In this situation 
examining the particular role she has been given and how her presence is interpreted is 
one route to understanding the highly-connected lives and global orientations of people 
and societies in the 21st century. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has primarily addressed challenges in defining the spatial terrain of 
the fieldsite and in understanding how the voices of Internet users were constructed 
through the reciprocal influence of interviewee and interviewer.  The issue of spatiality 
returned to the theme of boundaries initially brought forward in the introduction to this 
thesis.  The theoretical frame of this research questioned the existence of impermeable 
boundaries around the technological object and opened up a broader space for 
considering user agency.  Such boundaries emerge and disappear through many forms of 
social practice, not just official technology development processes.  The perception that 
they exist and the constitution and enforcement of such boundaries by humans serves a 
variety of useful social purposes.  Boundaries (around cultures most importantly) have 
also historically served as powerful methodological constructs that have helped to define 
the field of anthropology.  Yet the shortcomings of such constructs and their essentially 
illusory character has been a central argument of recent work on the study of culture 
through ethnographic methods.  In this chapter, broad, fixed boundaries have been 
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replaced by more precise and fluid contours as the fieldsite is reformulated as a network.  
The connection between the two methodological concerns of spatiality and voice are 
related to the way this proposed spatial configuration reorganizes the relationship 
between the foreign researcher and the group under study.  When entering the fieldsite is 
no longer a simple process of crossing a boundary from outside to inside, then there are a 
multitude of possible ways to define the connection between researcher and researched.  
Understanding the nature of this connection is key to understanding how the voices of 
research subjects are produced. 
The central methodological concern related to spatiality was what to include and 
what to exclude in defining the fieldsite and finding a way to do this by establishing, 
“some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited logic of association or 
connection among sites that in fact defines the argument of the ethnography” (Marcus 
1998b, pp. 90).  This ‘logic of association or connection’ was accomplished by defining 
the fieldsite as a heterogeneous network.  This made it possible to trace out the social 
phenomenon of interest by following the movement of Internet users through the city and 
also by capturing digital flows moving through the Internet cafés.  In their sense-making 
activities both mental and social, through speech and other forms of action individuals 
produced meanings that defined places.  These places including both the tangible realness 
of the Internet café and the imagined spaces of cyberspace and ‘America.’ 
A new role for the researcher emerged from the reconfiguration of the fieldsite.  
In the process of conducting fieldwork it became apparent that the voices of Internet 
users were constructed by complex motivations, not simply by the desire among these 
users to be understood.  By recognizing that my interviews and daily encounters with 
Ghanaians were being altered by my presence as a foreigner I became more aware of how 
Internet users were making sense of the ‘foreign’ and how they treated speech as 
persuasive performance.  I had access to these performances from two perspectives: as 
audience and as confidante.  My role as audience for performances of self represented 
one of my roles as participant in urban society in Ghana and in the Internet café scene.  
But I was a participant not by attaining a status as equal and unremarkable member of the 
community, but as a potential foreign contact, just like the foreign contacts Internet users 
were seeking online.  In contrast, as confidante I was situated in an observer role.  When 
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Internet users treated me as a confidante in interviews, they stepped back to provide a 
commentary on their own performances and to reflect on their experiences.  In these 
conversations they confessed some of the concerns, problems, and strategies related to 
their online relationships and encounters.  These reflections expressed how the 
intersection of the foreign gaze and the performed self is a space of tension where 
foreigners may be viewed in some ways as barriers and in other ways as vehicles to the 
realization of ideal selves.  These two perspectives as audience/participant and as 
confidante/observer proved complimentary; one providing the content of the performance 
and the other providing the performers self-analysis of their performance.  From these 
two primary perspectives (among others) emerged the complex and contradictory voices 
of Internet users as they are portrayed in this thesis. 
Both the cases of spatiality and voice pointed to the necessity of considering the 
way individuals in connected, contemporary societies make sense of their opportunities 
from a perspective that often embraces the global.  This chapter has proposed ways to 
include what is distant in ethnographic research without either converting external to 
internal or drawing an absolute distinction between the two.  This was done first by 
incorporating distant locales into the fieldsite through connections to the Internet café and 
messages received along these connections.  Second, by acknowledging the researcher is 
a participant in the fieldsite as a foreigner and as a member of the network without being 
converted into a member of society in equal standing to people being observed and 
interviewed.  These methodological strategies are applicable to a wide range of 
ethnographic studies that explore global trends and increasingly outward looking 
societies throughout the world. 
The structure of the four following chapters is in keeping with the spatial design 
of the fieldsite that begins with the Internet café itself as a starting point and moves 
outward following users into other spaces.  In chapter three, the distinctive characteristics 
of the Internet café as a place will be explicitly addressed.  The cafés were claimed, at 
times, by youth for imaginative and playful activities beyond the surveillance of older 
authority figures.  The space served to mediate local relations between peers and between 
the older and younger generations at the same time as it mediated between Ghanaians and 
their foreign contacts.  Following that discussion the analysis moves towards themes that 
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transect many spaces within the city as well as media spaces and virtual spaces.  The 
topics of Internet fraud (chapter 4), religious practice (chapter 5), and the perceived role 
of ICTs in Development (chapter 6) draw from observation and conversations in Internet 
cafés, as well as homes, churches, at restaurants, on the street, at a hangout in an 
unfinished building, at the Accra International Conference Centre, and in online chat 
rooms.  The ‘place’ of the Internet café was not always in the forefront of users minds.  In 
moments of total immersion in online chat the technical equipment, the chair, the place 
itself could fade from users’ active awareness.  The offline experience at the Internet café 
could at times be profoundly asocial as all attention was directed to conversations taking 
place in cyberspaces.  Internet cafes were not spaces shut off from tradition or ongoing 
processes of social change in Ghana.  They did not produce an abrupt break from what 
came before.  As the following chapters will demonstrate, they have been rapidly and 
broadly incorporated into social formations, sense-making systems and everyday 
practices in Accra.  
 68
 69
                                                
 
 
1 Findings from this preliminary research on technology use among Ghanaians living abroad are 
forthcoming in Burrell J. and k. Anderson. “’I have great desires to look beyond my world:’ trajectories of 
information and communication technology use among Ghanaians living abroad.”  New Media and 
Society. 
2 Hale, B. (9 June 2003a). “In search of a profitable connection.” BBC News Online.  URL: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2974418.stml. 
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c) Segan, S. (9 February 2001).  “Non-Profit Sends Tech Skills to Africa.” ABCnews.com.  URL: 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=98890&page=1. 
4 Tro-tros are Ghana’s answer to public transit.  The term tro-tro derived from a small Ghanaian monetary 
unit that has long since disappeared in the wake of rapid inflation.  These vehicles are privately owned and 
run regularly along predictable routes within Accra and between towns in Ghana. 
5 I also briefly visited a number of other Internet cafés throughout the city either on scouting missions, for 
interviews, or for personal use.  I found that it was typical for Internet users to visit two or three Internet 
cafés in the neighbourhood where they lived treating them as fairly interchangeable. 
Chapter 3 Internet Cafés as Spaces of Youthful Exploration 
 
“But again I was thinking it’s probably our youth that have also, you know, taken up this 
cybercrime and 419 and again that’s a national issue.  Why is it that our youth have 
nothing to do, that they are free to take up these illegal activities?  Why aren’t they being 
properly educated?  You know, why aren’t they being given opportunities to work, to get 
work experience and to get a decent job.  You know, I don’t believe that all our youth are 
criminals.  I think everyone has a good streak in them somewhere and wants to do a good 
day’s work, but are there those opportunities for them?  And again it’s a national issue 
and when young people have nothing to do and they’re bored, they get up to naughty 
things.” – Estelle Akofio-Sowah, managing director BusyInternet1 
 
Accra’s Internet cafés were primarily frequented by teenagers and twenty-
somethings many of whom had not yet completed schooling, had not established 
themselves in a line of work, and had not yet married.  The practices of youth in Internet 
cafés sometimes took on the distinctive form of competitive and collaborative game-like 
social rituals.  The Internet and the space of the Internet café were employed in forms of 
adolescent and post-adolescent ‘play.’  These social rituals centred on the acquisition of 
foreign goods, foreign media, and foreign contacts in tests of independence and 
expanding control.  The Internet allowed young people to engage imaginatively and 
interactively with aspirations they had formulated growing up in a society pervaded by a 
shared desire to strive towards greater global connectivity and a more modern and 
cosmopolitan identity.  The social games of youth that incorporated the Internet were 
often group-based and took place not only in the Internet cafés themselves, but also in 
school yards and informal hangouts.  These collective efforts brought forward issues 
about the Internet café as a place for technology consumption containing both people and 
commodities, computers as well as infrastructure, furniture, and décor.  The relationship 
between these co-located individuals and between individuals and commodities in the 
space structured the technology’s appropriation as it was negotiated by Internet café 
users, attendants and owners.   
Given the fixation among Internet users on the technology as foreign and as a 
mechanism for making contact with foreign lands, the appropriation of the Internet in 
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Accra may look, on the surface, like a process of localization that has failed or remains 
unfinished.  The escape fantasies of young people, the particular pressures they were 
under in relation to older members of society, and the concerns they had about their role 
in the ever-changing global order shaped this process.  The appropriation of the Internet 
by young users did not result in the tool becoming incorporated into established, 
everyday practice rendering it mundane.  Instead, users preserved it as a highly visible 
symbol of the foreign.  Instead of ameliorating the distance between the commodities 
origins and their own by absorbing it into a local vernacular, this distance was put on 
display as a valued aspect of the commodity.  Processes of appropriation were framed by 
the space of the Internet café.  The interiors of many of the smaller Internet cafés in 
Accra had a homogeneous quality.  They looked similar to one another and to many other 
types of small business.  They lacked much décor and their spatial design was not 
particularly ‘scripted.’  The term ‘café’ is a misnomer as few of these facilities served 
food or drinks of any kind.  In contrast to past studies that focused on how the rich 
material culture and spatial configuration of the Internet café communicated technology’s 
meaning to customers (Wakeford 1999; 2003; Laegran and Stewart 2003), the Internet 
cafés in Accra were distinguished by their material minimalism.  Yet, the resulting 
absence of an elaborate localization via spatial configurations in many of Accra’s Internet 
cafés did not interfere with users’ appropriation of the Internet.  The undefined quality of 
these spaces served the projected imaginations of young users very well.  This is not to 
say that the Internet cafés in Accra accommodated all users and all meanings.  The claims 
young people made on the physical space of the Internet café were sometimes 
exclusionary and defined the Internet café as a space meant only for certain types of 
people.  The efforts of youth to assert a degree of independence from authorities via the 
Internet café also undermined some of the intentions of Internet café owners in 
configuring the space for an alternate set of more desired users such as businessmen or 
students. 
What explains this affinity between youth and Internet cafés?  The notion that 
young people adapt to new technologies with an ease and intuition that is lacking in 
adults is a popular trope in the Western media and popular culture but has been more 
recently exposed as something of a myth (Facer and Furlong 2001; Facer et al 2001; 
 71
Livingstone 2001).  The activities of young users in Accra’s Internet cafés also call this 
popular notion into question.  The skills demonstrated by young Internet users in Accra 
were strikingly narrow and most had developed only a very limited repertoire of uses.  
The greater resources older users had at their disposal (education and income in 
particular) proved to be an advantage to their ability to use the Internet broadly and 
effectively.  The fact that young people often used very few Internet applications (heavily 
favouring e-mail and chat over web browsing) suggests that the opportunity to sit and 
experiment with a new technology, by itself, does not necessarily lead to the development 
of either deep or broad technical knowledge. 
The reason Internet cafés were primarily frequented by young people was related 
not simply to a natural ability with the technology (or the absence of this ability in older 
adults), but to their peer relationships, aspirations, and available free-time.  The Internet 
provided unique thrills through instantaneous contact and synchronous conversation with 
foreigners feeding into fantasies of unencumbered mobility and media-driven visions of 
Western affluence.  Online contact with foreigners was an extension of another popular 
activity among youth that predates the Internet; corresponding through letters with 
foreign pen pals.  The term ‘pen pal’ was used to refer to an extremely wide range of 
relationships including same-age peers, boyfriends, girlfriends, older patrons, business 
partners, and philanthropists.  Some young people valued these relationships for the 
enlightening conversation and the creation of social bonds.  However, others valued them 
primarily as strategic affiliations for realizing material gain.  Daniel, a former scammer 
who was teaching at a primary school, saw his pen pal collecting activities as continuous 
with credit card fraud noting that, “apart from the using of the credit card I take pen pals 
just for exchange of items and actually I don’t take my size, I take sugar mommies and 
sugar daddies because if you take your size they are unemployed.  So if you ask them 
something which is very huge, they wouldn’t get it for you.  So you have to go in for the 
grown ups like 50 years, 40 and above so they are actually working and they have the 
money so they can buy whatever you ask them.”   Abiba described the focus of her peers 
on pen pals as an addiction observing that, “some people they like friends.  You see they 
are addicted…getting Net pals and letting them sending them things.  You see some 
people they are fashion crazy…”  In these types of relations, through the mediation of the 
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chat room, chat partners were completely objectified as suppliers of niceties, fashion 
items, and mobile phones.  These examples point to a form of acquisitional play, within a 
range of recreational activities that will be further explicated in subsequent sections.  In 
contrast to the standard model of pen pal relationships as an exchange between young 
people, many Internet users expressed a preference for older pen pals who were 
considered both wiser (and therefore useful as advisors) and more affluent. 
The fact that searching for foreign pen pals was the dominant activity in Internet 
cafés does not mean that this behaviour can be categorized as leisure.  Stephen, an 
unemployed 21-year-old who had recently completed secondary school treated pen pal 
searching as a narrowly focused and goal-directed effort to realize migration 
opportunities.  He observed, “when you go to the cafés, you see a lot of websites, pen pal 
clubs…one thing I did was to visit the Christian pen pals.  We have the snail mails, we 
have the prisoners, we have the missionaries, but sometimes when you write them 
through the mail…they don’t take it serious.”  Stephen spent time in chat rooms 
exclusively seeking ‘invitations’ to visit foreigners.  He noted that many of the people he 
contacted, “want to know you for some time before…they will give you the e-mail 
address, they will ask you to write to them, to communicate with them for some time 
before [giving an invitation].”  Having no patience for such a time-consuming effort and 
seeing no redeeming value in the process itself Stephen noted, “when I chat and I see that 
you are not willing, I have to [quit talking to you].”  He had so far been unsuccessful in 
obtaining an invitation or a visa to travel.  These alternate motivations (seeking migration 
assistance obtaining status objects rather than the sociability of conversing) provide a 
partial explanation for why Internet users often held such fleeting and superficial 
conversations and maintained so many open chat windows at one time. 
The popularity of Internet cafés among youth was also related to the absence of 
older authority figures in these spaces.  For young people Internet cafés served as an 
unclaimed terrain where they had the freedom to pursue interests and explore an 
emerging sense of self.  They were spaces outside the constraints of home, school, 
church, and other institutions where young peoples’ presence was subject to the terms of 
authority figures rather than their own.  Some of these older authority figures, in turn, 
eyed the Internet cafés suspiciously as a possibly threatening rather than beneficial 
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presence in their communities.  Some believed that their primary or sole use was for 
criminal and immoral activities such as credit card fraud and porn viewing.  Less serious, 
but still troubling, some felt that Internet cafés distracted young people from their studies 
and other responsibilities.  Some young people expressed agreement on this matter.  
Bernice, a 16 year old senior secondary school student stated that, “since this invention of 
the computer, children go.  Instead of them staying beside their books, they just go [to the 
Internet café] and waste a whole lot of time.”  While the bulk of this research was 
conducted with Internet users, most of whom were rather young, these users also relayed 
some of the concerns they had heard from elder family members.  This view was 
confirmed directly in discussions with older individuals (typically non-users) in several 
family interviews as well as in conversations at churches, social events and other public 
spaces.  The concerns they and younger users expressed about criminal activity in the 
Internet cafés seemed exaggerated in relation to what I observed in the Internet cafés, but 
they were not entirely baseless. 
Given the preponderance of young people in Internet cafés in Accra it is worth 
examining how youth is experienced and described as a distinctive social category and in 
what ways this maps to technology practices.  In Accra, the social category of youth was 
constituted by a characteristic set of conditions that typically began somewhere in 
adolescence and extended for many as far as their late twenties or even early thirties.  
These conditions included having not yet attained the widely standard markers of 
adulthood; marriage and child-rearing.  For many young people, an incomplete education 
and/or lack of reliable full-time employment also went along with this.  There was an 
affective dimension to this state including a frustrating sense of stagnation and feelings of 
total uncertainty about the future.  While stagnation was not just a concern expressed by 
young people, for the young it was specifically related to an inability to move into this 
adult stage.  Young people struggled to gain access to the economic resources required to 
attract a spouse or complete their education.   
These conditions of unpredictability and stagnation were not unique to Ghanaian 
youth and are widely shared among youth in many geographies.  Willis in his study of 
youth creative cultures in Britain asserts that, “All young people experience one aspect or 
another of the contemporary 'social condition' of youth: unwilling economic dependence 
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on parents and parental homes2; uncertainty regarding future planning; powerlessness 
and lack of control over immediate circumstances of life; feelings of symbolic as well as 
material marginality to the main society; imposed institutional and ideological 
constructions of 'youth' which privilege certain readings and definitions of what young 
people should do, feel or be" (Willis 1990, pp. 12-13).  Much of this description is also 
applicable to young Ghanaian Internet users many of whom felt that a restricted role was 
imposed on them and was enforced through family interactions as well as religious and 
educational institutions. 
While young people in Ghana and in affluent Western societies shared a general 
sense of marginality, uncertainty, and disempowerment, the particular conditions and 
social shifts in these societies that impacted technology and media consumption patterns 
diverged in some significant ways.  Livingstone documents the growth of technology 
ownership and private media consumption by young people in homes in the UK relating 
it to the ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) and a growing perception of urban public spaces as 
dangerous.  Restrictions on where young people could go and with whom they could 
spend time drove the purchase of media technologies to outfit young people’s bedrooms 
in the family home.  These efforts were framed as safety measures (Livingstone 2002).  
In Ghana, by contrast, there was little emphasis on safety.  Restrictions on youth emerged 
through the efforts of authorities to cultivate disciplined young bodies and minds through 
educational and religious institutions.  Family roles and duties also placed substantial 
restrictions on how young people expressed themselves to their elders, how they spent 
their time and in whose company. 
Young people in Accra were tied into a traditional gerontocratic ordering of 
society and its principles of social authority by elders, a system that endures despite the 
uprooting process of rural-urban and international migration in Ghana.  This played out in 
the everyday lives of young people in a variety of small and large ways.  For example, 
Miriam had a younger sister living with her who swept the room they shared every 
morning, fetched water for Miriam’s bath, and sat at her drink-selling kiosk all day while 
Miriam was free to come and go.  In exchange, Miriam was expected to take care of her 
sister’s financial needs including her education.  Similarly, Abiba, a 16-year-old senior 
secondary school student was the youngest member of her household which was made up 
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of her grandmother, and several aunts and uncles.  Her family was Muslim and although 
she was both an Internet user and liked listening to American rap and hip-hop artists and 
dressed in Western-style trousers and tops, she also wore a headscarf in public.  She was 
allowed to leave the house only when necessary and only for short periods of time.  She 
slept at night in her grandmother’s room in case the grandmother needed anything (a 
glass of water, for example) and she did chores of all types (cooking, cleaning, errand 
running) around the compound.  Abiba, like many young people was expected to do quite 
a bit of work on behalf of the family and was almost constantly under supervision.  The 
structure of Abiba’s home life was continuous with the school environment which 
similarly held students to exacting standards of good behaviour.  Schools were oriented 
towards discipline and orderliness.  This theme was underlined at the annual competition 
between schools that perform in uniformed marching squads at the annual Independence 
Day celebrations on March 6th.  These squads compete for awards based on their 
precision and conformity.  Both at home and at school there was no tolerance for young 
people arguing with, questioning, or talking back to their elders.  Supervision and 
enforcement of behaviour was not limited to home and school, but could also be 
witnessed on the streets.  I once watched Kwadjo, a young man who was unmarried and 
had no children, discipline a young girl sitting on the lap of her mother for not responding 
politely to his question.  Although these checks on behaviour were limited by the 
unavoidable anonymity of urban living, it was socially acceptable and expected that older 
members of the community would monitor and regulate the behaviour of young people 
whether or not they were kin. 
While urban youth had a certain amount of choice in profession and life trajectory 
that their rural counterparts were unlikely to experience, frustration over their inability to 
progress to normal adult status was a refrain frequently heard among young men in 
Accra.  They defined this desired status as marriage and the ownership of property and 
modern goods such as cars and electronics.  Isaac for example, an Internet café operator, 
complained that his current job was taking him nowhere and he couldn’t make enough 
money to get beyond base-level subsistence.  To address this stagnation he planned to 
travel to mainland China to, in his words “escape the poverty cycle.”  Recognizing that 
this effort was far from a sure thing, he described the plan as a, “risk adventure,” but 
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added that he really had no desire to leave Ghana except to find a way to make and save 
money.  Yaw, another Internet café operator similarly complained of his inability to make 
any progress in life with his current employment.  He emphasized that marriage was an 
impossibility for him at his income level.  For young Ghanaian men marriage required a 
demonstration of economic viability through the many gifts given to a girlfriend 
culminating in a formal engagement ceremony where gifts of money, clothing and yards 
of fabric, domestic equipment (often a sewing machine), electronic devices (often mobile 
phones), and bottles of alcohol or cases of soft drinks are given by the groom’s family to 
the bride’s family. 
The sense of stagnation expressed by young people was exacerbated by periods of 
boredom and inactivity that many faced after they completed a level of schooling.  There 
were long gaps where students were not actively enrolled in school, but were preparing 
for exams or waiting for exam results to come out.  An exam was taken after junior 
secondary school typically at age 15 and again around age 18 many students took the 
Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination or university entrance exams.  Students 
took these exams in the fall, but didn’t hear their results until the spring.  Those who did 
not do well enough to advance had to re-sit exams and wait again for results.  Some 
young people were also forced to wait until they or their family members could gather the 
money to fund their next level of education.  Many were eager to find a way to fill the 
extra time.  Isaac was offered the position of driver’s mate on a tro-tro bus3 by his father 
while he was waiting for exam results.  He readily agreed to the job noting that, “I was 
lonely at home doing nothing.”  Many young people took computer and software training 
courses while waiting.  Spending time at Internet cafés was another way to fill this void.  
As Fauzia, an unemployed 23 year old noted, “Sometimes instead of sitting in the house, 
making noise, it’s better to go to the café, to go and chat.”  Going to the Internet café was 
not only an enjoyable way to pass the time, but the skills and foreign contacts gained 
might prove beneficial in the future justifying the investment of time and money. 
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Youth vs. Adult Internet Users 
 
Internet cafés were not exclusively the domain of youth, but older users had quite 
different patterns of use and alternate reasons for frequenting these spaces.  It became 
clear in the course of this research that Internet activities roughly correlated to age, 
gender, and education level.  Young people often fixated on certain forms of use –
collecting foreign pen pals and seeking romantic partners, chatting and hanging out – 
usually to the exclusion of all else.  They also spent more time than older users visiting 
Internet cafés in groups as a social activity pursuing entertainment and play on the 
Internet by watching music videos, finding music lyrics, through inventive competitions 
(detailed later in this chapter) and occasionally playing computer games.  Older users 
pursued a greater range of uses and were more often versed in information searching and 
were typically more effective in using the Internet for research.  Several young people 
who were interviewed described or demonstrated difficulty with identifying whether the 
information they had found was valuable and valid and were susceptible to falling victim 
to online scams.  It should be noted that older users also tended to be rather affluent and 
well-educated and so their patterns of use cannot be disentangled from these aspects of 
their background.  University students although young also used the Internet to do 
research and acquire information with great adeptness. 
 
 High School education or less University education 
Youth • Communication with foreign pen 
pals 
• Communication with 
family/friends in the diaspora. 
• Consumption of music and 
music videos. 
• Information searching 
• Research 
• Communication with foreign pen 
pals 
• Communication with 
family/friends in the diaspora. 
Middle 
aged 
Not represented among Internet 
users that were interviewed. 
• Information searching 
• Research 
• Communication with 
family/friends in the diaspora (but 
not pen pals). 
 
Table 2 - forms of use correlate with life stage and educational attainment 
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The typical Internet user in these cafés – young, educated but not to a university 
level, and usually not from affluent families – had a different relationship to 
‘information’ than older, university educated, and affluent users.  In particular, the typical 
Internet user did not relate to it as a neutral and impersonal commodity.  This definition 
of information is common in popular and political discourse in the West and can be 
traced to the mathematical concepts of information theory in the post World War II era 
that were concerned with the transport and storage of data (Roszak 1986).  Information 
has many characteristics including a detachment from context and source and consequent 
ability to circulate without changing.  Technological infrastructure preserves its 
movement as perfectly replicated packets of bits.  The realization of the tools to store and 
distribute it reliably was a remarkable technical feat.  Perhaps related to this technical 
breakthrough, the data itself has come to be characterized as an unassailable good.  Yet 
this definition of information and the technologies designed to facilitate its transport 
(including the Internet) circumvent traditional human mediators of such information.  
This has shifted many processing burdens onto the humans who receive such data. 
By contrast, when Internet users in Accra sought answers to questions, they often 
expected these answers to be embodied in a trusted source.  Many interviewees had never 
used or heard of Google indicating a reliance on direct communication rather than third-
party information systems.  They searched for ‘advice’ rather than information.  Among 
those who did use Google there were some dramatic misconceptions about how 
information searching worked.  For example Frank, a young and enthusiastic Internet 
user, sought buyers on the Internet for the glass beads his aunt produced locally.  He 
searched for customers by going to Google and typing in a string of keywords such as: 
“business men contact business in London dealing with beads 
works.”  Once the search results were returned he would sort through the links very 
quickly without reading them.  Instead of recognizing each search result as a site to be 
evaluated for relevance, he used an e-mail extractor tool to pull out any e-mail addresses 
on the page.  He described Google (inaccurately) as a vetted business directory as he 
noted, “Everyone who is on the Google registered it…so if I go to Google and say I want 
to know the business people in maybe Jamaica, those who registered in Jamaica Google 
will open it, straightforward.”  Relying on this mental model he assumed that all his 
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search results for potential business partners and customers were accurate hits.  This 
resulted in some very mis-targeted advertising.  For example, one of the results for his 
search terms was an e-book about the 19th century businessman John Jacob Astor.  I 
watched him send an e-mail to the e-text project at the University of Virginia about 
buying his glass beads using an e-mail address he had pulled from the page.  Frank 
related to the Internet as a network of individuals and groups with Google as the 
mechanism for facilitating introductions, rather than a network of machines that 
mechanically sort and circulate data. 
Instead of using search engines, several web users mentioned memorizing or 
guessing URLs.  Some received URLs passed along by friends via e-mail or chat clients.  
This of course meant that the range of media young people accessed on the web (outside 
of e-mail and chat) was quite narrow.  The sites most often mentioned included a few 
news websites, archives of music lyrics, and e-cards.  However, these Internet users did 
not perceive that their Internet skills were lacking; to them chat and email, collecting 
foreign pen pals in particular, was what the Internet was all about.  It was through 
personal contacts, not de-personalized information, that both entertainment and real 
opportunities could be found.   
Limited use of the World Wide Web and search engines did not mean that young 
people did not formulate questions and seek answers on the Internet.  Instead of search 
engines, many used their foreign chat partners to collect information about educational 
opportunities, international news, and everyday life in other societies.  In certain 
situations this provided some added advantages.  They were able to borrow the media and 
technology literacy (and sometimes bandwidth) of chat partners who had better 
connections and more experience with the Internet.  Charles, for example, a teenager who 
was preparing for his senior secondary school exams, had a friend in the U.S. evaluate 
education and scholarship opportunities to prevent him from falling for a scam.  
Education itself was also something that Internet users sought through interaction with 
human sources.  A young man called Moscow by his friends said that on the Internet he, 
“would want to meet an educative person.  Someone who is educated, a teacher or a 
scientist…so that he could be telling me more about this science course, it will be easy 
for me when I go to school.”  When asked what ‘benefits’ there were to knowing people 
 80
living outside of Ghana, he added, “when you got a friend either from America or London 
he teaches you English.”  The digital information young people received often could not 
be de-personalized and was embedded within their online interactions.  It was not always 
data that these Internet users sought, but a learning process, a sounding board, or 
someone who could open doors. 
Besides the use of the Internet for information searching, what distinguished the 
Internet uses of students at the Volta café on the campus of the University of Ghana at 
Legon was related to their greater degree of mobility that came with a more privileged 
background.  The Internet supported their movements in pragmatic ways.  Prince, for 
example, was using the Internet to check his bank account in London when I encountered 
him in the café.  He had been working on an online application for a job with multi-
national corporation Maersk.  He had also previously spent time in London working for a 
florist and living with his aunt while on a work holiday visa and was considering a return 
to London for a postgraduate course.  Several University students also described how 
access to the Internet made up for their inadequate and outdated University library.  
Manuela, who had also spent time in London, was participating in a research project and 
used e-mail to communicate with the professors working on the project including one at 
Johns Hopkins University in the US.  The Internet allowed these students to route around 
inefficient national infrastructure (such as the slow postal system) to engage with 
European and American institutions.  Yet greater mobility and broader capability with the 
Internet did not necessarily preclude an interest in meeting foreigners online.  There was 
still a fascination among some users with everyday life in foreign lands.  Some of the 
Internet users at the Volta Hall Internet café on campus described chatting with foreign 
chat partners.  Adama was the most involved in these activities.  Similarly to the Internet 
café users in Mamobi or La Paz, she prized her vast foreign social network boasting that, 
“I have so many friends in Europe.”  Her main chat partners included a Norwegian, a 
Swede, and a Nigerian.  However, the social relationships University students maintained 
were typically valued for the leisure, sociability, and possibly status they provided and 
less explicitly for material gain or migration opportunities.  Often these University 
students were able to navigate through formal channels for such opportunities. 
 81
The relative level of affluence among Internet café users is a question that is more 
effectively addressed through a qualitative description.  In the context of development 
discussions, Internet cafés are sometimes dismissed as the domain of elites and as an 
example of emerging digital divides within countries compounding those that exist 
between countries (Robbins 2002; Alhassan 2004; Mwesige 2004; Mercer 2005).  In the 
small, less expensive Internet cafés, particularly in poor neighbourhoods like Mamobi, 
young Internet users experienced very little privilege.  Many had parents who were 
jobless, marginally employed, or dead.  Bernice’s father for example was an electrician 
who complained that, “Here [in Ghana] if you’re electrical contractor, you don’t get the 
job, there’s no job.  You only call yourself electrical contractor, but there’s no job for 
you.”  Her six family members lived as tenants with several other families in a single unit 
within a compound house with an outdoor toilet and no running water.  Other Internet 
users lived with parents who were bakers, drivers, and did other types of work that 
required no more than a junior secondary school education and often less.  These young 
Internet users had typically managed to obtain more education than their parents, up to a 
senior secondary school certificate and were literate (to varying degrees) in English.  The 
money young people managed to collect to pay for Internet use was often skimmed from 
the daily ‘chop money’ their parents gave them for food and transportation.  Saadiq, a 
senior secondary school student who lived in Mamobi, said he received 2000 cedis 
(approx 10p) each day from which he was able to save about 1000 cedis.  Over several 
days he managed to acquire enough to use the Internet for an hour.  He also was able to 
get a little extra money from friends.  Fauzia similarly described the circulation of scarce 
resources among friends noting that, “sometimes I do use my own money, I save for it 
because I meant to use the café.  Sometimes too I do go there, when I see friends I ask 
them to buy me the code.  I just say, ‘oh, Charley, you know what, I want you to buy me a 
code, I’m broke.  You know I’m broke.’ ”  Internet cafes were frequented in poor 
neighbourhoods like Mamobi because they held a particular attraction to marginalized 
youth.  The Internet cafés existed as a symbol of opportunity and a potential mechanism 
for subverting the constraints of global economic and political infrastructures in an 
attempt to realize a better life.  
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Altogether, age, life stage, gender, income, and educational attainment roughly 
translated into distinct styles of Internet use.  Despite the differences, certain themes of 
Internet appropriation carried across demographic groups.  The search for international 
opportunities, whether through formal or informal channels, and the cultivation of foreign 
contacts was one pattern of use that was present in all demographic groups and more 
generally characterized the appropriation of the Internet in Accra’s Internet cafés. 
 
Youth in Groups 
 
In light of the burdens and boredom borne by young people, Internet cafés held an 
appeal as spaces where they could escape the surveillance of their elders.  Internet cafés, 
by contrast to home, school, and most public spaces, were spaces dominated by young 
people and there was limited, if any, supervision by elders.  The Internet café had less 
history and fewer interconnections with social processes in the larger society and 
therefore could be more easily appropriated on users own terms.  Internet café owners 
were typically absent most of the time and operators were often of similar age, acting 
more like peers than supervisors.  Young people could also arrange to visit cafés when 
they knew older people would not be around.  For example, Gabby noted that he and his 
school friends, “will leave the school around 10, midnight because by then the price is 
low and then older people will not be in the net….  They will tell us to stop watching this 
pornographic.”  Internet cafés therefore became spaces for forms of mischievous, youth-
centred and peer-oriented behaviour that would undoubtedly be disapproved of by 
authority figures.  These activities included watching and emulating music videos, flirting 
with foreign chat partners, trying to hack the computers to get free browsing time, 
playing online games, or finding ways to obtain free things such as pamphlets, bibles, or 
CDs of computer games.  Activities were sometimes configured by users to fill the space 
of the Internet café.  For example, on one occasion I walked into an Internet café where 
everyone was gathered around a computer monitor watching “Top Gun.”  On another, I 
observed a young man with some friends studying a video by the hip-hop artist Usher and 
emulating his dance routines.  The ability to escape parental supervision and create 
personal space is described as similarly motivating teenagers in the West to spend time 
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on MySpace and other popular spaces online (boyd 2006), consume music and television 
in private bedrooms (Livingstone 2002), use mobile phones (Green 2002), and spend 
time in Internet cafés (Laegran 2002). 
Of great concern to some older members of society in Ghana was the possibility that 
young people were using Internet cafés to look at porn.  A publication titled “The Word 
of god on Sex and the Youth” handed to me by its author Victor Olukoju has a chapter on 
the Internet that warns about Internet pornography: “Thousands of youth worldwide are 
already addicted to this ungodly practice…People keep ungodly appointments to go and 
chat with boyfriends and girlfriends on the Internet.  They occupy their time with such 
chats and do not have enough time to sleep early so they come to Church anytime they 
want.  What sort of world are we living in?  People pay money to commit sin!... The 
youths now steal and borrow money to browse the net just to ‘enjoy’ these nude pictures 
and other immoral acts or films.”  Olukoju as a religious figure lamented the way the 
Internet café kept young people out of church.  Educators correspondingly lamented the 
way young people skipped school to spend time in cafes.  These spaces were seen to 
challenge the dominion of these institutions over young peoples’ time. 
While the prevalence of these activities were undoubtedly exaggerated in Olukoju’s 
and other similarly alarmist accounts, it was occasionally possible to witness individuals 
and groups looking at porn in Accra’s Internet cafés.  Sadia described how some of her 
classmates – both male and female - went to the Internet café to watch ‘obonsam 
cartoons.’  Obonsam means ‘satan’ in Twi and the phrase was a coded and humorous 
reference to porn videos.  These schoolmates would discuss and tease each other about 
what they had seen when back in class out of the earshot of the teacher.  Young people 
were certainly aware that watching porn was a transgressive activity and did not defend 
them.  Sadia warned, “there’s a saying that anything that the eye sees it enters the mind 
and what enters the mind wants to be practiced.  They looking at pornographic 
pictures… and they will like to practice and at their age I don’t think you could do that.”  
Altogether, these activities that their elders would likely consider frivolous or outright 
harmful quite clearly served youth as a way of claiming personal territory, flouting social 
norms and exploring alternatives, and establishing themselves as individuals, distinct 
from the expectations of parents, teachers, and older relatives.  These mischievous 
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activities depended on such alarm and disapproval among elders.  This reaction was the 
sign of having escaped the hold such authorities had on young peoples’ minds and 
behaviour.  By asserting an awareness that this activity was considered harmful, they 
marked their defiance and agency.  In this way porn viewing and other transgressive 
activities in cafes served as a reaction to what Willis describes as, “institutional and 
ideological constructions of 'youth' which privilege certain readings and definitions of 
what young people should do, feel or be” (Willis 1990, pp. 13).  Internet cafés were 
spaces where young people were able to contravene these constructions. 
Mischievous and playful activities were frequently carried out by young people in 
groups, often schoolmates on their way home from school or off campus from their 
boarding schools.  As Sadia mentioned above, some discussed their forays online in the 
classroom and schoolyard thereby subversively expanding this terrain of youthful 
independence into spaces where they were highly supervised.  Printers and scanners 
made it possible to do so in multiple formats.  Gabby noted about his early Internet 
experiences, “I followed my seniors to town and we went to the café and then you see, 
when we got there…the pornographic pictures, sites, we have them plenty....  We go, scan 
them then we paste them in our dormitories.”  Through these actions youth found new 
ways to challenge authority in a subversive competition over turf. 
Additionally, Internet café use served as a way of building friendships and social 
cohesion among peers.  Kwaku, Daniel and three other friends from school visited the 
Internet café together regularly and ended up forming a club.  They formalized the group 
by going online to the British Airways website and signing up for the frequently flyer 
programme receiving membership cards by Post.  The British Airways programme was 
called the ‘Executive Club’ and so they took this name for the group.  Although they 
never planned to use the cards, they were pleased to note that they could charter flights 
and receive other benefits from their membership.  The group also developed a level of 
technical savvy by searching for “illegals” or ways of hacking into Internet café 
computers to get free online time.  These tricks spread by word of mouth in the 
schoolyard and quickly became overused, so the group was constantly on the hunt for 
new “illegals.”  Beyond technical tricks Kwaku, Daniel and their friends invented a 
competition where they would order free things online to see who could collect the most.  
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The example given was a CD of computer games.  The goal was not the computer game 
itself but the accumulation of a commodity that had travelled from a distant locale. 
A theme carrying through these youth activities online and offline was a fascination 
with abroad and with whatever evoked travel and connectivity with foreign lands.  
Airline membership cards and CDs or books by mail personalized with a name and 
address provided this sense of global interconnectivity that was far more compelling to 
young people than the gambling games the CDs contained.  The Internet provided 
opportunities for making faraway places very tangible and personal – marked with the 
most intimate of labels, one’s name.  Accumulating mail was a way of demonstrating 
power spanning great distances with whomever collected the most material declared the 
victor.  This thrill was also evident in the most popular of Internet activities among youth 
– collecting pen pals.  This activity was often conducted with such brevity and divided 
attention by Internet users in Accra that it became clear that a moment of contact rather 
than the content of extended conversations had value in and of itself (Slater and Kwami 
2005). 
The incorporation of the Internet into youth activities was not solely responsible for 
producing these youth clubs but rather extended pre-existing peer-oriented social 
practices.  In the neighbourhood of Mamobi where Kwaku and Daniel lived, young men 
came together to form ‘bases.’  These ‘bases’ were composed of friends who were 
associated with a certain informal hangout spot such as an unfinished building or a street 
corner.  These groups often competed against one another in football, although some 
described their motives and activities as extending beyond just playing football.  Some 
pursued entrepreneurial ventures and/or community service.  Alternately, mixed-gender 
groups came together to form youth clubs concerned with education and community 
service.  ‘Bases’ and youth groups had certain naming conventions, often favouring place 
names making use of the symbolic potency of places in the West, most often place names 
from the United States.  For example, among the names mentioned were: Alaska Youth 
Club, Nebraska Youth Club, Dallas Base and Canadian Academy. 
Many of the activities of young Internet users described in this chapter have been 
characterized as entertaining and engaging diversions.  However, many of these young 
Internet users also had an eye on more purposive and goal-oriented uses of the Internet 
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that would yield tangible improvement to their opportunities in life.  Users varied in 
terms of how focused they were on making gains from the Internet.  Some fluctuated 
between positions identifying a distinct point in time where they became more serious 
about the Internet.  Gabby for example ultimately determined that it was pointless to look 
at porn on the Internet noting, “…I didn’t really gain anything from that.  You see, so I 
started, since my friends introduced me to this, I saw it was going to be more beneficial 
than watching these stupid [porn videos].”  Yet, the result of this attempt to shift towards 
more focused and purposeful activities sometimes meant spending less time at the 
Internet café.  Kwaku and Daniel both indicated that once they finished school and had 
found jobs the members of the ‘Executive Club’ no longer had the time to frequent the 
Internet café.  While both had spent a brief period of time trying to gain money through a 
form of Internet fraud, when neither were successful they soon quit as Cospy notes, “I’ve 
seen that it’s not beneficial to me and I have not get anything out of it, I stopped.”   As 
they age, some young people have difficulties reconciling the meaning they attach to the 
Internet (as a fascinating, exploratory tool) with a more explicitly goal-directed focus.   
 
A Woman’s Place?  
 
For some young women who spent time in Internet cafés, the transgressive 
activities of other users detrimentally affected their ability to inhabit and use these spaces.  
Young women expressed concerns about their ability to maintain control over the media 
and forms of social interaction they were exposed to at Internet cafés.  Some were 
particularly concerned with restricting their exposure to sexual material.  The locus of 
control varied between young women and men; women typically spoke about 
pornography and sexual content as being imposed on them by male chat partners whereas 
their young male counterparts tended to speak about it as a temptation that must be 
avoided.  Sexual material was perceived not as something that would warp young 
women’s minds, but as a personal affront committed against them, something intended to 
pollute or violate them.  This was a problem they identified both in cyberspace and in the 
Internet cafés themselves.  Their concerns mirror an early debate in Internet studies about 
the sexually explicit, aggressive behaviour that was frequently directed at women (at that 
 87
time a minority group) in cyberspace (Frissen 1992; Dibbell 1994; Brail 1996; Soukup 
1999).  At the time there was concern that this male-dominated cyberculture would 
diminish women’s interest in using the Internet and that these virtual spaces would 
continue to be disproportionately frequented by men (Harcourt 1999).  Likewise, the 
concerns of young Ghanaian women and their families had significant consequences for 
their Internet activities.  For some, questions about the suitability of both Internet cafés 
and cyberspace as places for young women to visit limited the amount of time they chose 
to or were allowed to spend online and altered their online activities. 
Many young women, at least initially, perceived Internet cafés as unwelcoming 
spaces because of the kinds of activities they believed and had been told were taking 
place there.  Maureen, a 23-year old student in a tertiary business programme, noted, “my 
first time of visiting the café I heard kind of when people go to the Net, kind of browsing 
pornographic stuff and stuff like that.  Yes, so it was like going to the café no, no, no I 
won’t even try it.”  Although Maureen eventually became a regular at the Internet café in 
La Paz and determined that Internet cafés were not primarily used for porn viewing, her 
introduction to the Internet was delayed by these concerns.  Abiba, whose family 
responsibilities were described above, faced a three-fold restriction on the amount of time 
she spent at the Internet café4.  She struggled with unwelcome advances from young men 
at the café complaining, “You see, when you go to the café, sometimes you go you see 
plenty people and there are a lot of guys there.  When you go there they will just disturb 
you.  They say, ‘oh, this, I want you to be my girlfriend’ and those stuff.  I don’t like those 
things.  So sometimes I don’t feel going out.”  Yet even in her willingness to put up with 
some of this behaviour in order to check her e-mail and chat with a pen pal, she was 
further restricted by the time she was allowed to spend out of the home by family who 
wanted to keep her under supervision as much as possible.  She added, “I’m not even 
allowed out more times.  I’m always restricted.  Before I go out I seek permission, the 
time is given, go and come at this time.  Don’t stay long, so I’m being restricted...”  To 
resolve the problem of the obnoxious young men, Abiba began going to BusyInternet, 
because of its size and more affluent, older clientele.  As she noted, “The place is always 
busy, there are a lot of people up and down that place.  You don’t see people worrying 
another, everyone is concentrating on the Net.  That place, that is what they do there.”  
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At BusyInternet she benefited from the anonymity a larger café offered.  Unfortunately, 
the price of the café was twice what it was at the smaller neighbourhood cafés she went 
to so this was yet another restriction on the time she could spend on the Internet.   
The experiences of young women suggest that Internet cafés in Accra are the 
domain of young men, not simply because they are uniquely appealing to that particular 
group, but also because young women are actively discouraged from frequenting them.  
They faced this discouragement disproportionately and in accordance with an alternate 
logic than young men.  By contrast, in two separate interviews, young men described the 
admiration their fathers expressed about the mysterious knowledge and contacts their 
sons had acquired at the Internet café.  This emerged in an interview with Frank, the 
young businessman whose Google search strategies were described earlier in this chapter.  
During an interview with his family, Frank noted that his father “used to laugh.  He said, 
one day they will arrest you.  Maybe he [read] a paper about fraud.”  His father who 
affectionately referred to him as ‘Internet man’ added, “I advise him that if you want to 
use the Net, you have to use it correct way, not devious way.”  While aware that fraud 
activities were sometimes taking place in Internet cafés and even indicating suspicion that 
his son might be involved with such activities, Frank’s father positioned himself as his 
son’s advisor allowing Frank a great deal of autonomy. 
 The threat of paedophilia on the Internet was mentioned by young women 
exclusively.  Adama, a University student described the Internet ambivalently as, “it’s the 
best thing.  It’s the best, at the same time the worst thing because sometimes I also read 
about it, like how children meeting paedophiles and I’m thinking wow yeah the Internet, 
it isn’t good.  At the same time when I sit behind the computer I spend like 4 hours, I just 
can’t get myself to get up.”  Ada, a young Nigerian woman, also a student at the 
University of Ghana at Legon described a movie she had seen to explain why she was 
reluctant to share her e-mail address, she noted, “…people can start sending some really 
rude messages, email and everything like that.  [I don’t give out my e-mail address] just 
to prevent that.  There was a movie I watched, something similar to that, um, this woman 
and her daughter.  Her daughter was always on the Net and there was this psycho guy 
she met him in a chat room.  Eventually he got her e-mail address and really sent her 
some really explicit messages…I was so moved by that.”  For Ada protective measures 
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entirely shaped her Internet activities.  She approached chat rooms with deep scepticism 
noting that she, “just believed everybody was lying on the Net to make themselves look 
good.”  When she started using the Internet as a young teenager she would make things 
up about herself, give out a fake age, pretend she was from China, and she never gave out 
her e-mail address.  This precaution combined her interest in identity play on the Internet 
with her desire to protect her actual identity. 
This is not to suggest that all women met the Internet with such hesitation.  Don 
Slater and Janet Kwami observed Asma, a young Muslim teenager at an Internet café 
chat with up to 15 chat partners at one time quickly and easily identifying and ending 
conversations when they turned towards sexual innuendo (Slater and Kwami 2005).  
Asma was at ease in cyberspace confident in her ability to control the nature of her online 
interactions.  Akosua, a successful 42-year-old entrepreneur, narrated her relationship 
with the Internet in a way that excluded men entirely.  She suggested a compatibility 
between women and the Internet via their domination of the markets in Ghana noting 
both that, “…Here, women are more enterprising, you know…A woman can just put a 
table in front of her house, display her wares, she’s selling.  You understand I have to tell 
you that the economy here is run by the women, essentially the market women,” and that 
the Internet is, “…a tool for you to really be on top of the market.”  For Akosua, men 
were irrelevant to the Internet café, a space where she gained a competitive advantage 
against other entrepreneurial women. 
Akosua was able to ignore men completely in her use of the Internet.  The 
activities she chose to carry out on the Internet did not involve conversing with men and 
she spent most of her time at BusyInternet where in this more anonymous and larger 
space people tended to keep to themselves.  Ada and Asma were not able to evade these 
issues given the ways they wanted to use the Internet.  These young women were treated 
in a particular way by young men in these spaces (both online and in person) that they 
found disturbing.  Families, peers, and the media projected an interpretation of the 
relationship between women and the Internet that was also discouraging.  Where schools 
or religious institutions were involved, by contrast, they seemed to discourage or 
encourage men and women equally.  All of this had a profound effect on the patterns of 
use pursued by women.  It shaped the information they gave out, their decisions about 
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starting, continuing, and stopping conversations, whether or not they represented 
themselves authentically, and whether or not they engaged in virtual chat with strangers 
or simply stuck to chat and e-mail with friends from ‘real life.’  Their patterns of use 
sought to balance what they wanted to do at the Internet café and on the Internet with the 
need to protect their reputation and/or avoid contamination to the body and soul from the 
unwanted advances of young men. 
 
Internet Cafés as De-territorialized Places 
 
The activities of young men and women in groups shaped the space of the Internet 
café transforming it (from time to time) into a domain of youthful mischief.  This rarely 
reflected the intentions described by Internet café owners.  However, beyond the way 
young people inhabited and socialized the space, for the most part Internet cafés in Accra 
were strikingly place-less.  With some notable exceptions, Internet cafés were typically 
located in bland, often windowless rooms, sparsely decorated, the walls lined with 
computers with no effort to promote interaction between customers.  The arrangement of 
equipment and furniture was in some cases designed to provide customers with privacy 
making it easier to avoid interaction altogether.  While young people sometimes arrived 
at the café in groups most Internet café users noted that they had met few people (if any) 
at the café and were acquainted only with the Internet café operators.  These spaces did 
not play as significant a role as social centres as the Internet cafés in Europe, Trinidad 
and elsewhere that have been examined in past studies (Wakeford 1999; 2003; Miller and 
Slater 2000; Laegran 2002; Laegran and Stewart 2003). 
These previous studies of Internet cafés have often focused on the kind of social 
setting constructed intentionally or unintentionally through the arrangement of space.  
Wakeford described the Internet cafés she studied in London as “landscapes of 
translation” where technology is “re-territorialized” by staff and customers.  In an 
Internet café that targeted a female clientele she observed the efforts made to demonstrate 
a compatibility between women and technology through décor, graphic design, and 
staffing practices (Wakeford 1999).  Internet cafés in Accra, however, were experienced 
in quite the opposite way.  Users perceived these spaces as “de-territorialized,” providing 
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a suggestive, but incomplete dislocation from place.  Internet cafés did not succeed in 
translating technology into some Ghanaian visual or verbal vernacular.  Instead they 
served as places of escape (Slater and Kwami 2005) transporting customers, often to 
someplace indistinct, but a place that was definitively not located in Ghana.  This 
dislocation was desirable because it fed into the fascination with abroad.  Walking into 
the Internet café, customers were suddenly transported from a hot, tropical climate to the 
air-conditioned environment required by these machines from the cool North.  There was 
limited décor (if any) in most cafés, but when it was present it often made use of foreign 
imagery.  For example, one Internet café was oddly decorated only with large poster-
sized pharmaceutical ads that the café attendant said were brought back by a friend from 
Germany.  In Mamobi, a café had images of Mecca and other important Islamic sites 
displayed on the wall.  The naming of cafés also reflected this de-territorialisation.  “Sky 
Harbour” in the La Paz neighbourhood was named for the airport in Phoenix, Arizona.  
Mobra International Ventures was named to reflect the owners not yet realized aspiration 
to become a globe-trotting businessman.  These names are indefinite and suggestive 
rather than pointing to particular, well-known sites.  They generically evoked the non-
local.  In this sense Internet cafés as places accomplished a negation or transcendence of 
a ‘purely’ Ghanaian identity rather than successfully accommodating and re-interpreting 
it.  It provided this transcendence without supplying an alternate identity in its place.  
Instead the Internet café provided a canvas for imaginatively exploring cosmopolitan 
yearnings. 
One exception to this tendency towards “de-territorialisation” in Internet cafés 
was the interior design at BusyInternet, the largest Internet café in Accra with 100 public 
terminals.  The product of both local and foreign investment, the café was a profit-
making venture guided by a social mission to cultivate technology education and 
investment in Ghana and throughout Africa.  To demonstrate a compatibility between 
African ethnicities and cultures5 and a technology culture was part of this mission.  
Management made efforts to decorate the space with imagery of Ghanaians using 
technology.  Local artists also had their work displayed and sold in the space.  The 
attached restaurant and café served as a very hip hangout with a club atmosphere at 
 92
nights that was popular with young people providing social interaction beyond 
technology use. 
BusyInternet was a space where a compatibility between Ghanaians and techno-
culture was powerfully performed.  It was common to see Ghanaians of a variety of ages 
using the most up-to-date technology gadgets.  Yet, BusyInternet was exceptional in the 
Internet café scene of Accra.  It attracted a wealthier, older, and more international 
clientele and it drew women in much greater numbers than the smaller cafés.  At the 
same time BusyInternet hosted its fair share of teenagers and young men in groups.  Over 
time the management at BusyInternet had implemented several new regulations in order 
to create a space where a diverse clientele would feel comfortable and welcome.  This 
often came at the expense of a younger, rowdier clientele.  The ‘Nima Boys’ presumed to 
be from the rough neighbourhood of Nima were notorious for rowdy behaviour and 
fraudulent activities.  They were gradually discouraged from using BusyInternet as their 
constant hang out.  Management at Busy eventually closed off access to all secure web 
sites in an effort to prevent credit card fraud from taking place in the café.  Rowdy 
youngsters did not disappear from the space, but were forced to keep a lower profile.  
Furthermore, customers were allowed to sit only two to a screen preventing groups from 
crowding around a single terminal.  The attached restaurant and café was conceived of as 
a space entirely open to the public, however eventually due to a shortage of space and 
problems with loitering a rule was implemented that required customers to pay for food 
or beverage in order to use the space.  
Undermining the space-dominating activities of young men did have the desired 
effect at BusyInternet.  Abiba, the young Muslim teenage girl mentioned above, went out 
of her way to spend time at BusyInternet because she felt more comfortable there than in 
the smaller neighbourhood cafés where customer behaviour went unregulated.  
Management did not simply construct the space by restricting behaviour, but through 
special seminars and public events sought to promote new forms of face to face 
interaction.  These events were both business-minded and recreational – the café 
projected football games onto a wall and a conference room played movies on the 
weekends.  For an older, more affluent crowd BusyInternet served as a popular public 
space for networking.  A number of small businesses were run out of Busy rather than 
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from a traditional office space.  Some of these entrepreneurs applied Internet skills to 
established businesses.  This was the case with Sandra who used the Internet to do 
research and communicate with suppliers for her nascent label-making business.  Others 
such as Kwame, a recent university graduate, were attempting to open up new markets, 
developing unique new products and services.  He and a partner were creating a GPS 
system for tracking cars and trucks with a web-based interface.  His business model 
intended to help vehicle (i.e. taxi and tro-tro) owners to monitor their drivers and help 
government officials to collect appropriate import taxes on trucks transporting goods 
through the country.  BusyInternet became a social centre for the new media industry in 
Accra frequented by graphic designers, IT consultants, and people pursuing 
entrepreneurial projects. 
Yet, the efforts at BusyInternet were not always interpreted by Internet users as 
intended by management.  Benjamin, a University student who worked as an “Internet 
advisor” at BusyInternet described how the furniture at the café made an impression on 
him, “…I never saw these kind of seats in Africa.  I’ve never even seen.  They only time I 
saw that kind of seat was in a magazine.  My sister is a marketing personnel and they buy 
these kind of things for companies.  So I’ve only seen it in a magazine, but I didn’t know.  
I mean, a whole company can buy this much chairs, all imported, you know?”  He 
defined the experience of entering the space as instant dislocation as he notes, “the first 
day I entered, I didn’t believe it.  I didn’t believe it was Ghana.”  While BusyInternet was 
ultimately quite successful in creating a space where a wider range of society felt 
comfortable and where the compatibility between Ghanaians and technology was 
demonstrated every day, to an extent the ‘foreign’ quality of technology and its setting of 
use prevailed. 
 
Identity and Escape in a Post-colonial Society 
 
The perception of technology as non-African and spaces of technology use as 
outside of Ghana points to more troubling aspects of the ongoing struggle over national 
and cultural identity in postcolonial societies.  On the use of colonial languages by the 
formerly colonized, Fanon uses this same metaphor of detachment from place when he 
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suggests that, “[adopting] a language different from that of the group into which he was 
born is evidence of a dislocation, a separation" (Fanon 1967, pp. 25).  This principle can 
be extended to the embracing of alien material cultures.  The adoption of the Internet was 
intended by young Internet users to serve the purpose of dislocation, fulfilling a longing 
to transcend and leave behind the limitations of one’s origins.  Indeed rather than 
providing advantages, young people often perceived their background as primarily 
serving to limit them.   
While young people in Accra approached the Internet with an openness to future 
possibilities and with an eye on personal transformation, at the same time they relied on a 
lifetime of interpretive resources, a legacy of their cultural heritage to make sense of the 
technology.  Their cultural positioning was therefore impossible to escape entirely.  In the 
narratives Internet users provided about themselves and about the Internet, they 
accomplished the translation of the technology into something locally comprehensible, a 
translation often occurring in a verbal/oral modality through speech and story-telling 
rather than a spatial one (i.e. through the configuration of space in Internet cafés).  While 
young people incorporated ideals of modernity and post-modernity attributed largely to 
the West in their engagement with the Internet, they also demonstrated a much wider 
embrace of the global that included an interest in ideas and opportunities coming from 
multiple directions, not just from the north.  Therefore, as the following examples will 
demonstrate, technology use did not simply westernize, civilize, or modernize Internet 
users. 
To address these complexities of technology appropriation it is useful to look at 
the self-portraits of youth and how they made use of computers and the Internet in their 
biographical narratives.  Much of this work was done in interviews, but the Internet was 
also used, in a few cases, as a platform for producing personal web pages as a durable 
self-portrait in a rich, multi-media format.  Personal web pages were on the continuum of 
activities carried out by young Internet users that incorporated new technologies to reach 
a particular audience and provide support for their claims of accomplishment and 
affiliation.  The case of two young men, both particularly adept Internet users, who 
posted their personal biographies as web pages will be examined in this section.  
Additionally digital media practices that were used to supplement online and offline 
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interactions, such as photo attachments sent by e-mail, will also be detailed.  I am 
purposefully drawing on my role as audience and as potential ‘foreign contact’ in this 
analysis including self-portraits that were directed to me in the context of interviews 
(before, during, or after) as well as those constructed for a foreign audience online.  
These self-presentation strategies made use of personal heroes, foreign contacts (with the 
teller sometimes brandishing proof in the form of a photo or letter), and idealized self-
representations that often selectively highlighted and exaggerated personal details and 
credentials.  These cases can also be related to the personal web pages produced in other 
regions highlighting some significant differences in the way nationality and ethnic 
identity are represented. 
Isaac, a man in his late twenties who worked as an Internet café operator, put 
together a website for a bid for political office.  He was planning a campaign to run for 
MP in 2008.  The site includes a lengthy and eloquent manifesto where he describes his 
platform addressing the concerns of as many of his potential constituents as possible.  He 
emphasizes four distinct components of his biography and involvements to make his 
case: 1) his high-status family ties, 2) his foreign contacts, 3) his fluency with technology 
and 4) his outsider status.  As evidenced by the way he addresses his readers, Isaac 
envisions both Ghanaian citizens in the district as well as interested foreigners or 
Ghanaian transnationals visiting the site.  On one page, for example, he provides bank 
details so that individuals living outside of Ghana can donate money to his campaign. 
The first aspect of his biography appeals to distinctly Ghanaian markers of social 
status and is communicated in the very opening lines of the website where he notes that 
he was, “Born on Saturday, 11th February, 19xx to [name], the Paramount Chief of xx 
Traditional Council, and the President of the xx Traditional Council and Madam xx, the 
Queen Mother (now deceased).  I am the third born boy in a row of three boys and also 
the third born of five children from my mother, but the 14th born of 16 children from my 
father, the Makorsor of xx.”  However, Isaac devotes much more space on the site to 
detailing his foreign contacts through text and imagery than to these traditional status 
indicators.  On a page titled “Business Partners / Advisors” Isaac references an African-
American businessman in the U.S. (whom he had an ongoing partnership with) and 
another advisor from Germany.  Photos and contact information provide proof of their 
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existence.  On his biography page the right hand side is lined with photos, on top a photo 
of his father, a chief, leaning in to consult with a middle-aged white man dressed in 
traditional Kente cloth.  Underneath are two photos showing Isaac standing in a group 
with other young people of both white and black ethnicity.  In the context of his bid for 
MP, claiming foreign contacts is a way of demonstrating to the constituency that he is a 
man of means and has access to valuable social and financial resources.  He credits the 
Internet with facilitating access to these foreign resources noting that,  
 
“Our state has endured floods and droughts. The floods displacing people 
and the drought starving us. We had to get help from NADMO. These help 
will come a three-fold. Trust me, as I have the links worldwide by the 
power of the Internet [added emphasis].” 
 
Isaac translates his technical knowledge into a benefit for the district by pointing to 
foreign contacts as a source of help (as above) and by describing the Internet as the 
terrain where he cultivated his skills as a salesman as he notes, “I am an Internet 
salesman by nature. And now most of my energies will go into selling [district name]. If I 
can sell houses, cars and plots of land on the Internet, you know I can sell just about 
anything. [district name] is the easiest sell I will ever have.”  Yet, in my interactions and 
interviews with Isaac over a period of 8 months there was no indication that he had sold 
any of these goods.  Therefore, this claim serves as a likely example of the tendency that 
I observed among young men towards fictional and exaggerated claims in self-
representation and the conflation of a realized and aspirational self. 
Isaac recognized that his youth and inexperience was a liability to his aspirations.  
Rather than deny this, he sought to reclaim it as an advantage.  Conjuring a vision of 
impotent and corrupt ‘career politicians’ he positions himself as a reformer arguing in his 
manifesto,  
 
“Frankly, these people — several of the candidates — have been in [district 
name] for 20 years, they've been saying the same things… It is no secret that 
I'm a newcomer to politics…I will talk to address the problems facing my 
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Constituency and have then solved which my predecessors have and could not 
do. And I will work hard to reform government, but [sic] bringing openness 
and full disclosure of how I will spend the MP’s Common Fund. I will enter 
this office beholding to no one, except you, my fellow citizens.”  
 
Isaac also attempts to substitute experience in the domain of technology for his 
inexperience in the domain of politics.  He turns the tables on the other candidates by 
casting them as perhaps experienced in (but also corrupted by) politics, but inexperienced 
with the Internet and computing technologies.  As he notes, “I am rather sad to say that 
not even some of the other contestants have email addresses of which they can 
correspond to the outside world by the touch of a computer keyboard.”  To drive home 
this point, he illustrates his technological fluency with several photos.  At the bottom of 
the list of photos on his biography page are two photos showing Isaac in the Internet café.  
In one photo he is wearing sunglasses and actively interacting with a computer with one 
hand on the mouse and the other on the keyboard.  In another he is wearing the same 
sunglasses looking authoritatively into the camera, seated next to a computer with his 
arms crossed.  His body positioning communicates his comfort with and command over 
these technologies (see figure 4). 
Isaac was motivated by the pragmatic and fairly short-term need to raise funds for 
his campaign.  A second website, by a secondary school student named Mohammed was 
politically-minded in a way that was similar to Isaacs.  His site, however, was not tied to 
a specific goal such as election to political office, but had a more abstract and open ended 
purpose.  It served to encapsulate and represent his interests and to project them out to the 
wider world.  On one of his web pages, he describes as his ambitious and far-reaching 
aspirations, “TO BECOME SUCCESSFUL IN BUSINESS AND POLITICS SO AS TO 
CHANGE MILLIONS OF LIVES GLOBALLY.”  Mohammed’s site is divided into 
three sections.  One section describes the youth group he and a cousin had started and 
provides links to their constitution and calendar of activities.  A second section details 
social problems in his home neighbourhood as a way to educate other young people and 
to put political pressure on authorities.  A third section contains his biography.  Like 
Isaac’s website Mohammed also has photos of social contacts of various ethnicities and 
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nationalities as a way of highlighting his foreign ties.  Mohammed also includes several 
images of his role models, mostly American politicians and political figures including 
Malcolm X and Bill Clinton.  Photos of people he knows personally include friends and 
family living abroad; one, a white pen pal named Liz and another identified as “Brother 
Zaindeen in Japan.”  Unlike Isaac, in his biography Mohammed omits any information 
about his family ties (that were low-status) beginning instead with details about his more 
promising educational attainment.  Other photos on the site show Mohammed depicted as 
a leader, holding a microphone in the midst of giving a speech, wearing a suit, standing 
next to a local politician and a lawyer.  Unlike Isaac, Mohammed did not use imagery of 
computers and technology to construct his self-portrait although he did describe “surfing 
the web” as one of his hobbies. 
It is notable that in none of the personal websites created by Ghanaian Internet 
users was there any effort to mark the site with national symbols such as the Ghanaian 
flag.  The number of websites produced by Ghanaians who were part of this research 
comes to about a dozen or so altogether including personal profiles at the social 
networking sites Hi5 and sms.ac.uk.  This is a contrast to the websites produced by 
Trinidadians (similarly from a post-colonial nation) that were heavily marked by such 
national identifications (Miller and Slater 2000).  Neither was there an effort to educate 
website visitors about Ghana.  Instead, website developers made an effort to distance 
themselves from this identity, emphasizing instead their connections to abroad, their 
common interests shared with foreign visitors.  For example, another website created by a 
pastor named Alexander underlines mutual belonging to the realm of Christendom6.  
Alexander’s concern was with remedying his ‘otherness’ in the eyes of a foreign 
audience by foregrounding sameness through linguistic phrasings and shared stories from 
the global Christianity movement. 
Internet users also found ways to incorporate media forms (digital and non-
digital) into the personal biographies they delivered verbally in interviews.  These media 
forms constructed, supplemented, and provided proof of their spoken self-representations.  
One young man during his interview presented a postmarked envelope with a female 
name and return address in the U.S. to demonstrate the existence of an American pen pal.  
Two young men initially contacted in Internet cafés, followed up their conversations with 
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me by sending e-mails with photographs as attachments.  Like the images on Mohammed 
and Isaac’s web pages, the photo sent by Charles attempts a similar construction of 
cosmopolitan identity.  He accomplishes this through clothing style rather than making 
visible his affiliations with foreigners.  His photo depicts him alone on an anonymous 
beach (see figure 5).  The almost non-existent background fades into the black night 
providing no indication of location.  In the foreground, Charles stands looking directly 
into the camera.  He is wearing a knit hat with the words NYPD and a heavy oversized 
track suit.  The jacket he is wearing has the words “New York” written in graffiti-style 
script.  His attire locates him on a cold, American beach although from his self-reported 
lack of travel experience it is clear that it was actually photographed on a beach 
somewhere in Ghana.  It is not clear what the circumstances were for the creation of this 
photo, but this was the sole image Charles chose to send to me as a representation of 
himself. 
Given the explicit sender and receiver structure of e-mail, photos sent as 
attachments, unlike those posted on web pages, could be incorporated into exchange 
relations.  Emmanuel sent a set of 11 photos to my e-mail address after our interview.  
They depict him neatly dressed in either traditional or Western style clothing.  They were 
extended as a free gift, attached to an e-mail that said, “I really want us to be good friends 
and i dont want to be missing and i will be glad to take you as a sister in the Lord and i 
will also love to learn so many things from you and the same way i will also teach you 
more things.”  The photos therefore served not only in representing connections with 
foreigners through their content, but also played a role in effecting such connections.  E-
cards and greeting card style mobile phone text messages with cute poems7 were 
similarly employed to build bonds between young Internet users and foreign contacts as 
well as amongst friends and family locally.  Beyond signifying cosmopolitanism to an 
audience or providing an expressive outlet for such fantasies, these digital objects served 
to build and maintain affiliations between people across distances that could not be as 
easily or frequently bridged before the arrival of these technologies. 
Yet, media objects could also be used by adversaries to undermine efforts to 
impress and build trust with contacts by contradicting the self-representations carefully 
assembled by the young and ambitious.  Isaac, the aspiring MP whose website was 
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analyzed above, had worked with Emmanuel when both were operators in the same 
Internet café.  After I interviewed Emmanuel, Isaac handed me a print out of an e-mail he 
had found in the café.  It gave evidence of Emmanuel’s attempt to scam money from a 
foreign televangelist thereby calling into question his moral stance and good intentions.  
Altogether, documents and photos supported idealized and aspirational self-presentation, 
provided proof of affiliation and location, and served as gifts to build social bonds.  In all 
of the above examples, the uses of imagery, documents, and web pages show how 
Internet users were inclined to complement the flexibility and ephemeral nature of speech 
with the concreteness of more tangible and durable media objects.  They had the weight 
of proof that could either convincingly support a coherent self-representation or 
undermine it. 
One feature of both Mohammed and Isaac’s websites was a list of role models and 
similar lists were also referenced in several interviews.  These role models contributed to 
the project of self-presentation, but were also sense-making tools.  The biographies of 
role models were resources that Internet users referred to in selecting ideals and 
determining paths towards a desired self-realization.  Through the role models young 
people selected, they embraced global influences from many directions, not just Europe 
and North America.  They drew their own interpretations about these biographies relating 
it to personal challenges and aspirations rather than simply absorbing versions of heroism 
legitimated in the West.  Instead, young men expressed an ambivalent relationship to the 
West, an admiration and envy of Western prosperity and at the same time support for and 
identification with those seen as successfully challenging Western hegemony.  This 
ambivalence yielded striking and unresolved juxtapositions.  For example, in their 
research in the Mamobi neighbourhood, Don Slater and Janet Kwami found a group of 
young people at a ‘base’ who had designed a flag depicting an American $100 dollar bill 
with Osama Bin Laden’s face in the centre.  The young men described both an admiration 
for the ‘almighty dollar’ and American power while simultaneously seeing Bin Laden as 
a disciplined Muslim that they admired for his commitment to his faith.   
Clarence was another example of the attempt to extrapolate commonalities from 
the lives of individuals who in public political and media discourse in the West are 
characterized as enemies.  The role models he listed included Bill Gates, Kwame 
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Nkrumah, Colonel Gaddafi, and Saddam Hussein.  On Gaddafi he tells a story of triumph 
against adversity, “you know, Gaddafi was on sanctions for almost 50 years, but in his 
country nobody begs for food.  You have places where you can just go and eat for free.  
Over there if you are a citizen.  You know?  Even in Ghana, we’ve not gotten to that level 
yet.  Imagine somebody on sanctions, it’s an Arab land.  You don’t have much favour in 
Europe and America and they’ve managed to make it that way.  He’s really worked hard.  
You’ve got the best of roads in Libya, you know?”  Clarence’s presentation of this and the 
other biographies of role models was idealistic and simplified, cleared of complications 
and inconsistencies.   
The reinvention of role models sometimes went much further than over-
simplification and omission of part of what is documented about these famous figures.  
This was the case with stories about Bill Gates.  These stories facilitated the self-creation 
that comes out of hero stories in a way that could be linked directly to the possession and 
use of computing technologies.  What was particularly interesting about the Bill Gates 
story was the inaccuracies that were introduced in the version told in Ghana and how this 
served the storyteller.  Gates biography was told as an IT version of the rags to riches 
fairy tale.  Below are two striking retellings of this story, both contextualized by the 
tellers as a source of motivation for their own Internet activities: 
 
“You see Bill Gates of the America, he entered into Microsoft.  You know he was an 
illiterate, if you don’t, I hope it’s on record…He was a dropout at school I think at the 
age of 12 or 8, I’m not very sure, but now look at Microsoft it’s big.  It’s like a Coca-
Cola bottle, almost everywhere they know it.  So, some people as my role model I realized 
I can do something not necessarily, you know, because I didn’t have that means and I 
was schooling at the same time...” – Kwadjo 
 
“Bill Gates, was no one.  He had to drop out of school because he wasn’t able to pay, you 
know?  So he’s no different…you realize that look, you can make it because people are 
making it and you read their background, it’s no different, you are even better off.  You 
are far better off.  So, basically that inspires you, it makes you feel, look, I’m on the right 
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track, but if you don’t know much about other people, you are forced to believe they were 
born rich and look you were born poor.” - Clarence 
 
In both examples, the teller translated the story of Bill Gates into a version that 
was locally intelligible.  Whereas in the public media version told in the West Bill Gates 
was a Harvard undergrad who dropped out to focus his energy on his entrepreneurial 
aspirations, in these retellings, Bill Gates had a much more modest beginning.  He 
dropped out of school long before reaching university because he could not pay.  This 
revision of the story gave it greater resonance among young Ghanaians for whom 
dropping out of school follows from deprivation, not from an overabundance of 
opportunities.  The translation of the Bill Gates story made information technology a field 
ripe with opportunities well suited to youth in Ghana who often face extreme difficulty in 
attaining the formal education they desire.  IT was portrayed as a field that rewards those 
who work hard and have sharp minds rather than those with the privilege of a formal 
education.  This process effectively re-territorialized the biography of Bill Gates as a 
Ghanaian fairy tale.  Computing technologies thereby became a domain highly 
compatible with the conditions youth face in Ghana. 
Internet users made use of a wide range of source material including images of 
people and goods (including technologies), selective personal details (notable for both 
what was included and what was omitted), as well as the borrowed and re-constituted 
biographies of role models.  These materials were brought together in unique ways to 
construct idealized self-portraits that produced similar representations of young people’s 
lives both in informal interviews as well as more permanently on personal web sites.  The 
Bill Gates story is a good example of how source materials were transformed through 
their appropriation.  The way narratives and imagery were altered and juxtaposed in 
unexpected and contradictory ways (by Western standards) counters any notion about a 
simple internalization of foreign media messages about technology. 
Internet users in Accra expressed both conscious appreciation of the abstract 
potential of this technology and the settings of its use while justifying their use (and the 
positive outcome to this use that they were convinced was imminent) by underlining its 
compatibility with their life situation.  Users sought to bring the technology within reach 
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while at the same time maintaining a distance that preserved the possibility of self 
transformation through contact with this foreign object.  Users did not wish for the 
Internet to fade into the background of their lives, serving as an invisible supporting 
structure, instead they fantasized that it would launch them into a wholly better lifestyle. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Appropriation is a process through which technology users attempt to reconcile 
the distance between an abstract commodity and themselves.  This chapter has attempted 
to highlight the complex ways that users effect such a reconciliation calling into question 
simplified visions of how the ‘natives’ social self is transformed through a relationship 
with ‘foreign’ goods.  The outcome is not the automatic westernization of the subject 
through contact with Western technologies.  Neither is it the translation of what is foreign 
into a completely local vernacular.  The Internet does not have to be explicitly 
Africanized for young Ghanaians to meaningfully engage with it.  Indeed it was precisely 
the technology’s qualities of foreignness that attracted many young people. 
A total localization whereby the Internet comes to be identified as having local 
origins8, or is thought to better facilitate some distinctively national lifestyle or mindset 
(Miller and Slater 2000) was not largely in evidence in Accra.  The absence of this type 
of localization was not a failed appropriation.  Rather it related to the way Internet users, 
particularly young people, negotiated a relationship with the West.  The Internet was not 
defined as intrinsically Ghanaian in part because so many Internet users sought to 
distance themselves from this identification.  The models of success communicated by 
young people in idealized self-descriptions frequently underlined a rejection of being too 
place-bound, provincial or “bush” (a reference to rural life implying ignorance of 
modern/city living).  Technology use was part of this process of becoming more 
cosmopolitan through contact with foreigners and the development of internationally 
transferable IT skills.  Furthermore, the presentation of the Internet in the space of the 
Internet café with air conditioning, minimalist décor, and ambiguous or abstract business 
names referencing foreign locales created a de-territorialized space where users could 
escape local conditions and project alternate fantasies of location and dislocation.  In a 
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postcolonial context, such a rejection of national and ethnic identifiers suggests that an 
insidious process of self-negation may be at play.  Alternately, their efforts at self-
presentation in interviews and on websites could be interpreted as evidence of a very 
forward-thinking desire to transcend national boundaries, a vision that finds a 
compatibility in the boundary-less ambiguity of cyberspace.  Either way, the absence of a 
connection between the technology and an explicit sense of being Akan, Ga, Ewe, 
Ghanaian or African distinctively characterizes how the Internet was appropriated by 
many Internet café users in Accra. 
The activities of youth, particularly the competitive games and mischievous 
exploration of illicit media, bring into sharp focus the often exploratory, non-
instrumentalist nature of technology appropriation.  Users’ interests were not driven 
solely by the pragmatic efficacy of the Internet.  Rather, the Internet enabled potent 
symbolic functions, as when young men made foreign goods (like bibles and CDs) 
magically materialize via the electric impulses of the Internet to demonstrate their 
expanding control over vast global distances.  Mercer makes the point that there is an 
‘African Exceptionalism’ at play in the way technology is related to African development 
in hegemonic Western discourses (Mercer 2005).  This expectation is that the Internet in 
Africa should serve primarily as a tool for realizing pragmatic improvements in living 
conditions through health, education, government, and business applications.  By 
contrast, in the West the Internet has a recognized and legitimate role fulfilling 
entertainment needs and (among youth in particular) facilitating identity play.  Mercer 
challenges this exceptionalism asserting that uses of the Internet in Tanzania were 
broadly similar to tendencies in developed nations.  However, while this argument is 
appealingly egalitarian, it is rather too general and glosses over the alternate motives and 
constraints that exist in different settings of technology appropriation.  By emphasizing 
similarity the interpretive flexibility of technology and the capacity for user agency is 
downplayed.  Taking the opposing route, examples throughout this thesis will further 
detail the processes that distinctively localized the Internet in Ghana.  This chapter has 
shown that even within Accra there was a fundamental diversity in styles of Internet use 
that related to age, gender and education level.  The distinctiveness of Internet use in 
Ghana was tied simultaneously to a particular local sense of Ghana’s position in the 
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world order as well as the peculiarity of local social formations, such as the relationship 
between youth and their elders, between peers, and between men and women. 
Besides delving into the complexities of localization, this chapter has also 
introduced the notion that the appropriation of the Internet in Accra was fundamentally 
collaborative.  An analysis of youth activities in the Internet café has looked at innovative 
group play.  This play made use of language, multiple media formats, as well as richly 
embodied practice such as dancing to music videos and ‘being noisy’ to claim ownership 
of space.  Yet, these practices contradict assumptions about the inherent sociability and 
cohesiveness of shared technology access spaces like Internet cafés.  Activities taking 
place in the Internet cafés of Accra were also shaped by conflict, competition, and 
exclusion.  Appropriation occurred through human to human relations, not just human-
machine relations.  Users and non-users looked to others for information, direction, 
encouragement, and even permission to relate to the Internet and to inhabit the Internet 
café in particular ways.  Youth who visited the Internet café together in groups were an 
easily observable and visibly apparent case of a collective appropriation.  These practices 
will serve as a stepping stone to an examination of more subtle forms of collective sense-
making in later chapters of this thesis that took place outside of the Internet café and 
through other social configurations.  Examples in this chapter from classrooms and 
dormitories as spaces where memories and materials from the Internet café were 
transported demonstrate the broader terrain of collective engagements with technology.  
The following three chapters incorporate observations from a still wider range of spaces 
to make the point that use of the Internet was not limited to a direct interaction with the 
keyboard and screen within the walls of the Internet café.  Collective practices could also 
circulate in the representational form of language.  The next chapter examines the 
circulation of rumours about Internet fraud as an informal media that defines 
functionality and sets expectations for users while outlining a relationship between the 
user and the technology.  Like this chapter, the next will continue examining how Internet 
users narrate a place for themselves and others in relation to the technology and how the 
sense of their place in the world is impacted through an engagement with the Internet. 
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1 From a radio show publicly broadcast in Accra February 2006 
2 Dependence on parents was a concern for youth only in the situation where their parents were unable to 
provide for them.  Ghanaian families operated much more as an economic unit with money flowing 
towards whomever most needed it and typically from older to younger family members.  There was not a 
strong sense of pride in economic independence and self-sufficiency or shame about dependence. 
3 The driver’s mate is the person who collects money, announces the route of the bus to those waiting at bus 
stops, and arranges seating.  Trotros are the primary form of low-cost public transportation in Ghana.  The 
vehicles and routes are not government funded or organized, but rather privately owned and operated. 
4 It is likely that the restrictions faced by young women related to whether they were Muslim or Christian.  
However, this empirical ‘hunch’ is based on a very limited number of encounters with young female 
Muslim Internet users. 
5 BusyInternet was initially meant to be the first of a chain of Internet cafés spreading through West Africa 
and beyond 
6 see chapter 5 for further discussion of the role of religion in transcending geographic and social distances. 
7 Some examples of text message poems:  
           1) “The ,-#-.-#-. 
 Heart    #    ‘#’  # 
 Of ‘#,   ,#’ 
 A Friend    ‘#’ 
 Knows 
 No 
 Boundaries. 
 No 
 Limits 
 Just 
 Endless 
 Love and Care! 
 Have a pleasant day.” 
 
2) “A morning is a wonderful blessing…whether stormy or sunny, it stands for hope, giving us another start 
of what we call…L-I-F-E ! Good morning” 
 
3) “Today’s Weather Forecast – THERE SHALL BE SHOWERS OF BLESSING ALL OVER U & A 
HEAVY DOWNPOUR OF GOD’S FAVOUR.  Be ready to be soaked in it.  Have a great day!” 
 
8 For example, the German liquor Schnapps has been thoroughly incorporated into traditional gift exchange 
rituals given as brideprice at weddings and as gifts to chiefs.  In one interview I was told that Schnapps was 
a local drink.  This may mean either they believed the distillation process originated in Ghana, that the 
locally consumed bottles were produced in Ghana, or that it was thoroughly entwined in the practices of 
local ethnic groups.  With time the foreign origins and any attached cultural meanings have been expunged 
from the way Ghanaians interpret the commodity.  For a similar account, see Miller (2002) on the cultural 
positioning of Coca-Cola in Trinidad and Classen (1996) on Coca-Cola in the Argentine Northwest. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Telling Stories of Internet Fraud 
 
“there is something really about this Internet, there is something that is really making my 
friends rich...” – Gabby 
 
Face-to-face conversation between Internet users, particularly through the 
modality of rumour, constitutes a ‘use’ of the technology that challenges the supremacy 
of direct human-machine interaction in establishing a meaningful understanding of how 
the Internet ‘works.’  To establish this claim, this chapter grapples with an intriguing 
disconnect, that users sometimes described how the Internet works generally and how it 
was relevant to them personally in a way that was contradicted by their personal 
experiences using the technology.  This was nowhere more apparent than in the case of 
Internet fraud and scams which seemed more widespread as a phenomenon of speech and 
social imagination than as one of Internet use.  Many young Internet users who had never 
made a dime on the Internet expressed the conviction that it was being widely used by 
clever, young Ghanaians (and/or others) to acquire thousands of dollars, the latest 
fashion, or the newest technologies by duping unsuspecting foreigners.  This mental 
representation of the Internet as a tool for making big gains was socially constructed, in 
part, through rumours about Internet crime that played an important role as a mechanism 
for making sense of the Internet through the creation and diffusion of meanings. 
In their forays online, however, Internet users had to work with the material 
capabilities offered by the Internet: the keyboard, the mouse, chat rooms and other virtual 
spaces, and the people they encountered in these spaces.  Users were at times confronted 
by a mismatch between the behaviour of these ‘others’ (human and non-human) and the 
way they were alternately represented in rumours and other speech.  They had to 
reconcile their own failure to ‘make gains’ or achieve personal transformation through 
Internet use.  In short, the Internet often didn’t behave as expected or desired.  In light of 
their experiences, Internet users revised the definitions of the Internet and Internet crime 
they had described in speech.  They pointed to the need for additional resources or 
referred to forces at work that they had not previously been aware of to explain this 
difference between representation and experience.  However, these explanations served 
only as caveats.  The notion of the Internet as a tool for making ‘big gains’ had a 
 108
paradigmatic quality and remained remarkably intact despite contrary evidence.  While 
the details about effective Internet use might alter in light of user’s experiences the 
essential shape of the narrative presented in rumours did not. 
The endurance of rumours about Internet crime is explained by the role they 
played in reducing the threat and uncertainty presented by these illicit activities and in 
amplifying the sense of purposefulness and efficacy in Internet use.  Among all forms of 
Internet use in Accra, Internet crime had the highest stakes.  It was an activity that held 
the promise of unlimited financial opportunity while at the same time representing a 
dangerous entanglement that could damage the morality and finances of those involved.  
The idea that these crimes were being committed by their peers cast suspicion on young 
male Internet users and contradicted the positive representation they sought to portray of 
themselves and their society.  In rumours about Internet crime, therefore, young people 
negotiated issues of morality, opportunity, and aspiration that seemed altered and newly 
challenged by the technology.  Through speech, Internet users worked to create a sense of 
predictability and stability that would alleviate this threat.  Therefore Internet 
appropriation in Accra was a process that involved far more than concerns about 
functionality and local usefulness, but was also about defining a relationship to the 
technology that preserved or amplified perceptions of safety, effectiveness, and morality. 
Beyond reducing threat and unpredictability, speech about Internet crime 
activities also served as an implicit social commentary on north-south relations.  Internet 
users who were either witnesses or personally involved in the Internet crime scene were 
cynical about the potential for Internet connectivity to incorporate marginalized societies, 
such as their own, into the global economy, a claim that is made as part of the debate over 
the digital divide.  They expressed the conviction that in order to succeed in the global 
economy they had to work against rather than in cooperation with prevailing powers.  
These powers provided them with no legitimate position from which to acquire capital or 
participate productively in the global economy.  These activities, however, have had a 
negative effect on representations of Africa and Africans in virtual spaces leading to an 
exacerbation of stereotypes and have served, in some online venues, to reinforce a racist 
discourse of black criminality. 
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A Typology of Internet Fraud and Scams - Defining Deviance 
 
Nigerian 419 e-mails1 are a widely known scam associated with the West Africa 
region.  In these e-mails the author often claims to be a wealthy former member of the 
corrupt Nigerian government needing to quickly transfer money out of the country.  The 
extraordinary circumstances are explained by the death (often by plane or car crash or 
murder by political opponents) of a family member or business contact.  The e-mail 
recipient is asked to provide assistance often by making their bank account available for 
the money transfer.  As a reward, the recipient is promised a hefty percentage of the gain 
often in the amount of several million pounds.  Victims are asked to pay upfront fees for 
bribes or other costs and this money disappears.  There are a number of variations on this 
e-mail scam including ones about lottery winnings, church projects, or business deals, all 
falling roughly into the same category.  The e-mails are not limited to the Nigerian 
political scene and authors often claim to be from other African countries.  They describe 
political problems and civil wars on the continent to provide a concrete reference point 
that is meant to create a sense of plausibility.  The conflict over diamond mines in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia and the seizure of white-owned farm land in Zimbabwe are some of 
the plot points that have been employed.  While Nigeria continues to be commonly 
identified as the source of these e-mails, the content locates them more broadly on the 
African continent.2 
The sorts of scam strategies that Internet users (scammers and non-scammers 
alike) in Accra described were similar to the Nigerian approach that employed 
misrepresentation and persuasive story-telling.  However, scammers in Accra used 
simpler stories that did not reference the region’s political history.  They often initiated 
contact with potential victims through chat rooms or dating websites instead of e-mail.  
Rather than pose as a wealthy government official, young male scammers took on an 
alternate female personae while online in order to find a foreign boyfriend.  These 
scammers worked with a few contacts at a time rather than using machine harvested e-
mail addresses to send out mass e-mails.  Invariably the primary scammer was male, 
although he might recruit a sister or a female friend to assist by taking phone calls from 
the foreign boyfriend and by sitting in front of a web cam while the scammer typed.  
Once the boyfriend was properly seduced the scammer would invent a scenario.  He 
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might ask for money to pay for travel so that they could meet in person or he might claim 
a family member was gravely ill and ask for help with medical expenses.  In contrast to 
the Nigerian approach, the Ghanaian scammers tended to appeal to the sexual desires and 
altruism of foreigners more often than their greed. 
Another approach was the use of stolen credit card numbers to make purchases on 
e-commerce sites.  Credit card numbers were obtained from contacts overseas or from 
local four star hotels among the few places where credit cards were accepted and 
commonly used in Accra.  Some used a website to generate credit card numbers although 
most agreed that this was fairly ineffective.  The purchases made this way (often 
electronics or fashion inspired by American hip-hop and rap videos) were shipped to a 
friend in the U.S. or U.K. who re-routed them to Ghana where the fraudster resold the 
goods for cash.  The use of an intermediary was necessary since many e-commerce sites 
did not ship to Ghana (where few people have or use credit cards) and a similar process 
of misrepresentation and story-telling was often used to woo foreign intermediaries if 
friends or family abroad were not available.  It was clear from my observations that 
attempts were being made to use credit cards in Accra’s Internet cafés.  From time to 
time I saw young men at Internet cafés copying credit card numbers off of hand-written 
lists or from e-mails into e-commerce sites.  However, I never witnessed anyone succeed 
with these practices. 
In the broader context of Internet use these were the forms of use that were 
invariably defined by Internet users in Accra as deviant.  However, these were not the 
only forms of Internet use in Accra that made use of knowing misrepresentations.  More 
generally, the Internet was used to contact people abroad to make requests for assistance 
with finances or migration.  These contacts abroad could be foreigners or they could be 
family or friends from Ghana who had migrated.  To represent oneself favourably and 
sympathetically online was, of course, the goal.  From speaking with Ghanaians living 
abroad I learned that requests from family in Ghana were often treated with scepticism 
since they could involve misrepresentations.  Samuel, a Ghanaian working as a social 
worker in the U.S. noted, “they will even tell you stories about ‘well I’m not feeling well 
the doctor says this’ it’s medical, so you send money to them.  Then they just go and 
spend the money…”  To a certain extent this problem arose from a misunderstanding 
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between those abroad and those in Ghana who believed those outside (family or 
foreigners) to be stingy (or racist in the case of some foreigners) and themselves as 
legitimately in need of the money.  As Samuel added, “the concern has always been like 
every other family…they always think that you are making too much money, you’re here, 
so you have to send them money.”  This motive for misrepresentation (stinginess, greed, 
the failure of the wealthy to redistribute wealth) is a theme that carries through to other 
forms of Internet use including Internet crimes. 
 Beyond cases of what would be considered socially acceptable misrepresentation 
for financial gain, there were, in contrast, examples of legitimate gains made over the 
Internet that were portrayed as transgressive.  For example, a few young men described 
how, as schoolboys, they used to go to the café in groups and visit websites to request 
shipment of CDs of computer gambling games or free bibles.  Among friends, they would 
hold a competition to see who could get the most copies.  The magic of ‘gaining 
something for nothing’ through the Internet provided a thrill. At the same time this 
behaviour was criticized in the same way many criticized Internet crime.  One of these 
former schoolboys, Kwaku, described the motive for CD and book collecting as, “you 
just want to be greedy, that is the reason....”  Some of this sense of greed or criminality 
related to different perceptions of value.  The level of general poverty in Accra is such 
that access to books and papers are fairly limited.  While in work environments in 
developed countries we may feel like we are swimming, or even drowning, in papers, in 
Accra to give someone your business card was treated with reverence as a material gift.  
Business cards were referred to as ‘complimentary’ cards highlighting its characterization 
as a gift.  Similarly, from time to time people I encountered in Accra brandished creased 
and stained ‘letterhead’ from an organization as proof of their affiliation, but did not have 
the resources to provide me with a copy.  Some of this reverence around paper relates to 
the power of affiliation and having contacts, but some of it is also about what producers 
in the north see as valueless being interpreted as valuable by consumers in the south. 
 Local interpretations of value and distinctions made on a case by case basis 
between need and greed explain how, amongst similar activities, some could be 
interpreted as deviant and others as socially acceptable.  The nature of the social tie and 
the level of obligation between giver and receiver was another factor.  Financial gains 
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made through established ties of obligation where some form of misrepresentation was 
employed (i.e. a non-existent illness, money sent for a school book is used for something 
else) was a gray area.  This rationale of need was also taken up by Internet scammers and 
fraudsters as justification for their activities.  On the issue of obligation, a young woman 
who had assisted a male friend with an Internet scam defended her role by asserting that 
it was her duty to help a friend whenever asked.  This was true, she implied, despite any 
moral reservations she might have about the activity.  One reason gender-switching 
Internet scams are defined as deviant is the non-legitimacy of the obligation between the 
male scammer and foreign boyfriend by virtue of the scammers misrepresented gender.  
Obligation and need were justifications that overrode moral transgressions in online 
interaction drawing a distinction between how Internet users defined Internet 
crime/deviance in opposition to ordinary and harmless misrepresentation.  Internet users 
often contextualized rumours about Internet crime using this rationale of need versus 
greed providing an instant register of their position as sympathizer or critic of these 
activities. 
 
Rumours Generate a Discourse of Meaning about the Internet 
 
In media-saturated societies, dominant messages about new ICTs often diffuse 
through marketing campaigns, the news media, the education system, and/or the 
government.  Studies of these formal communication systems have shown how these 
public discourses attempt to structure and motivate use and make sense of the Internet 
and other technologies for users (Haddon 1992; Hubak 1996; Mackay 1997; Lally 2002).  
However, in Accra the information about ICTs that filtered through these formal systems 
was limited.  The Internet was primarily being consumed at the grassroots level by youth.  
These youth were clearly developing some of their own shared meanings sometimes by 
rearranging and reinterpreting the messages coming through formal channels such as the 
mainstream media and institutional discourses.  As an alternative information source, 
Internet users also referred to rumours, a mechanism of communication far more informal 
than the news media or mass marketing, but a mass media nonetheless.  Rumours 
provided a way of transporting and diffusing shared meanings about the Internet.  
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Rumours served as discursive units that were memorable and had entertainment-value 
making them durable and well-suited to travel widely. 
As White notes, rumour "is a very poor term with which to discuss stories that the 
storytellers think of as true” (White 2000, pp. 58).  It is only among sceptical outsiders 
that the term ‘rumour’ is used.  When an ethnographer identifies a unit of speech as 
rumour it is a moment where she sheds the role of community member and ‘believer’ and 
turns a cold, analytical eye towards the phenomenon.  That the same unit of speech can 
be called rumour by one person and fact by another is a way of circumscribing a group of 
people defining believers and non-believers, insiders and outsiders.  Insiders do not 
necessarily constitute a community, but they likely have in common a set of concerns, 
beliefs, and assumptions that lend the rumour plausibility and this may extend from a 
common background (Shibutani 1966).  For example in her study of rumours circulating 
within African-American communities Turner found many well-known rumours that had 
never been heard by white Americans.  She also found that certain rumours were inverted 
and circulated in different forms and for different purposes within these two very 
heterogeneous groups defined by race3 (Turner 1993).  Internet crime rumours were 
primarily told by male youth expressing the concerns of that particular group within 
Ghanaian society.  The analysis of these rumours can tell us something about these 
common concerns based in part on what they interpret as plausible. 
However, plausibility and belief is a long way from unquestioned fact.  While 
rumours were believed, and treated as true, they did not have the status of fact, instead 
marking out spaces of uncertainty and controversy.  The teller uses a rumour as evidence, 
a way of convincing the listener.  Latour refers to the way rhetorical strategies are 
pursued in language through associations such as the references in scientific papers 
(Latour 1987).  This same process applies to all rumours.  By telling a rumour, one refers 
to a source to support or defend the belief that corresponds with the story.  ‘I heard’ or ‘a 
friend told me’ is a way of recruiting allies to bolster the claim by saying ‘it’s not just 
me.’  A similar effect results from associating a belief with a concrete event.  However, 
the inability of a belief to stand on its own as ‘fact’ without these allies is an indication 
that the issue is still contested.  The use of a rumour is a way of establishing the 
plausibility of a belief by recruiting allies in the form of people and places.  Rumours, in 
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this way, can also be employed to contest authority by opening up a closed debate and 
recruiting allies against official closed ‘factual’ statements (Kapferer 1990).  In this sense 
I am arguing that rumours do not create belief out of thin air, but often draw from and 
provide reinterpretations and new evidence for existing beliefs or reflect the shifting of 
beliefs into new domains.  Cohen argues along these lines that rumours match the mood 
of the group providing evidence to sanction what the group wanted to do anyways 
(Cohen 1972).  For example, the notion in Ghana that Nigerians or people in Mamobi 
were the ones committing crimes such as armed robberies preceded and fed easily into 
the belief that these same groups were the ones doing Internet fraud. 
Rumours have a certain notoriety because people will accept as plausible what 
later turns out to be completely false.  However, rumours are not necessarily false and are 
sometimes self-fulfilling (Shibutani 1966; Kapferer 1990).  Rumours convey information 
that is important and consequential to cope with situations of uncertainty and therefore 
often lead to action (Allport and Postman 1965; Kapferer 1990).  Rumours often accuse 
individuals, groups, or institutions of deviant or criminal behaviour.  These accusations of 
deviance can shape how the accused is treated stimulating action or inaction.  Ambiguity 
is an important factor in the identification of deviant groups.  Cohen argues that 
scapegoating occurs in situations of maximum ambiguity.  He notes that in labelling ‘folk 
devils,’ a collective sense-making process identifies meaning and causes in order to 
reduce the discomfort of this uncertainty and to develop a response (Cohen 1972).  One 
category of these collective accusations are rumours about the criminal activities of 
corporations that target African-Americans as consumers.  For example, a rumour spread 
that Church’s Chicken put something in their food that led black men to become sterile 
and this resulted in boycotts (Turner 1993).  Recently in August 2005 rumours about 
violent mobs and armed gang members (that later proved to be false) resulted in victims 
suffering and dying in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina by preventing aid from 
reaching those left homeless and immobile by the disaster.  In the case of Hurricane 
Katrina, rumours were believable enough to be widely circulated by the media and by 
high-level government officials.  Therefore the notoriety of rumours relates to the 
potential for injustice to result when groups are labelled deviant and actions are taken 
against them based on what seemed plausible, but was false or exaggerated information. 
 115
Exaggeration is another relevant aspect of rumour and ‘moral panics.’  We can 
expect rumours to shape perceptions of the Internet in a unique way because of the 
characteristics of the kind of narratives that travel this way.  Rumours are not about 
ordinary experiences.  They are entertaining, best or worst-case scenarios.  Similarly, the 
news media’s sensationalist Internet panic routine highlighting addiction, abduction, and 
adultery reflects that what is ‘newsworthy’ are notable, extreme cases, not typifications.  
Both rumours and the news media communicate stories that are, “not grounded in 
normality” (Kapferer 1990, pp. 42).  Yet the public often interpret these notable stories as 
being representative of some larger trend, as shown by recent examinations of how 
perceptions of risk relate to media coverage (Glassner 1999).  This quality of rumour 
shaped how the Internet was perceived by those who heard rumours about Internet crime.  
As a consequence extreme cases of outrageously successful Internet crime (whether 
celebrated or lamented) were over-represented in the public discourse.  This evoked both 
fear and an amplified sense of the efficacy of Internet crime and Internet use more 
generally since users did not hear about people wasting time, money, or making only 
small gains through the Internet. 
The nature of rumours makes them a durable mechanism for transporting social 
meaning.  Rumours are re-told because they reflect things that matter to those who hear 
them and are therefore memorable.  The number of people who will potentially receive 
and pass on a rumour depends on how plausible it seems and how important and 
consequential the information it conveys.  In the case of Internet crime, through rumours 
young Internet café users expressed shared concerns about making a living, getting 
ahead, losing money, and moral behaviour.  Rumours also reflected how young Internet 
café users imagine themselves in relation to their peers, foreigners, and the opposite sex.  
Because rumours are treated as true they lead to the actions that would follow from those 
beliefs.  The examples in this section demonstrate how rumours are not ‘idle talk’ and are 
not spread only by the naïve or uneducated or only in the absence of formal mass media.  
I have defined rumours above to show how they should be treated seriously and 
analytically as an influential source of information that may lead to action and therefore 
as an influence on both material and symbolic aspects of technology appropriation. 
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Structure and Strategy of Rumours about Internet Crime 
 
Internet crime rumours existed in several forms and were told by different groups 
of Internet users for different purposes.  Many were told as ‘success stories’ emphasizing 
the prosperous outcomes of these activities.  These were typically told by young men 
who had attempted Internet fraud or scams themselves.  Others were told as tales of 
deceit highlighting the scamming process and the misrepresentations scammers carry out 
in their forays online.  Those who told ‘deceit’ rumours often contextualized them within 
stories about defending foreigners from scams.  This served as a way to position 
themselves as affiliated with foreigners in a protective capacity serving as cultural 
insiders.  Rumours were also told as victimization stories.  These were told by both men 
and women and described local rather than foreign victims revealing a greater sense of 
vulnerability and a less morally sound portrait of these activities.  In these various modes 
young Ghanaians describe Internet crime as an attractive activity or as an activity that 
was feared or lamented.  However, all rumours about Internet crime took for granted that 
Internet crime activities were widespread and successful. 
‘Success stories’ often told by aspiring scammers tended to be the most elaborate 
Internet crime rumours and had a common structure.  They started with the acquisition of 
a link to wealth located abroad.  This was either a personified link (such as a boyfriend 
from a dating website) or a non-personified link such as a functioning credit card.  The 
scammer/fraudster used the link to gain money or goods through Internet purchases or 
money transfers from the scam victim.  In the narratives’ resolution the scammer effected 
a total life transformation where his gains provided a jumpstart to legitimate, sustainable, 
and prosperous adult status.  Scammers disappeared from the scene after their big gain.  
“I think he lives abroad now,” was a typical epilogue to a scamming story.  Internet crime 
was never described as a permanent way of life, but rather a means to an end.  These 
rumours served as fantasies of capital accumulation.   
A particularly detailed example of a scamming success story is the one I was told 
about a young man who gained $20,000 through a scam.  The scammer was said to have 
posed as a woman on the Internet.  “She” found an American male chat partner whom 
she convinced to pay for her schooling in the U.S.  The scammer went so far as to apply 
for and gain acceptance to an American university as a woman.  The chat partner paid the 
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school fees directly to the school in the U.S.  Then the scammer cancelled his enrolment 
and took the refunded money.  He used half of it to buy a house and the other half to buy 
treasury bills using the interest to buy and sell ladies clothes and shoes. 
Much more can be said about each of the elements in this general rumour 
structure to understand how meaning is generated about the Internet and the tellers 
relationship to the technology.  In deconstructing rumours a number of questions can be 
asked such as: What institutions, what documents, and what local or foreign people were 
involved?  What were the nationalities and the genders of the people involved?  What 
goods or monetary amounts were gained?  How was trust established and the victim 
persuaded?  What were the consequences of the events that took place?  I will address 
some of these questions in the following section by looking at some commonalities in 
Internet crime rumours, particularly the various ways Internet crime victims and 
perpetrators were characterized. 
 
Rumours and Self-representation Strategies, the Preoccupation with Morality and 
Efficacy 
 
Internet crime rumours played a significant role in strategies for constructing 
desirable representations of self and community.  Rumours could serve as both self-
confirmation and as ‘impression management’ for those who told them (Paine 1967; 
Goffman 1971).  These rumours were used by Internet café users primarily to establish 
themselves as either good or effective (or ideally both) in relation to the Internet. These 
two qualities reflect a shared interest among Internet users in the new opportunities 
presented by the Internet as well as the moral trade-offs potentially required to pursue 
those opportunities.  Through rumours Internet users cast characters, including 
themselves, in an unfolding drama around Internet crime.  The following conversation 
between an admitted scammer, an Internet user, and myself demonstrates the ‘casting’ of 
characters: 
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Gabby: “sometimes the people whose credit cards are being used are these rich 
people…they don’t really notice it, the money is reduced.”  
Kwadjo: “laptop to Bill Gates is a peanut.” 
Gabby: “he will not see it.  Last time I heard on the news that this lady, Oprah 
Winfrey, $60 million dollars was missing on the credit card or something like 
that whilst all the things the money was used for she didn’t order them.  And I 
don’t know whether they arrested people who bought the things.” 
Kwadjo: “60 million dollars!” 
Jenna: “but are most Americans like Oprah or like Bill Gates?” 
Gabby: “eh hehh, well if I get the credit card of Bill Gates…” 
 
This conversation is an example of how foreign celebrities or sports stars were 
sometimes cast as scam ‘victims’ who were impervious to harm.  Similarly to Gabby’s 
comment above about Oprah Winfrey, Daniel noted in his interview that, “in Ghana here 
we have some people who are having …direct access to people’s accounts.  I learned 
some months ago, they’ve utilized the money in Mike Owens [Michael Owen football 
player for Liverpool] account.”4  Invoking the names of famous celebrities in this way 
created distance between the criminal and victim of Internet crime.  This distance 
maximized non-identification with scam victims in general since they were represented in 
these rumours by celebrities who are utterly different given their fame, wealth, and 
nationality.  As Gabby noted, “sometimes the people who’s credit cards are being used 
are these rich people.”  My appeal (as the owner of several credit cards) for more 
accurate representation of scam victims in the comment, “but are most Americans like 
Oprah or like Bill Gates,” was ignored by Gabby who instead followed up by fantasizing 
about obtaining Bill Gates credit card.  Internet users in this way construct a scenario 
where scammers are stealing from the very rich (who are unharmed by this act) and 
giving to the poor whom they define as themselves.  For example Gabby who had spent 6 
months attempting to scam people online claimed his deceitful activities were not greed 
but, “because of circumstances that I’m doing it.  Sometimes if I’m not really in need I 
wouldn’t go and dupe somebody for money.”  Through these casting strategies rumours 
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functioned to create a more morally sound relationship between young Internet café users 
in Accra and foreign ‘victims’ of Internet crime. 
Constructing non-identification has historically been a strategy of moral 
justification and there is a precedent to the use of rumours to cast groups and individuals 
out of the human race entirely as superhuman or as subhuman.  Celebrities, sports stars, 
the fabulously wealthy are the urban folk equivalent to superheroes and as such they 
represent something verging on superhuman.  At the other extreme, as Turner notes, in 
the first encounter between English explorers and native Africans, both groups concluded 
that they had made contact with cannibals.  For the colonialists who followed, this 
rumour was a strategy of attributing their greatest taboo to Africans casting them as 
subhuman and served to justify dehumanizing exploitation of their bodies and their land 
(Turner 1993).  In this way victims of exploitation or crime are seen as already too 
depraved or too privileged to need or deserve a measure of human sympathy. 
Just as Internet users ‘cast’ Internet crime victims to put their peers in a 
relationship with the Internet that was ‘good’ or morally sound, they also ‘cast’ Internet 
crime perpetrators using similar strategies of non-identification.  This also served to 
maintain moral stability through the identification of scapegoats.  For Internet users this 
was as simple as ascribing Internet crime to maligned local minority groups.  In Accra 
these were Nigerians, Liberians (often refugees), Muslims, and people living in certain 
crowded slums in Accra such as Nima, Mamobi, or New Town.  Muslims in Mamobi, 
whom I spent time with as part of my research, expressed an awareness of their 
marginalized and maligned status particularly in relation to the Internet.  However, they 
found ways to reinterpret this status so that it could serve as an advantage.  In Mamobi, 
Internet users often confirmed a tendency towards Internet crime activities in the area, but 
reframed it in a way to enhance their self-presentation strategies. 
Mamobi is an area in central Accra that has historically been a destination for 
rural-urban migrants coming from the north of Ghana.  For this reason it has a large 
Muslim population, but unlike neighbouring Nima which is dominantly Muslim its 
inhabitants are from a mixture of ethnic groups and there are significant numbers of 
Christians and people with traditional beliefs living there.  Mamobi is part of a broader 
area that includes the adjacent neighbourhoods of Nima and Newtown.  The significant 
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presence of minority groups in the area including Muslims, Nigerians, and people from 
smaller ethnic groups in the North of Ghana, contributes to this marginalization.  In 
addition, the area is very poor, densely populated and has an inadequate infrastructure.  
People in Mamobi typically live in compound houses, shared among unrelated tenants or 
in various sorts of repurposed housing.  In one area of Mamobi families were living in 
windowless structures that were constructed for market storage.  While I was there, the 
water taps were locked and for months women and young people had been walking 
several miles early in the morning to buy and bring back water for daily needs.  There 
were also major problems with sanitation, trouble with getting garbage picked up by the 
city, and a severe shortage of toilet facilities.  Inhabitants of Mamobi referred to it as a 
‘Zongo’ sometimes drawing an analogy to the American urban term ‘ghetto.’  ‘Zongos’ 
like Mamobi were seen as areas with high crime rates including armed robbery, mobile 
phone snatching, and Internet fraud.  While acknowledging problems with crime in the 
area, there was also a general sense in this community that the government and their 
representatives were neglecting their needs and concerns. 
In this marginalization, however, inhabitants were able to reframe their 
community’s reputation to build an empowering narrative of self-sufficiency.  Hamza, a 
young man I met at an Internet café in Mamobi, but who had lived in neighbouring Nima 
his whole life noted that as a result of their neglect by those running the government 
people in Nima have developed survival skills and self-reliance.  He commented that they 
don’t need access to any formal institutions for this, they resolve community problems on 
their own.  Here he was implicitly referring to a sort of informal justice system5 used to 
deal with problems of thievery and cheating.  He added that by their sheer numbers the 
government depends on his community for votes and must win them over and in this 
sense they have power collectively. 
In contrast, Mohammed, a very adept young Internet user and local community 
activist, used a similar reframing approach to enhance the self-portrait he constructed of 
himself but not his community.  Rather than defend his peers from vilification he stated 
plainly, “there are people who try to buy things…from outside like use credit cards to buy 
things…basically I would say majority of the people who goes to the café that is what 
they do… Yeah, yeah, in our community I would say it’s true…so I don’t take part in all 
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these things. [added emphasis]”  By distancing himself from his peers in the community 
he claims a status of ‘apartness’ and ‘specialness’ that was coherent with the way he 
portrayed himself as a diamond in the rough, a young man with a disadvantageous 
background who was fighting the odds to make a success of himself. 
As mentioned before, rumours define a boundary between insiders and outsiders 
by revealing that those who hear and believe a certain kind of rumour are members of a 
group of shared interest.  One rumour that was widespread among Internet café users in 
Mamobi was that I was not in fact a student and a researcher as I claimed, but rather, a 
CIA agent.  This rather abruptly positioned me as a hostile and duplicitous outsider from 
the perspective of the group and although I worked very hard to explain myself and act in 
a reassuring manner I was never able to fully overcome it.  Yet this rumour was another 
way in which young people reframed the way Mamobi was maligned as a ‘Zongo,’ in 
order to establish their effectiveness in relation to the Internet.  It built on the assertion 
that the Internet was a powerful way of making contact with foreigners.  If CIA agents 
were showing up in Mamobi it meant that local youth had become very effective at using 
the Internet, so much so that they were actually compelling foreigners to come to Ghana.  
It has been noted that rumours can have multiple interpretations and that individuals may 
tell the same rumour for different reasons (White 2000).  The CIA agent rumour not only 
reflected a sense of efficacy, it also reflected the understanding that Mamobi is seen by 
outsiders as lawless and criminal and that white foreigners and other outsiders who 
present themselves as allies may actually be adversaries.  Although I heard this rumour in 
other areas of Accra where I did research, it was most pervasive in Mamobi where I was 
generating so much suspicion amongst the customers at one Internet café that the owner 
of one Internet café suggested that I should stop coming by so frequently and in fact I felt 
compelled to stop visiting that café altogether. 
The case of the CIA agent rumour reflects how Internet users were preoccupied 
not only with issues of morality, but also with positioning themselves as effective in 
relation to the Internet.  The efficacy of Internet use was constructed in rumours through 
‘casting’ strategies that amplified the perceived power of those connected in some way to 
Internet crime.  Through the CIA agent rumour, I was being re-cast as someone more 
powerful than was the case.  Pushing characters to extremes this way had a dual benefit.  
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It affirmed the efficacy of Internet crime by claiming contact made with the most 
powerful of foreigners, the largest sums of money, and even (by extension) powerful 
foreign government agencies such as the CIA.  At the same time it maintained a sense of 
moral equilibrium since powerful figures are impervious to harm.  Through these stories 
embellished with hyperbole, the potential for power among local youth through the use of 
the Internet began to seem not only possible, but limitless.  In this way stories about 
celebrities and other powerful characters as Internet crime victims are useful to establish 
the Internet user as both ‘good’ and ‘effective’ in relation to the Internet. 
 
‘Good’ and ‘Effective’ as a Contested Duality 
 
However, to be both ‘good’ and ‘effective’ in relation to the Internet was a duality 
that was often difficult for Internet users to reconcile when they told stories about Internet 
crime perpetrators.  As described in rumours, the most effective ways to make ‘big gains’ 
on the Internet were often also the least good.  To get $20,000 from a foreign connection 
on the Internet likely meant doing something illegal and doing someone harm.  Stories 
about Internet crime perpetrators forced the choice between ‘good’ (through non-
identification) or ‘effective’ (through identification).  Internet users employed a variety of 
strategies in an attempt to reconcile this tension.  Kwadjo, tried to bridge this gap by 
drawing a comparison between Ghanaian women legitimately finding foreign boyfriends 
online and the Internet dating scams of people like Gabby.  He commented, “genuine 
people use the same procedure and it works,” suggesting that rumours about criminal 
activities can also serve to affirm the efficacy of the Internet for legitimate uses. 
Kwadjo’s statement also points to an essential continuity between what young 
Ghanaians define as scams and what they define as legitimate Internet activities.  In this 
way rumours about Internet crime could serve double duty affirming both legitimate and 
illegitimate Internet activities as efficacious.  In addition to rumours about Internet crime, 
there were other rumours that circulated about online dating and Internet love.  These 
took on the same structure of foreign link leading to a ‘big gain’ (in the form of visa 
invitation) and resulting in a transformation through marriage and moving abroad to join 
a foreign spouse.  For example Ahmed, an Internet café operator, described a friend who 
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had met an American woman, chatted with her for four years and eventually moved to 
America to be with her.  He noted, “I know one day I will get the person who will help 
me.” And added, “Internet love…it happens....”  In all cases, rumours about ‘big gains’ 
whether obtained legitimately or not held to an assertion of efficacy often stated 
explicitly in the comments, “it works” or “it happens.” 
Daniel, is a good example of how this ambivalence can be contradictorily 
expressed by one person and tentatively incorporated into a single representation of the 
Internet.  In a rumour (as shown above) he claimed, “in Ghana here we have some people 
who are having access to Mike Owens account…” but moments later added, “and I don’t 
know who did that, but I learned it’s from Nigeria not in Ghana…but not in Ghana, not 
in Ghana actually.”  The first version of the rumour describes a group of successful 
Internet fraudsters to whom Daniel was a member by co-location as he notes when he 
says ‘here in Ghana’ and this membership created a stronger identification between 
himself and the scammers.  He could think of himself as part of an imagined movement 
of young men in Ghana who are very effective with the Internet despite the fact that he 
had not yet realized any gains on his own.  However, in revising his story to note that 
Nigerians were the scammers, he renounces this membership suddenly mid-story.  Later 
in the conversation he also asserted repeatedly that he wasn’t attempting credit card fraud 
anymore and wasn’t really using the Internet much.  In the context of a story about a 
friend who sought help from supernatural forces to scam money from foreigners he 
reaffirmed his positioning as ‘good’ noting, “I’m a Christian so I don’t indulge myself in 
those things.”  Daniel was also the only person interviewed who identified his Internet 
crime story explicitly as ‘rumour.’  By representing himself in a multiplicity of ways 
Daniel attempted to position himself simultaneously as an authoritative insider to Internet 
crime activities, a reformed former-fraudster, as well as a savvy and sceptical outsider.  
His self-awareness reflects the complexity and ambivalence of being both ‘effective’ and 
‘good’ in relation to the Internet, something he sought to accomplish by actively shifting 
back and forth in this single conversation between multiple perspectives.  
White, a historian, sees rumours as a potentially revealing primary source for 
historical research noting that rumour, “may reveal an intellectual world of fears and 
fantasies, ideas and claims that have not been studied before.  The contradictory elements 
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of rumour can be read to reveal the complications of everyday concerns” (White 2000, 
pp. 86).  The way Internet users expressed identification and at other times non-
identification with Internet scammers and fraudsters through rumours was one of these 
contradictory elements reflecting the desire among Internet café users to say both “it was 
us” and “it was not us” in order to maintain both notions of local mastery and moral 
rightness.  At the same time in these rumours Internet users reflect how they see 
themselves in relation to their peers, family, neighbourhood, nation, and the rest of the 
world.  They express perceptions about the opportunities that are open to them (or the 
lack thereof) as they chart a course into adult life.  In Mamobi, young people perceive 
themselves as marginalized and consequently describe a wariness of outsiders and a 
suspicion that their performance of concern concealed an underlying self-interest.  
However, rather than portraying themselves merely as unfortunate victims in these 
positionings, they describe their peers (and by extension themselves) as controllers of a 
powerful subversive force gained through mastery over new technologies. 
 
How Rumours were put into Practice at the Human-machine Interface 
 
The previous examination of the structure and effect of rumours about Internet 
crime was primarily an analysis of discourse.  The truth claims of Internet users and their 
rhetorical strategies yielded a socially constructed definition of Internet crime and the 
relationship of Internet users to this phenomenon.  Through these particular performances 
of speech about Internet crime, they appropriated the technology in a way that was not 
wholly reliant on personal experience or first-hand observations of the technology in use.  
Instead through rumours Internet users relied on others, their peers in particular, to define 
what the Internet is and what it is useful for.  Since rumours are told about consequential 
issues and are treated as true, they can and do (as do all forms of discourse) shape the 
way users go about their activities online.  Both aspiring scammers and fraudsters and 
Internet users who saw themselves as potential scam victims used the Internet in a way 
that coherently followed from treating these rumours as belief. 
Rumours by identifying the threat of Internet crime gave Internet users a concrete 
course of action.  Kwadjo for example had heard that it was Nigerians who were doing 
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Internet scams so he refused to interact with Nigerians when he was online.  However, 
the constitutive force of these social definitions of the Internet had a limit.  Describing 
and believing that the Internet is a place where one can get the credit card numbers of 
wealthy and famous people does not, alas, make it so.  Internet users still had to contend 
with the resistance of the material objects making up the Internet, the people contacted 
through the Internet, and a variety of other related resources.  Rumours related to this 
other dimension of technology practice by laying out the diversity of objects and people 
involved and their expected forces.  In that sense rumours could be instructive.  However 
rumours served an alternate function to the corresponding arrangements made material.  
They served to amplify the sense of efficacy and morality of Internet users.  The activities 
of Internet fraud (as opposed to speech about these activities) were intended, of course, to 
yield monetary gain. 
Rumours and other verbal descriptions of Internet scams (sometimes based on 
direct observation of scam attempts by friends) indicated that Internet scammers and 
fraudsters recognized the diverse materiality of Internet crime.  They were in a classic 
sense ‘heterogeneous engineers’ bringing together the forces of humans and non-humans 
(including, but not limited to the Internet) in an effective arrangement in order to 
accomplish some desired outcome (Callon and Law 1997).  The list of resources required 
could be quite extensive.  Kwaku, a friend of several scammers who himself admitted he 
had attempted credit card fraud noted (as paraphrased from my fieldnotes):  
 
Mostly people on chat only want to talk to the opposite sex.  If you want to get 
money from a person, pose as a woman.  Have to get a picture of a female and 
create a female account in chat.  Have to get a girl who will help you.  She will 
receive the [phone] calls.  Some use their sister or friend or girlfriend or 
girlfriend’s sister.  Get words at loveingyou.com.  Give them a time to meet online.  
Gradually send pictures over time, one by one.  Will gradually get to the point 
where marriage is considered.  Then you (scammer) tell them you need visa, 
passport, etc. need money to get these things.  Tell male chat partner abroad that 
they need to send you money for this.  Send by Western Union.  Get the picture of 
the woman on websites (if you don’t get a picture of your sister) but doesn’t know 
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what the websites are.  Using picture of your sister is “very risky.”  Can use a 
webcam too if you are using your sister or friend.  Go to the Internet café together.  
Otherwise tell the chat partner there is no webcam at the café you use.  What 
happens when the money comes at Western Union since you are using a female 
name? Knows a guy who can use Corel Draw to design a fake ID card.  Put the 
fake name and a real photo on it. 
 
This is Internet use, but it is also the use of one’s sister, Western Union, Corel 
Draw, forged documents, and a foreign chat partner.  However, the real test to the model 
of successful Internet scamming as it was constituted in rumours was when attempts to 
scam people or to use stolen credit cards yielded no financial gain, when the people and 
things involved failed to cooperate as expected.  Describing the forces exerted by the 
resources involved did not, in the end, create these forces.  The representation of the 
Internet in speech did not match that particular experience Internet users had with the 
Internet itself.   
When I pushed Internet scammers to explain their failure to make gains on the 
Internet, they did not call into question the underlying model about Internet use and 
monetary gains communicated in rumours.  Instead, unsuccessful Internet scammers and 
fraudsters explained their failures as a problem of certain resources lacking adequate 
force.  They described resources not acting as expected or to the presence of hidden 
forces that they hadn’t previously accounted for.  The hidden forces they described were 
wide-ranging.  For example, Gabby referred to supernatural forces as preventing his scam 
victims from cooperating.  He believed that his aunt was visiting a fetish priest and that 
this was serving as a spiritual block that prevented him from succeeding with the people 
he contacted over the Internet.  He was also having some trouble with a girlfriend whom 
he broke up with shortly after consulting his own fetish priest.  In the case of Stephen a 
non-scammer who was aggressively but unsuccessfully seeking invitations to go abroad 
from chat partners, he attributed his inability to get invitations and an offer of 
accommodations to racism.  He noted that, “[chat partners] will tell you that they don’t 
have accommodation for you, they can only receive you and you go to the hotel…they 
can’t allow you to stay with them.  And I don’t know maybe, there are some white people 
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who don’t like blacks.”  In these cases, Internet users pointed to the ill intentions of other 
people as preventing their success.  This negative force reflected the perception that the 
Internet was embedded within other systems and subject to corresponding social forces. 
Internet scammers also recognized problems with the force or agency coming 
from non-human resources.  Kwaku noted that the successful fraudsters are the ones with 
“powerful credit cards” and that he had only been able to get credit card numbers from a 
number generating website, and that these numbers were admittedly weak.  Similarly 
Daniel noted that successful scammers use “powerful words” such as love quotes from 
loveingyou.com that have such an effect that, as Kwaku describes it, “…the person will 
fall in love with you…So if they use that words it will change people’s mind.”  Success 
with Internet scams depended on access to these resources and that often (as in the case 
of working credit card numbers) required money6.  Internet scammers perceived that 
even in the ‘something for nothing’ game of Internet fraud they could potentially be 
blocked by a lack of adequate capital to invest. 
To address their lack of success on the Internet, scammers proposed recruiting 
additional resources or substituting one resource in for another one that was not working 
as expected.  Gabby, for example, was planning to go back to his fetish priest to break the 
block his aunt had against him once he had saved up enough money to pay for this 
assistance with the supernatural.  The model of ‘big gains’ described in rumours was 
never described as fundamentally inaccurate, merely as imprecise or incomplete.  In this 
sense scammers alluded to the imperfect relationship between how speech represented 
the material world of Internet crime and how they interacted with and experienced this at 
the human-machine interface.  This incompleteness meant that they were not obliged to 
make the material world match with how they represented it in speech.  Therefore 
rumours about Internet crime could persist despite the disconfirmation of alternate 
experiences. 
 
Manipulating Representations of Africa in Virtual Space 
 
In utopian futurist formulations, communication technologies provide a sense of 
immediacy that inevitably leads to mutual understanding.  Robins notes that this 
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formulation also entails the denial of difference or asymmetry between individuals.  
Divisiveness and discord are described as stemming from distance and mediation, from 
not seeing each other transparently (Robins 1995).  Contemporary IT marketing messages 
have also taken up this vision of a unified language leading to mutual understanding that 
will erase race, age, and infirmity (Nakamura 2002).  This techno-utopian proposal of 
technology as a solution to social problems has been around at least since the invention of 
the telephone and telegraph (Marvin 1988).  This discursive trope has been similarly 
taken up in conceptualizing the digital divide which is described in its simplest form as a 
problem whereby some have access to computing technologies and some do not.  By 
gaining access (and the requisite literacies) the implication is that ‘have-nots’ will enjoy 
the same advantages (the same access to information and to global markets) as the 
‘haves.’  This is particularly relevant in relation to Ghana, a place typically conceived of 
as on the ‘have-not’ side of the digital divide.  Therefore Internet users in Accra are 
former ‘have-nots’ who are now supposed to be enjoying the benefits of technology 
access. 
However, scammers rejected the formulation of social exclusion proposed by the 
digital divide.  Although they had technology access, they felt that they did not have 
access to the benefits of the global economy for other reasons.  In general, Internet users 
in Accra held the view that the world was characterized by unequal wealth distribution 
such that massive accumulations of capital were located primarily in the West.  These 
accumulations could only be accessed by getting past those already advantageously 
positioned in the global economic system who served as gatekeepers.  Scammers 
believed that greed, ethnocentrism, and/or racial prejudice on the part of these 
gatekeepers prevented their access to this accumulation of capital by legitimate means.  
So scammers resorted to illegitimate methods in order to circumvent this barrier. 
Despite the political stance of some scammers, their online activities did not 
constitute a social movement.  They were meant primarily as survival strategies. 
Scammers did not, as in the case of ‘social bandits,’ speak about redistributing their 
gains, improving society, or righting wrongs (Hobsbawm 2000[1969]).  They did not 
envision any alteration to the status quo through their activities.  The understandings they 
had about global disparities of wealth and opportunity were simply facts of life that they 
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had to face with realistic strategies in order to realize personal success.  The dynamic 
scammers criticized placed them as allies with all Africans against foreign exploitation.  
However, there were questions among Internet users in Accra as to whether the scammers 
genuinely targeted wealthy foreigners or whether they parasitically scammed their own 
people as well.  Rumours about local victims of Internet crime and the fears many users 
had about losing money to scammers reflect a local perception of scammers as self-
interested, not as community minded.  Neither scammers nor the communities they come 
from think of these scamming activities in a consistent way as political acts.  Their 
activities did not constitute a fully realized social movement and should rather be 
interpreted as a social commentary. 
Few Internet users shared the degree of cynicism expressed by Internet scammers 
about the impossibility of legitimate access to the global economy via Internet use.  Many 
believed that it was possible for them to participate in and gain from socially acceptable 
forms of online business.  However, many Internet users also expressed a sense of 
persistent disadvantage in their online activities that was consistent with the scammer’s 
perspective.  For example, Isaac in his attempts to find a business partner online was 
repeatedly told that he would need to come up with some capital of his own to invest.  
Similarly, Sandra had used the Internet to get all the information and clients she needed 
to start a profitable label-making business, but despite her solid business plan she had 
several times been denied a bank loan to buy a $15,000 label making machine.  Frank 
spent hours and hours on the Internet trying to sell traditional glass beads to people via e-
mail, but struggled with gaining trust from his customers.  He talked about his 
salesmanship work as ‘hustling’ requiring his wits and social savvy to get by.  ‘Hustling’ 
is a typical survival strategy of those without other employment, but one that does not 
usually involve serious crime7.  It is a strategy that is, in a positive sense, pursued on the 
terms of the hustler and with the potential for gain and growth (Hall et al. 1978).  There 
was general agreement among Internet users that lacking start-up capital and given their 
position as latecomers from marginalized societies, gaining some form of access to the 
global economy would not be a straightforward matter.  It would require struggle and 
compromise.  It was among Internet scammers that those compromises took on the shape 
of more extreme forms of deviance and misrepresentation. 
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Scammers were acutely aware of their need to persuasively perform for and 
therefore understand the foreign ‘gaze.’  They developed elaborate online personas that 
were designed to be appealing and believable to foreigners.  They sought to appeal to the 
altruism, sexual desires and/or greed of foreigners and often drew on Western stereotypes 
of Africans (as impoverished, as corrupt) to create believability.  In order to construct 
these personas they studied the foreign ‘gaze’ in media representations and in both online 
and offline interaction with foreigners to understand how they, as Africans, were 
perceived by foreigners. 
Goffman’s theories about how people perform for each other in social situations 
are applicable in speaking about Internet crime as a drama of persuasion (Goffman 1971).  
People ordinarily try to control the impression they make on others through verbal and 
non-verbal cues.  Scammers were heavily invested in ‘impression management’ since 
their success entirely resets on their ability to dupe foreigners by carrying out a believable 
self-representation.  The Internet provided a rather unique ‘front stage’ that, through 
digital mediation, provided opportunities for dramatic manipulations of identity.  The 
non-verbal cues that are usually impossible to control such as race, gender, and 
geographic location are easier to conceal in mediated online environments than they are 
in face to face interaction.  Scammers recruited a variety of disparate elements to 
construct these identities, including female friends and family, digital photos of black 
models, websites with ‘love quotes,’ fake ID cards, web cams, etc.  Scammers stepped 
out of themselves to imagine the foreigners ‘gaze’ and sought to meet the expectations of 
that ‘gaze’ in a way that gave them a strategic advantage. 
In terms of the foreign ‘gaze,’ just as Mamobians recognized themselves as 
marginalized within Accra, Ghanaians recognized themselves as marginalized in the 
world.  Ghanaians were aware of the way the foreign media represents Africa as 
homogenously war-torn, poverty stricken, chaotic, and perhaps even hopeless.  This was 
a source of frustration among Ghanaians who felt these characterizations were in many 
ways inaccurate in relation to Ghana.  The countries status as HIPC8 was also a source of 
shame and was sometimes publicly lamented in church services or in the media.  To be 
deemed highly-indebted and poor and therefore in need of special foreign aid and debt 
relief resulted in a sense of inadequacy amongst many Ghanaians.  This sensitivity about 
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foreign representation meant that friends and strangers alike at times tried to dissuade me 
when I attempted to take photos of scenes that might suggest poverty.  This was one way 
in which people in Ghana were able to effect control over their representation to the 
outside world, but beyond this they had few other options for challenging the foreign 
representations that were imposed on them. 
Ghanaians found that many foreigners they met in chat rooms were quite ignorant 
about Ghana and Africa more generally.  Some people refused to talk to them after 
discovering that they were Ghanaian whereas others expressed fear over visiting Africa, a 
fear of violence or disease.  An offensive statement a number of Ghanaians reported 
hearing from foreign chat partners was the suggestion that Africans lived in trees whether 
consciously or subconsciously employing the dehumanizing tactic of imagining Africans 
into identity with animals and out of the human race entirely. 
Through exposure to media representations and through interactions with 
foreigners Ghanaians confronted their construction as the ‘other’ by Westerners.  In the 
conventional sense the other is the socially-constructed portrait that is built by one group 
about another.  This other serves primarily to affirm the identity of the group constructing 
the portrait, to reduce the anxiety and threat of difference.  This portrait is constructed in 
terms of what the viewer has that the viewed lacks.  The other is defined by absence.  It is 
always a warped portrait emerging as it does out of self-interest and the desire for self-
affirmation.  Media and online sources have played a role in delivering images of the 
other in print, broadcast, and digital forms (Morley and Robins 1995; Nakamura 2002).  
Internet scammers similarly constructed Westerners as other in developing their online 
personas, but using a form of double consciousness.  Westerners are described in terms of 
what they have that Africans lack.  The ‘Western other’ is therefore an inversion of the 
African ‘other.’  As Africans are typified in the West by poverty-stricken famine victims 
on the television, Westerners are typified by wealthy celebrities.  Whereas Africans are 
needy, Westerners are greedy.  This mutually agreed upon asymmetry is exaggerated into 
mutual misunderstanding. 
Young Internet scammers like Gabby believed these foreign perceptions of Africa 
could be usefully manipulated perhaps even in a way that served as subversive justice.  
Previous examples in Mamobi have shown how the marginalization brought on by the 
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perception of outsiders could be reinterpreted into a more positive self-representation, but 
Internet scammers believed it could also be used against Westerners as a tool for 
extracting money.  As young Ghanaians imagined themselves as ‘other’, they found a 
limited set of archetypal identities they could perform that would be treated as believable 
and sympathetic by foreigners.  They believed that their desires for the capital needed to 
start a legitimate business or to go to an IT school were not persuasive enough to grab the 
attention of a foreign contact, as Gabby notes “… if I put my real picture or if I tell you 
this…my family background, my status, my financial background you will not even want 
to talk to me.”  Scammers came to understand the foreign ‘gaze’ as one that expected an 
asymmetry, expected and responded to them as needy, but not as potential partners.  It 
expected medical bills, not IT schools.  In response scammers created alternate identities 
that catered to the perceived prejudices of their foreign chat partners.  They performed as 
a needy African orphan, as an attractive African woman seeking rescue, as a participant 
or victim of a corrupt African government regime, or as a God-fearing Christian pastor 
seeking funds to help improve his impoverished community.  The performance of 
neediness maintains continuity with the history of foreign involvement in Ghana 
conforming to established relationships of patronage or dependency that have taken on a 
multitude of forms starting from missionary work through colonialism into the 
contemporary age of development work. 
An example of how Christianity and ideas about poverty were used in the 
construction of an online personae is found in the following letter written by a young 
Ghanaian man: 
 
“DEAR PAUL CROUCH ‘ I AM SENDING THIS TO YA BEGGING YA TO 
HELP THIS MAN OF GOD IN GHANA AFRICA ‘ I FOUND HIM ON THE NET 
AND HE ADOPTED ME AS HIS MOM BUT W/ TEARS IN MY EYES I AM AN 
ELDERLY WOMAN ON S SECURITY AND HAVE NO MEANS TO DO 
WHAT’S NECESSARY FOR HIM …HE DO0ES NOT HAVE FOOD/ SHELTER 
AMND MONEY AND SLEEPS AT TIMES AT THE BUS STATION AND PARK 
AS HE IS” BLACK” AND NO ONE GIVES HIM AID AND CANNOT GET A JOB 
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OF THIS REASON …[I AM A WHITE WOMAN FROM THE SOUTH] GOD 
BLASS YA !! 
[scammers name and address omitted]” 
 
The scammer who wrote the above letter took on the personae of an elderly American 
woman to appeal on his behalf to an American televangelist.  In this strategy of 
persuasion, he constructs a third-person narrator to be a sympathetic, but unbiased 
advocate.  This narrator, by virtue of being the same religion, nationality, and race as the 
televangelist was thought to be a more persuasive figure.  This reflected the young man’s 
perception that sympathy was difficult to generate across great social differences.  Some 
discordant details in the letter stand out: his comment about not being able to get a job in 
Ghana because he is “black” and his reference to sleeping in a park.  Neither detail is 
applicable to the situation Ghana where the population is dominantly black and there are 
no urban parks.  In this letter he references Western images of racial minority and poverty 
illustrating an extensive awareness of not only African media representations, but also 
representations of the African diaspora. 
The manipulation of foreign stereotypes for financial gain is a strategy that 
precedes the Internet.  Gabby started exploiting these stereotypes when he was still in 
secondary school.  Before he used the Internet he tried to send letters to pen pals 
appealing for money.  He noted, “if I have the contact address of these pen pals I will 
write to them and if they start corresponding I will start asking money.  My parents are 
dead, please help me, I’m in Africa, you know the situation in Africa.  You see Africa is 
never printed as it is out of the continent Africa.  You understand me, or the fact that if 
you are not in Africa all the pictures you see in Africa are diseases….  These nice, nice 
places will not be broadcasted...”  In his comments, Gabby explicitly implicates both 
foreign print and broadcast media.  An awareness of this tendency towards 
misrepresentation in the foreign media has been with him since his childhood. 
Yaw who claimed to be in touch with a number of very successful scammers 
operating out of a large, centrally located Internet café told stories that cast Westerners in 
a darker light, not as ignorant people susceptible to the influence of their biased media, 
but as blatantly prejudiced and as actively disadvantaging Ghanaians and other Africans 
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and therefore deserving of the Internet crimes committed against them.  Yaw noted that 
his friends don’t feel bad about scamming because, he ambiguously notes, ‘the say the 
white man is the biggest thief.9’  This is yet one more example of the morality of Internet 
crime being re-imagined in strategies of ‘casting.’  In this case Internet crime victims are 
cast as racists or criminals rather than the wealthy celebrities previously described.  
Victimizing a criminal becomes an expression of vigilante justice rather than crime.  Yaw 
also pointed to resentment over the harsh restrictions on migration that prevent young 
Ghanaians from seeking better opportunities overseas, noting that ‘because they can’t go 
to America they will take money from Americans.’  He added that Westerners perceive 
Africans as not clever and capable enough to carry out a scam.  In a satisfying sense of 
revenge against this racism, it is precisely by this prejudice that these Westerners are 
taken advantage of. 
Internet scammers felt compelled to work within a set of false perceptions and 
distorted archetypes that they viewed as alien and even openly resented.  In this way they 
were operating with what de Certeau defines as a tactic.  A tactic is the strategic work 
done by ‘the weak’ who lack a space of their own from which to relate to what is 
external.  The lack of space is determined when external forces refuse to recognize that 
position as ‘the weak’ define it for themselves.  This forces ‘the weak’ to relocate.  A 
tactic, “insinuates itself into the other’s place” (de Certeau 1984, pp. 18).  Internet 
scammers were doing this in both a material and discursive space.  As de Certeau notes, 
“the weak must continually turn to their own ends forces alien to them” (de Certeau 1984, 
pp. xix)  Through ‘tactics’ Internet fraudsters and scammers sought to subvert and 
transcend a disadvantageous position within society and the world using the very 
representations of Africa defined apart from and against them by hegemonic forces. 
The implications of the many failed Internet scams are detrimental to Ghanaian 
society.  Scammers constructed stereotyped identities in a ploy to subvert foreigners by 
using their prejudice and ignorance against them.  However, in failing to make gains, 
their subversion was reversed and turned back on them.  While pursuing scams and fraud 
they constructed alien identities that further reinforced stereotypes they resented.  The 
potential gains seemed to justify the sacrifice of time and money, but when these gains 
went unrealized there was a personal cost as well as a cost to society through the negative 
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impact on national reputation and the representation of Ghanaians and Africans more 
generally in cyberspace.  In some cases these online representations are being 
appropriated by Westerners into discourses of black criminality and inferiority. 
An example of how scammers’ stereotyped performances of self are 
reappropriated in the West is found the in a practice referred to as ‘scambaiting.’  This 
activity taken up by small groups of individuals living primarily in industrialized nations 
who have received the 419 scam e-mails typically associated with Nigerians serves as a 
form of vigilante justice against scammers.  Their strategies, at their worst, include 
degrading ridicule where those who attempt scams are tricked into sending photographs 
where they are shown holding sexually explicit signs reading, for example, ‘mi semen 
stains’ or ‘I love cocky sucky’ or doing foolish things like holding bread or fish on their 
heads.  These photos are displayed on one particular scambaiting site in a “Trophy 
Room,” that includes scammers most of whom identify themselves as Nigerians, as well 
as some Ghanaians, and people from other West African countries10.  A separate “Hall of 
Shame” also ridicules the technical skills of scammers by displaying inexpertly forged 
documents warning that after viewing these documents, “you may feel the urge to laugh 
uncontrollably.11”  The reader is therefore invited to laugh at the technical (and by 
extension educational or intellectual) inferiority of the scammers. 
In an ‘ethics of scambaiting’ page the author make use of scammers own 
statements to promote a notion of why scambaiting activities are justified based on, 
“some very basic facts and concepts” that centre on Nigerian society as a whole being 
fundamentally pathological.  These ‘facts’ include the puritanical condemnation of work 
ethic expressed in the statement, “there is a culture in Nigeria that esteems those who can 
make money without working.”  Similarly the author seeks to erase the culpability of 
industrialized nations who have any historical involvement in Nigeria by commenting 
that, “a huge amount of valuable natural resources” but remains poor because of their 
own corruption, “right through the whole of the society – from the top down.”  Scamming 
therefore comes to be represented amongst these vigilante anti-scammers in the West as 
evidence of the criminality, foolishness, and ineptness of Nigerian (if not West African) 
societies12.  This is a perfect example of what Gilroy refers to as the racist discourse of 
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black criminality where acts of crime committed by blacks are seen as representative of 
African or Caribbean cultures as a whole (Gilroy 1987). 
The effect of scamming activities on representations of Africa and Africans in 
virtual space is significant.  It is an unfortunate reality that Nigerian 419 e-mail scams are 
likely to be the primary association Westerners have between the Internet and West 
Africa.  Internet users, including scammers, create representations of Africans which they 
leave as traces in virtual space.  These traces are appropriated and reframed by non-
Africans, sometimes in disturbing ways.  Both scams that are not believed and those that 
are contribute to this, the former by providing fodder for the black criminality discourse, 
the latter through the production by scammers and consumption by scam victims of 
stereotyped online personas.  On this issue of representations, it has been proposed that 
technology may be a platform where members of marginalized societies can represent 
themselves, make their interests known, and reach a wider public (Schech 2002).  
However, Internet scammers point out that beyond the technological capabilities of 
publication, there is the important matter of audience.  Scammers felt that they could not 
get attention without misrepresenting themselves in a stereotyped fashion, that the foreign 
‘gaze’ was deaf to more authentic representations.  For this reason they were willingly 
complicit in the exacerbation of the stereotypes they portrayed. 
The potential for large financial gains and the total life transformation they 
implied seemed to justify playing into these stereotypes, although some young Ghanaians 
recognized that this came at a cost to their national reputation.  Kwaku commented on 
this in describing the outcome of his attempts to ask for small amounts of money from 
chat partners, “I tried it…I think I lost the friendship that I had with the friend…if I write 
to her she doesn’t reply.  So I say we should stop doing those things, but if we keep on 
asking for money people will think maybe we are beggars…It is very bad.  Because we 
are smart people we can use our brains because when Ghanaians go to the U.S. if you go 
most of the time they are on top.  They go to the Universities and schools they are on top 
of the schools…we should use our intelligence and stop requesting money and people 
referring to us as… beggars.  That’s what will help us and it will create a good image for 
people in the nation too.”  Despite its promise, in the end, for aspiring scammers the 
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Internet did not yield the subversive and transformative opportunities they sought.  This 
fantasy remained tantalizingly out of reach. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As evidenced by the example of Internet fraud, the introduction of a new 
technology to society can have a destabilizing effect.  Interaction with the technology 
may be a process of restoration as well as one of development.  A new technology begins 
as an alien object, undefined, and unpredictable.  In the early stages, technologies present 
opportunities as well as threats that are ambiguous and poorly understood.  Internet fraud 
emerged as a particular threat posed by interaction with the Internet, a threat to the 
morality of perpetrators and to the finances of victims.  It is possible to reduce the 
ambiguity of such a threat so that technology users may continue to use the technology.  
However in order to do so it is necessary for the technology to be made predictable.  
Lally, drawing from Giddens, terms this resolution, ‘ontological security,’ the 
arrangement that makes a technology and its properties known (Giddens 1991; Lally 
2002).  Certain practices, in this case sharing rumours, can create a sense of 
predictability.  Kwaku’s avoidance of Nigerians in cyberspace based on the rumour that 
they were the ones doing Internet fraud is an example of how predictability is constructed 
in speech to manage threat.  Ultimately, as I discovered by talking to former Internet 
users in Accra, if a restoration cannot be realized and the unpredictability introduced by a 
new technology cannot be reduced users may resort to rejecting the technology and 
reverting to a state of non-use. 
As argued in the introduction to this thesis, speech acts are deployed in the 
appropriation of a new technology, not in an otherworldly representational role, but much 
more directly, in the course of everyday practices.  Instances of speech create orderings 
out of representations of technologies, humans, and the multitude of objects making up 
the material world.  These orderings accomplish certain outcomes.  In the case of Internet 
fraud rumours, the outcome was the restoration and development of individual and group 
identity in relation to the Internet.  This outcome was accomplished in rumour through 
‘casting’ strategies where the speaker defined himself, the Internet, victims of fraud, and 
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perpetrators of fraud by putting these characters into a particular relationship to one 
another.  The effect on identity was to restore the speaker and his co-horts as moral 
human beings and to simultaneously underscore their effectiveness with new 
technologies. 
Internet users recognized that the modality of rumour did not provide a complete 
account of the Internet, nor did their particular experiences at the computer interface.  
Some combination of the two produced the Internet socially.  The Internet was 
constituted by rumour practices when it was used to seek ‘big gains’ in a way that 
corresponded with these rumours.  However, the frequent non-compliance of the 
components that make up the Internet to conform to this plan for making ‘big gains’ is 
evidence against the notion that the technology is determined by rumour practices alone.  
The Internet is still more than the rumours about it.  Rumours have an effect on actions 
taken at the user interface to the extent that they are believed.  Their effect was limited 
since the Internet itself (including the technological components and foreign chat 
partners) did not subscribe to these rumours. 
Westerners often had a quite different response to Internet scams and the highly 
self-aware performance of self that scammers constructed for the foreign ‘gaze.’  The 
various reactions of Westerners to these scams and more generally to the presence of 
Ghanaians and other West Africans in certain online forums demonstrates that a sense of 
cultural understanding and incorporation of the marginal into the mainstream is 
sometimes far from the outcome of connectivity.  There is no obligation among those 
who already inhabit cyberspace to resolve misunderstandings, to learn from those they 
encounter, or to tolerate what they may perceive as incoherent or wrong.  Instead, as 
members of marginalized societies emerge in virtual spaces behaving and communicating 
in unexpected and often unwelcome ways they are, in some circumstances, further 
vilified and rendered as a threat to Western modernity and order rather than being 
welcomed as potential members. 
 This chapter has been centrally concerned with the way the informal media 
mechanism of rumour circulated meanings among Internet users.  As a communication 
practice it was characterized by a lack of hierarchy, a one-to-one relationship between 
speaker and listener, and the trust and solidarity that such a communicative act reaffirmed 
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between the two.  It had a chain structure.  This practice was one particular configuration 
of collective appropriation, a mechanism that produced shared understandings and the 
replication of certain patterns of use.  In the next chapter additional configurations, those 
defined by religious faith and practice will be considered.  Through the church service 
and particularly the church sermon, another mode of collective appropriation is explored.  
Once again the way Internet users perceive and constitute a relationship with the West is 
of central concern.  However, through religion, particularly Christian faiths, users found 
an alternate engagement through compatibility and collaboration rather than the 
adversarial nature of fraud. 
 
 
1 419 is commonly referred to as the Nigerian police code for fraud.  Alternately they are called advance fee 
fraud referring to the ‘fees’ that are collected in ‘advance’ of the big money transfer payoff promised by 
scammers to their victims. 
2 sample e-mails were gathered from several websites (http://www.scamorama.com/, 
http://www.419eater.com/) and my own personal collection. 
3 I encountered while in Accra an example of how opposing rumors can circulate with different groups.  In 
the spring an American student on a study abroad at the University of Legon died of cerebral malaria.  A 
friend of mine, another American studying at Legon told me a ‘rumor’ that the unfortunate student had 
been rushed critically ill to a hospital by some American friends and that the doctors refused to treat him 
because the friends had been ‘rude’ to the staff.  He was rushed to another hospital, but by then it was too 
late and he died.  A story which taps into the fears among foreign students about health, safety, and 
foreigners animosity.  I was also told by this friend that some members of the Ghanaian staff who ran the 
exchange program had been talking quite a bit about the supposed pot smoking habits of the student 
suggesting that recreational drug use was linked in some way to his death.  Weeks later another friend 
relayed a rumor to me (while on a boat travelling to Timbuktu, Mali of all places) about the same ill-fated 
student that he had heard from some Ghanaian students from the University.  They had heard that the 
American student died in direct consequence of a pot smoking session with friends where he was so high 
that he neglected to go to the hospital at all.  This example shows two groups divided by race, nationality, 
and privilege constructing and expressing ideas about drug use, and the neglect, irresponsibility, or 
incompetence of the other.  It indicates opposing ascriptions of blame and reveals latent tensions in 
relations between foreign and non-foreign, white and black members of the University community. 
4 it is worth noting here that these young Ghanaians thought of credit cards as bank accounts with a certain 
amount of money already in them.  Many didn’t have a notion of credit card limits or what a typical limit 
would be.  This is additional evidence of how distant they actually were from those effectively committing 
Internet fraud. 
5 outsiders might alternately apply the more derogatory term ‘vigilante justice’ 
6 in 2005 in Accra, a working credit card number reportedly cost around $7. 
7 ‘Hustling’ can involve the sorts of harmless misrepresentations mentioned previously such as seeking 
money from a wealthy relative for non-existent health problem.  It can sometimes involve small-scale law 
breaking such as zoning violations or not reporting income gained from under the table work arrangements.  
It might involve social manipulation or, for example, when taxi drivers in Accra charge much higher prices 
to foreigners than they do to locals. 
8 A World Bank initiative has identified the poorest and most indebted countries to target for debt relief. 18 
countries have been approved for this debt relief and are identified by the acronym HIPC which stands for 
‘heavily indebted poor countries.’  Ghana is one of these 18 countries. 
9 Italicized comments in single quotation marks are paraphrases from my fieldnotes and may vary slightly 
from the speakers actual words.  Comments in double quotes are transcribed from tape recorded interviews. 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 See http://www.419eater.com/html/trophy_room.htm, accessed April 27, 2006 
11 See http://www.419eater.com/html/hall_of_shame.htm, accessed April 27, 2006 
12 See http://www.419eater.com/html/ethics.htm, accessed April 27, 2006 
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Chapter 5 Connecting and Configuring Religion 
 
Religious practice and belief provided a central framework shaping the way many 
Internet users talked about their social relationships, aspirations, as well as their use of 
technologies like the Internet.  In speaking of religion, we are dealing with another 
domain of meaning-making.  The church sermon as well as church member ‘testimonials’ 
were additional forms of ‘small media’ like the rumours examined in the last chapter that 
contributed to local understandings of new technologies like the Internet.  Through these 
communication practices, technology users (and non-users) collectively appropriated and 
re-produced technology.  However, this set of practices diverged from rumour in certain 
ways.  It communicated believability, in part, through the hierarchical mode of the church 
sermon where the message is sustained by the preacher’s authority.  The relationship is 
one-to-many.  The ritual of message dissemination made use of diverse materials such as 
anointing oils, photographs, and sacred books – most importantly, the Koran and the 
Bible.  Not only in the church service, but through other religious practices, individuals 
performed an ideal relationship between themselves and technology.  This rehearsal of 
the Internet’s function and value reaffirmed (while also narrowing) their expectations 
about what would or should take place when they sat down at the computer keyboard in 
the Internet café. 
When speaking about their religious affiliations Internet users often described 
Ghana as a setting of religious diversity and tolerance.  Indeed, Ghana has not been 
marked by the episodes of violence in the name of religion that have afflicted 
neighbouring Nigeria.  At the same time, there was competition between religious groups 
with a huge variety of Christian denominations represented in Accra.  In the course of 
this research, when asked about their religion, most Ghanaians identified themselves as 
Christians.  This was consistent with the most recently available statistical data that 
suggests a predominantly Christian population (Pentecostals in particular) in the urban 
capital (Meyer 2006).  In rural areas traditional animist beliefs are more widespread and 
are practiced more openly while the northern part of the country is home to a large 
Muslim population.  Among the Christian faiths present in Ghana, researchers have noted 
a primary division between mainline or orthodox churches (Presbyterian, Methodist, and 
Catholic churches among others) and the more recent rising popularity of Pentecostal, 
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Charismatic evangelical sects.  In the past few decades Pentecostalism has emerged as the 
“main current” in Ghanaian Christianity (Meyer 2006).  The neighbourhoods of Accra 
that housed significant Muslim populations (namely Nima, Mamobi, and Newtown) were 
among the poorest in the city and Muslims constituted an often maligned religious and 
ethnic minority.  While religious orientations showed geographical tendencies in Ghana1, 
they were not strictly bounded by geography any more than the citizens themselves and 
particularly in the urban capital, people with various religious affiliations intermingled on 
a daily basis. 
Since the 1980s religion in Ghana has had an increasingly visible and influential 
role in public spaces.  Popular newer strains of Christianity, in particular, pervade 
broadcast and print media.  As Birgit Meyer notes, the liberalization of broadcast media 
(beginning in 1992) and the transfer of control from state authority to private business 
yielded an abundance of religious media content (Meyer 2006).  This religious media 
took on a variety of formats including Christian music videos, televangelism, and local 
movies with religious themes and came from both local and foreign sources.  As of 2007 
this trend in broadcast programming continues unabated.  With the arrival of a new wave 
of communication technologies including the Internet and mobile phones in Accra 
religious followers have discovered new possibilities for religious practice, self-
education, and evangelism.  Notably, Internet users connected the Internet to religion 
more readily than to notions of secular and information-based development of the kind 
promulgated by Development institutions.  This chapter will examine what it was about 
various religious orientations in Accra that users recognized as compatible with the 
Internet.  A close evaluation of two cases (one a Christian pastor, the other a young man 
relying on the quasi-traditional services of a ‘Malam’) will highlight particular 
configurations users constructed that welded technology to religious practice. 
Islamic practices in conjunction with the Internet were not as readily apparent as 
Christian practices in Accra and therefore are not covered extensively in this chapter.  
Since much of the research for this thesis was conducted in Mamobi many Muslims were 
interviewed.  Religious rituals such as Friday prayers and the pilgrimage to Mecca were 
discussed in these interviews, but in a way completely detached from uses of the Internet 
cafe.  The lack of material relates, in part, to the suppression of these religious followers 
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by the evangelical Christian majority.  Muslims made it clear that there were widespread 
negative connotations to their religious affiliation in Ghana.  They were less eager to 
speak about their faith in interviews and did not have the same imperative to proselytize 
and seek converts as many Christians.  The lack of material is itself an indication of the 
place Muslims have in Ghanaian society, one that is marginalized and kept private, but is 
not overtly under attack by the government or citizenry. 
These initial comments on technology in religious practice in Ghana contradict an 
institutional perspective on Development emerging in the West that sees the diffusion of 
the Internet and other media technologies as promoting a more democratic and often 
more secular society (i.e. Ott and Rosser 2000; Ott and Smith 2001).  New and old media 
technologies, according to this view, are crucial to social and economic progress by 
distributing shared, impersonal information and knowledge and providing open and 
inclusive opportunities for political debate.  But this progress is only possible if the media 
is freed of government regulation and censorship.  On the issue of democratization, 
researchers who study the Internet as a space of political engagement have frequently 
turned to Habermas’ definition of the public sphere as an heuristic device.  Habermas 
defines the public sphere as a space open to all comers, where participants relate as 
equals engaging in rational debate apart from the instrumental demands of business and 
economic survival and free from interference by State authority (Habermas 1991[1962]).  
Researchers have used this ideal to analyze whether the rapid diffusion of the Internet 
marks the re-emergence of the public sphere out of an era of political apathy and 
corporate controlled media and, in some geographies, repression of political speech by 
the state (Rheingold 1993; Herring 1993; Poster 1995; Ess 1996; Eickelman and 
Salvatore 2002; Bernal 2005).  Habermas addresses religion directly in his argument 
indicating that in the wake of a functioning public sphere religion will increasingly 
become marginalized and privatized, since ostensibly it is incompatible with a purely 
rational mode of discussion.  He judges that this process of secularization is a desirable 
continuation of the Enlightenment project.  In accordance with his thesis, so far as the 
Internet functions as a public sphere and becomes more and more central to the public 
life of a citizenry, we could expect religion to retreat to private and dedicated spaces - the 
home as well as churches, mosques, temples, and shrines. 
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Scholarly criticism of the ‘public sphere’ is complex and plentiful.  Habermas’ 
secularization thesis in particular has been compellingly and convincingly refuted in 
recent years (Casanova 1994; Asad 2003).  Anthropologists have widely observed the 
highly Eurocentric nature of his argument and its inapplicability in many non-Western 
geographies (Hackett 2005; Meyer and Moors 2006).  Yet, Habermas’ secularization 
thesis marks a (by now) classic modernist argument opposing religion as cultural 
superstition to a universal rationality.  This is echoed in development approaches that 
treat new technologies as tools for engendering decentralized rational thought and 
political debate (against autocratic, tradition-based information dissemination) in the 
developing world.  The basic structure of this opposition appears in more recent scholarly 
work that deals with technology explicitly.  A notable example is Manuel Castells’ 
examination of religious fundamentalist movements.  Castells describes these collectives 
of both Muslims and Christians as attempts at, “constructing social and personal identity 
on the basis of images of the past and projecting them into a utopian future, to overcome 
unbearable present times” (Castells 1997, pp. 25).  He depicts a process of disconnection: 
from secular society and from global processes.  These movements, he argues, constitute 
a reaction to and wilful rejection of globalisation, a process fundamentally facilitated by 
new network technologies such as the Internet (Castells 1997).  His argument places 
religious belief and practice in opposition to new technologies, analogous to the 
opposition between tradition and progress, the past and the future.  
Yet Christian and Muslim fundamentalist movements, as Castells himself 
acknowledges, are not the only trend towards increasing religiosity in contemporary 
societies.  His observations do not generalize to a broader opposition between religion 
and globalisation.  How could the ongoing growth and spread of world religions through 
migration, mass media, and missionary work be described as other than evidence of 
globalisation itself?  Furthermore, the use of the Internet and other network technologies 
by fundamentalist groups suggests a readiness to align with and reappropriate (rather than 
escape from or destroy) the tools that facilitate globalizing processes.  Whereas particular 
fundamentalist movements may indeed involve a turning away from the wider world and 
its material goods and a reassertion of something defined with great intentionality by 
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followers as local, this provides an incomplete picture of contemporary religion and does 
not reflect the trends in religious practice that are taking place in Accra in particular. 
Quite the opposite of Castells’ observations, many Christians in Accra valued the 
way their faith connected them into a global movement.  This was demonstrated by the 
number of churches I encountered that incorporated the word ‘international’ into their 
name, even those that had no foreign branches.  Alexander, a young evangelical pastor 
who spent time ministering to people on the Internet, treated his religious affiliation as an 
equalizer that allowed him to transcend differences in race, ethnicity, and nationality.  
This is not to say that Internet users in Accra used their religious affiliations principally 
for the political benefits and social opportunities.  This is the implication of Castells’ 
argument that positions religious fundamentalisms alongside nationalisms, gender, and 
sexual identity movements as one among many contemporary socio-political strategies.  
Castells’ analysis is a disenchantment of religion.  Beyond this worldly existence, bodies 
of religious belief in Ghana provided theories about the interconnection between visible 
and invisible forces, between the physical and spiritual realms.  Practices to aid believers 
in operating on and in the world also accompanied these religious ontologies.  Religion, 
like the Internet, was viewed as a system that individuals could operate to realize certain 
desired outcomes.  Social scientists have previously recognized that religion frequently 
functions as a technology, a theory of forces that can be applied to social relations, the 
material world, and the self (Malinowski 1935; Gell 1988; Miller and Slater 2000).  This 
is a partial explanation for what Internet users in Accra recognized as a compatibility 
between religion and technology, separate realms from a modernist perspective.  It is the 
theme of religion as technology (not religion as identity or religion as socio-political 
strategy) that resonated most with religions many diverse forms in Accra. 
 
A Brief History of Religious Movements and Modernity in Ghana 
 
Anthropological research has highlighted tensions in the religious landscape in 
Ghana as competing practices and beliefs evolve (through individual and collective 
efforts) to address contemporary concerns.  Three issues in particular were actively 
contested in churches, the mass media, and other public spaces in Ghana.  The first was a 
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tension between the way emerging strains of religious belief critique and resist, but also 
facilitate processes of modernization and globalization.  Secondly, while many 
Ghanaians consumed diverse religious media (music, sermons, movies) and expressed an 
openness to alternate religious practices, there was also a vociferous public debate about 
competing practices (Christian vs. animist for example) and whether they could be 
effectively and legitimately mixed.  A third tension was between the focus on salvation 
versus prosperity.  The first Protestant and Catholic missionary churches in Ghana 
emphasized modest living and the promise of rewards in the after life.  The growing 
popularity of American Pentecostalism presented a challenge to this perspective touting 
the ‘prosperity gospel’ that links religious faith to rewards (spiritual, social, and material) 
in this lifetime (Gifford 1990; Hackett 1995; Meyer 1998).  Certainly, these debates 
contributed to the notion that religious movements serve as the preserver of all things 
traditional and as a way to detach from the burdens of worldly existence.  At the same 
time these tensions demonstrate ambivalence.  The flip side of this traditionalism was the 
powerful undertow of religious trends that were progressive, pragmatic, and syncretic 
adapting to and reframing ongoing social and economic changes in Ghana. 
The public role of religion in Ghana was closely tied to popular culture.  
Religious content (mostly Christian) was pervasive on the radio and television and in 
video-films, CDs, and cassette tapes.  Religious practice was also highly visible and 
audible in the streets of Accra.  This was primarily true of Christian churches that 
commonly amplified their sermons and music on Sundays as well as on weeknights to 
capture the attention of anyone nearby2.  Local music forms frequently conveyed 
religious messages and gospel music videos were shown daily on network television.  
Ghanaian and Nigerian video-films, very popular in Accra, dealt primarily with the 
religio-supernatural cosmologies that fascinated many Ghanaians.  These videos were 
often heavy on spectacle and typically dealt with the machinations of evil forces.  Videos 
supplied information about the workings of the supernatural realm, and inspirational or 
cautionary tales about the triumph of good over evil and the proper moral path to ensure 
safety and genuine prosperity (Meyer 2006).  Videos as well as popular literature were 
widely consumed for their entertainment value, but also their educative role on matters of 
religion and morality (Newell 2000). 
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The prominence of religious content in the mass media is evidence that modern 
technologies have not compromised the role of religious faith in Ghana, but rather 
provided new platforms for its diffusion.  A historical example of the role of religious 
practice in simultaneously resisting and facilitating processes of modernization is the rise 
of anti-witchcraft cults in West Africa that reached a peak in the 1940s and 50s sparked 
by rapid wealth accumulation among individuals benefiting from economic transition.  
This wealth drew suspicion as the work of occult practices when it seemed mysteriously 
or suddenly acquired and when the traditional obligation to redistribute wealth among kin 
was ignored (Parish 2003).  These cults emerged in the wake of colonialism with its 
accompanying transformations – the shift to cash crops, a money economy, as well as 
substantial migration to growing urban areas.  Anti-witchcraft rituals emerged as a way of 
addressing the threats posed by these changes.  But these rituals did not simply reject 
these new economic and political realities, they also served those with entrepreneurial 
aspirations.  Entrepreneurs sought to unburden themselves of any spiritual blocks (put in 
place by the activities of witches) that were hindering their success in business 
endeavours (Parish 2002).  These cults re-asserted traditional norms of wealth 
redistribution and kinship obligation (by targeting transgressors) and at the same time 
aided entrepreneurial activities that spanned traditional social ties and new economic and 
political structures. 
In contemporary times, evolving religious practices have also addressed an 
increasing reliance on and desire for foreign material goods including electronics, cars, 
clothing, and household items.  Meyer has examined the perception amongst Pentecostal 
Christians that these foreign imports present a threat.  The danger is that if one is not 
vigilant one’s possessions can potentially possess the owner in the most tangible sense: 
cars can take control from their drivers, underwear can cause unwanted sexual dreams 
(Meyer 1998; Verrips and Meyer 2001)3.  Through religious practices among Ghanaian 
Pentecostals such as prayer over ‘enchanted’ foreign consumer goods, the threat they 
pose is eliminated facilitating their unencumbered use (Meyer 1998).  Parish describes 
the acknowledgement of this danger via religious practices as a ‘reflexive consumption’ 
that engages with the ambivalence of change and of a constantly expanding and 
diversifying material culture whose origins are increasingly obscured, a distinctive twist 
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on Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism (Parish 2002).  Religious affiliation, with its 
accompanying code of ethical social conduct, also eased fears about the new possibilities 
of social ties to strangers through new communication technologies like the Internet.  For 
some Internet users in Accra, religious faith and trust in the fellow Christians they 
encountered online yielded a sense of protection and safety in virtual space, i.e. that they 
were being watched over by a divine presence and would not come to harm. 
In their competition for members, churches and other religious institutions were 
under pressure to recognize and address contemporary and worldly concerns.  Christians 
in Accra described a religious consumer culture with churchgoers discussing often subtle 
preferences and understandings of differing styles of worship, systems linking 
faithfulness to goal attainment, the appeal of certain charismatic preachers, and pragmatic 
church programs that promise assistance with job searching and education.  The urban 
setting provided good access to radio, television, and other communication technologies 
as well as a great variety of churches and other religious institutions.  Many of the 
individuals I encountered in the course of this research made use of these diverse 
resources to sample and compare religious teachings.  Many had already converted from 
the church of their childhood to another of their choosing.  Conversion from Christianity 
to Islam and vice versa although more rare was not unheard of.  Pastors, shrine priests, 
malams, and others who provided religious services correspondingly recognized the need 
to appeal to potential clients.  Parish described competing advertisements among shrine 
priests of the particular gods they represent and the unique skills these gods hold and 
assistance they are able to provide to those who visit their shrines (Parish 2003).  
Traditional figures like these shrine priests competed alongside the more recently arrived 
World religions to attract clients. 
The diverse religious influences in Ghana and the competition among various 
denominations created many opportunities to combine the practices of competing 
religions.  There was a tension around whether this was legitimate and moral or whether 
it was imperative to maintain purity of practice.  Mixing traditional animism with 
Christian practice was particularly controversial.  Pentecostal faiths emphasized the birth 
of a new self that involved the full rejection of traditional animist practices (such as the 
use of talismans and fetish) as the work of the devil (Meyer 2006).  However, while pure 
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Christian faith was publicly proclaimed, an underground market of traditional treatments 
and rituals remained active.  The pious Christian who secretly seeks the assistance of 
fetish priests for problems with illness or infertility (portrayed as dangerous, dishonest, or 
even humorous behaviour) is a locally familiar archetype, one frequently portrayed in 
Ghanaian and Nigerian films. 
Faithful Christians and Muslims did not always recognize that they were 
transgressing the teachings of a particular faith as old and new beliefs have merged 
together and become indistinct.  Christian denominations that have gained popularity in 
Ghana have undergone a process of adaptation where in various ways they have been 
made coherent with a pre-existing ordering of natural and supernatural worlds.  The 
resulting religious syncretism of this adaptive process is common to the emergence of 
world religions throughout Africa (Horton 1971).  Therefore despite the exhortation to 
reject old ways, what took place in Pentecostal Christian churches (and to a lesser extent 
the orthodox churches) in Ghana was a syncretic blend of new beliefs with pre-existing 
worldviews.  For example, rather than reject witchcraft and fetish practices as figments of 
the imagination, these beliefs became incorporated into a Christian worldview as the 
work of the devil (Meyer 1995).  The harmful activities of family members against one 
another (a key theme in witchcraft narratives in Ghana) and the effective (albeit demonic) 
use of fetish often featured in stories told by pastors in their sermons and by ordinary 
church members in their testimonials.  Even for pious, loyal Christians in Ghana 
witchcraft and fetish often remained very real, very dangerous forces and therefore still 
played a role in their everyday lives and sometimes had a bearing on how they used the 
Internet. 
The way Pentecostal ontologies are able to accommodate aspects of traditional 
belief is offered as an explanation for their rapid and growing popularity in Ghana 
(Meyer 1998).  Pentecostalism was positioned by followers in Ghana as the most 
effective tool for battling supernatural adversity in well-known traditional forms.  
Furthermore, these emerging Pentecostal churches were appealing because, “they claim 
to have the answers to Ghanaians’ existential problems and especially to their most 
pressing existential problem, economic survival” (Gifford 2004, pp. ix).  Pentecostal 
churches promoted a distinctly ‘this-worldly’ approach that was not limited to securing a 
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spot in the afterlife, but was also concerned with achieving material success while still on 
earth.  A tension between the focus on salvation in the afterlife versus prosperity in this 
life emerged from competing Christian worldviews.  Notably, since the ‘prosperity 
gospel’ emphasized rewards realized in this lifetime, it could be tested since the 
consequences of religious practice could be observed before death.  It was also coherent 
with a traditional, animist worldview that has always been concerned with ways of 
operating (via the supernatural) on the natural and social world to realize desired 
outcomes.  The way individuals adopted, combined, and abandoned those religious 
practices that proved ineffective was, in part, a process of testing.  The testability of a 
‘this-worldly’ orientation contributed to the way religion was employed as a technology 
in Accra. 
 
Sense-Making Through Religious Ritual 
 
Like the sense-making role of rumours (discussed in the last chapter) religious 
rituals similarly primed users’ attitudes towards technology and structured their 
expectations.  Religious rituals served as a space of sense-making that involved particular 
forms of speech.  The church sermon and church member testimonials had much in 
common with the rumours addressed in the last chapter.  Both served as a form of 
informal media relayed through verbal, in-person communication.  Both set expectations 
and shaped behaviour relying on ‘true stories’ for their impact. 
Technologies (old and new) occasionally made appearances in sermons and 
testimonials and therefore this space of media production contributed to the way 
technology was publicly framed.  The particular message conveyed depended on the 
church following from tensions between this-worldly and other-worldly orientations.  For 
example, at a Presbyterian church in Accra, the sermon one week centred on the theme 
‘God’s unchanging word in a changing world.’  The pastor grouped new technologies 
including the Internet together with obscene music and the World Trade Centre bombings 
as threatening changes that Christians could seek respite from in God’s word.  This was 
coherent with the tendency in Orthodox churches to emphasize an alternate spiritual 
realm as distinct from a ‘worldly’ (a term used pejoratively) existence.  By contrast, at a 
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Ghanaian charismatic church in the outskirts of London, the pastor, addressing a well-
educated and cosmopolitan audience of Ghanaian immigrants, exhorted church members 
to embrace and learn about new computing technologies.  He specifically called out 
Microsoft PowerPoint and Word in his pragmatic message about the work skills 
necessary for prospering in the West.  At this church a laptop and projector were set up to 
show song lyrics and church events as a demonstration of the ‘new way’ the church was 
advocating (Burrell and Anderson forthcoming).  A testimonial given at a very large 
‘mega church’ in Accra provided a similar account of maintaining a hold in the 
technological domain.  The church member stood up to describe a dream he had about the 
electronics he kept in his room being stolen.  He interpreted the dream as a prophetic 
warning and decided to move his belongings.  When he told the landlady about it, she 
was unworried.  One night when he was at a prayer service at the church, someone broke 
into the house and stole many of the landlady’s belongings, but none of his since he had 
heeded his prophetic dream and moved the items.  The landlady, he noted, belonged to a 
competing church so his testimonial communicated a message about the ineffectiveness 
of competing faiths and their inability to aid technology consumption.  The young man 
treated the technologies he owned as prized objects (setting them apart from other types 
of belongings) and his religious faith had a direct impact on his ability to maintain this 
desirable state of ownership.  His dream and the actions he took in response also reflect 
how the ownership of such goods generated a vulnerability that required extraordinary 
measures, even supernatural intervention to cope with. 
A variety of materials ranging from modern commodities to items from the 
natural world played a role in the services provided by traditional fetish or shrine priests 
that incorporated modern commodities and items from the natural world.  For example, 
Parish described how American Express cards “plastered with herbs” by shrine priests 
were used as talismans to aid those seeking success in business (Parish 2002).  Douglas 
and Isherwood theorized that material objects, distinct from their use in human 
subsistence, serve as an information system.  They indicated that, “goods are…needed for 
making visible and stable the categories of culture” (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, pp. 
59).  The visibility and stability of the material world (in opposition to the dynamism and 
impermanence of living organisms) has been noted as important to sense making 
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(Douglas and Isherwood 1979), to cognition (Hutchins 1995), and to social order (Law 
1994).  Most importantly according to these theorists is the way the material world 
mediates between humans serving to synchronize collectives of individuals.  The 
manipulation of materials (both commodities distributed via local and global markets but 
also gathered from the natural world) makes memorable and persistent a specified 
ordering and organization.  Therefore fetish objects and talismans embody a particular set 
of priorities, beliefs, and desired outcomes, reasserted by viewing and manipulating these 
items and communicated socially where others view and manipulate these items or when 
they are transferred between individuals. 
Along with the stability offered whenever meaning is embedded and expressed in 
the material world, the use of these materials in the context of religion also involves 
ritualized practice.  Gell argues that religious rituals are often organized as an idealized 
form of everyday behaviour, a labourless ‘something for nothing’ routine that is the very 
definition of magic.  Particularly when organized in this idealized form, these rituals 
serve a cognitive function, a performed rehearsal of not just any ordering, but of ideal 
processes and outcomes (Gell 1988).  Rituals by definition are repeated periodically and 
therefore solidify perceived relations through rehearsal.  This rehearsal serves as an 
insistent reminder, focusing attention on one structure of relations over other possibilities.  
Individuals or groups who request that these practices be carried out must make explicit 
what it is that they most desire.  Ultimately through these rituals, they also make 
assertions about what forces and entities prevent or facilitate these desired outcomes.  A 
consideration of sermons and testimonials, as well as the materiality of ritual and rituals 
cognitive function is a useful starting point and important connection to other ordering 
processes that have already been considered (i.e. rumours).  However, in Accra there was 
also evidence of a more direct integration of technological objects into broader religious 
ontologies. 
Rituals did not simply sit apart from technology, modelling and socially 
constructing its meaning and utility.  The relationship between religion and technology 
was not limited to the symbolism of the former imposed on the latter, but was also about 
the complex interplay between supernatural and material forces and attempts by users to 
intervene and to delegate between the two.  Supernatural forces that did not exist in 
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Western readings of how technologies operate (or fail to operate) on the world were 
evoked in appropriations of the Internet in Accra.  Therefore to properly understand the 
technology practices of some Internet users, this spiritual realm had to be accounted for 
as well.  This was particularly true for explaining the relentlessness of certain forms of 
Internet use (such as seeking financial support and educational opportunities from pen 
pals) that did not seem to produce the desired results for most users.  The Internet was 
only one component in broader systems constructed by users and often the rigidity of 
technology practice was explained by adjustments users were actively making in other 
parts of the system (including adjustments in religious practice).  To begin, the 
combination of Christianity and the Internet for networking to build social contacts will 
highlight how the two domains reconciled the inadequacies of one another.  
 
Networking Christians and Christendom as a Network 
 
Most mornings before heading into the hot and dusty traffic jam between the 
home where I was staying in East Legon and the city of Accra itself, I would gather to 
pray alongside the family of Arthur, the born-again Christian pastor who was my host.  
His prayer, addressed to Jesus included the ordinary appeals for protection, but included 
one additional request.  The pastor asked Jesus to ‘put us into contact with whomever can 
help us.’  Much like Internet use, religious rituals and practices were perceived as a set of 
techniques allowing individuals to extend themselves exerting a more powerful force of 
influence over broader social terrain.  In this sense, if one fulfilled all the practices to gain 
the favour of Jesus (by observing Christian norms of conduct in relation to family and 
friends, attending church, tithing personal income, etc) he would, in turn, become the 
ultimate patron, an all-knowing, all-powerful figure networking behind the scenes on 
one’s behalf. 
Connections between the social and supernatural (and back again) were possible 
through proper Christian practice, but even without supernatural intervention Christianity 
offered a language and moral code that improved one’s chances for connecting across 
cultural and geographic distances.  Many Ghanaians explicitly recognized the importance 
of ‘networking’ and of knowing the right people and both Christianity and the Internet 
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served to expand the human social networks of those who appropriated these systems.  
The realm of Christendom is characterized by a common language, or in Castell’s 
conceptualization, a mutually understood communication code (Castells 1996).  A visit to 
any church service of any Christian denomination in Accra will illuminate these codes in 
the expression of Christian aphorisms – ‘Jesus saves,’ ‘with God all things are possible.’  
Christianity supplied a way of speaking with coherence and recognition across cultural 
boundaries through the common ground of Christian faith, something that Internet users 
found useful online. 
Alexander, a pastor who frequently visited the La Paz Internet café explicitly 
recognized this formation of Christendom as a network.  He was among the few I 
encountered in Accra who had produced his own website.  On the main page of the 
website Alexander and his wife are pictured in a wedding photo along with some basic 
information about the church including their weekly schedule.  The site was designed not 
only to advertise the church he had started, but also to offer guidance and inspiration 
through selections from the Bible and pastoral commentary and advice.  Another page, 
aptly titled ‘Let’s Network’ begins with the story of the Good Samaritan.  The text 
continues with an appeal to Christians of all denominations doted with references to 
‘common ground,’ agreement, and fellowship,  
 
“Friend, God gave us Christendom a common ground on which all of us 
can trod safely, and that is believing in Jesus Christ the only Son of God, 
through whom salvation has come to the world. 
 
The above statement is sufficient for you and I to agree upon no matter 
our affiliations, so that we can all have fellowship with one another.  In 
that case, we would keep you posted by sending you our prayer request 
from time to time.  You can also be a Financial Supporter to this work.” 
 
The pastor’s approach employs a sense of sameness through religious affiliation 
(overriding any other memberships) and makes use of insider language to appeal to site 
visitors’ sense of belonging.  Through the Good Samaritan story he reminds his fellow 
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Christians of their obligation to assist.  He segues into requests for financial support.  
Alexander followed this text with a list of desired technologies for the church including 
electronic music equipment, and a computer, printer, and scanner as well as plots of land 
for building a church auditorium, chairs and help with finding jobs for church members.   
Despite the focus on the material needs of the church, Alexander envisioned what 
he was inspired to do on the Internet as an exchange.  In his role as pastor he had 
something of value to contribute in his online encounters.  He said that he spent most of 
his time online giving support and praying with foreigners that he met in chat rooms.  He 
described in detail several relationships he had established online talking with people 
about problems in their romantic relationships or with family and those suffering from 
illness.  In ongoing conversations with an American man, Alexander had advised him on 
his relationship with a woman from the Philippines, an unexpected pregnancy, and an 
engagement that was accepted and then broken.  He described himself as an educator and 
counsellor online commenting, “I’m trying to project that idea to the Internet, to people 
that look if you learn to walk in the presence of God with God you will not, no matter 
what you are going through you will not feel rejected, every day you will be experiencing 
the presence of God.”  Although aligned with the “prosperity gospel,” his comments 
expressed a side of his religious faith that rejected the necessity of material gain for 
spiritual well-being.  Furthermore, through his role as counsellor he positioned himself in 
a much more egalitarian relationship with the foreigners he encountered than the 
relationships described by many other Internet users in Accra that were often oriented 
primarily by patron-client and dependency relations.  His Christian affiliation, 
particularly his status as a pastor, subverted the social hierarchies defined by his 
nationality, age, and economic status that might otherwise define his online interactions. 
Alexander described the benefit of the Internet in collaboration with his Christian 
faith.  Neither the Internet nor Christianity operated as effectively without the other.  
Both facilitated strong, sustained, social connections, but in different ways.  The role for 
technology was one of amplification a way of broadcasting his message more widely to 
reach more people.  He noted that “I can use the Internet to reach the world… to sell out 
the ideas to people across the world that, look this is what the lord is using us to 
do…these are my visions.”  The Internet was not the only technology used to amplify his 
 - 156 - 
message, he also sought support for purchasing (literally) amplifiers.  A practice common 
in many Pentecostal churches in Accra was to use speakers to blast Sunday sermons so 
that ‘the word of God’ would reach those nearby who were not yet believers.  
Alexander’s church service was, in fact, the loudest I ever attended while in Ghana 
amplified at ear-damaging decibel levels on low-quality speakers that desperately needed 
to be replaced.  He described his desire to, “hold the crusades and in Ghana here when 
we say crusades we mean mass evangelism.  Right, you need powerful instruments, 
powerful machines that amplifies, which we don’t have.  Powerful speakers which we 
don’t have to mount them up and preach the truth of Christ.  And that is my vision…using 
the media to touch the world.”  The Internet was placed on a continuum with stereo 
equipment – speakers and amplifiers – as a technology for carrying messages across time 
and space to reach as many people as possible. 
With technology in place for amplifying his message, Alexander’s Christian faith 
played a role in improving the quality of those new connections by relying on the 
obligation to be connected that was inherent to his Christian ideology.  To approach the 
Internet as a Christian seeking other Christians was seen as a way to resolve the troubles 
many Internet users faced in finding a foreign chat partner who was “serious” meaning 
committed to an ongoing relationship that potentially included tangible forms of support.  
Even Christians in Accra who had not made the church their livelihood pursued similar 
strategies, using their faith as a filter on Internet content that would steer them towards a 
more effective, less dangerous, and higher quality communion with foreigners.  Several 
emphasized that they spent time in Christian chat rooms as a way to find compatible chat 
partners and to avoid the immoral temptations of the Internet. 
In describing his efforts to participate in Christian fellowship online Alexander 
underlined the role the Internet played in bridging vast distances.  Christianity had the 
separate role of eliminating difference by serving as a common bond that superseded all 
other affiliations and identity markers.  As he commented, “The trust is there [on the 
Internet] to accept one no matter the race, no matter the tribe, no matter the nationality, 
no matter the continent.  You know, it brings you together, it bridges you, you know…it 
makes you a family and at the end of the day you know that you’re not alone even if you 
don’t have anybody else to talk to, you can talk to somebody, Christian brother, far away, 
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in Africa or in America.  Or somewhere else in the part of the world.”  His description 
evoked classic utopian idealizations of cyberspace.  He portrayed the Internet as a tool 
that allowed for the transcendence of an identity undesirably marked by race and 
nationality.  This viewpoint echoed a hopeful and utopian view of new computing 
technologies also seen in IT marketing messages (Nakamura 2002) as well as some of the 
early studies of the Internet (Rheingold 1993; Turkle 1996).  This vision was not 
common among the Internet users I interviewed and (demonstrating the range of 
viewpoints) was directly contradicted by cynical Internet scammers who saw the Internet 
as a space for manipulating foreigners’ prejudice and lack of understanding.  Alexander, 
by contrast, placed his faith in the capacity for human relations to be transformed, for the 
better, but not by the Internet alone.  Like the Internet scammers, he recognized 
technology’s inability to single-handedly correct the indifference of the Western world, 
and instead saw Christian ideology as the solution.  Alexander’s vision joined the Internet 
and Christianity as two complementary components of a larger project of social 
connectedness. 
While Alexander principally described the advantages of his Christian faith on the 
Internet in social terms, he was also explicit about its supra-human dimensions and it was 
clearly more to him than an identity or socio-political strategy.  Both newer strains of 
Pentecostal Christianity and traditional beliefs rely on a vast ontology comprised of 
entities and forces that are ordinarily invisible to human perception and that can be 
accessed and influenced only through special mediation.  For faithful Pentecostal 
Christians an elaborate demonology that draws from traditional animist beliefs makes up 
a significant part of this ontology (Meyer 1998).  Technologies and other material 
commodities are also embedded within this ontology and are subject to supernatural 
forces.  Meyer provides an example in her examination of the video production industry 
in Ghana where she notes that there was a concern over videography equipment being 
tampered with by evil forces in the course of filming stories with a strong religious 
message (Meyer 2006).  A few Internet users who were interviewed believed these sorts 
of supernatural forces could be manipulated with beneficial effects and discussed the 
possibility of using them to make their online interactions more effective.  The perception 
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of this spiritual realm and how its forces relate to technology was an important aspect of 
the connection drawn between religion and technology in Accra. 
 
Spiritual Entities in the Actor-Network 
 
Alexander’s vision of the virtual utopia realized by combining the Internet and 
Christianity expressed how the Internet, by itself was incomplete.  The Internet, alone, 
could not answer the demand for social and economic transformation.  An inability to 
realize expected gains through Internet use was not necessarily resolved through an 
adjustment in technical practices and was rarely attributed to a lack of technical 
proficiency.  The reliance on religious practices to correct ‘technical’ breakdowns 
indicated that users perceived the Internet as embedded within broader force fields of the 
material, social, and supernatural.  The question of the Internet’s relationship to spiritual 
forces was resolved in idiosyncratic ways by users who had diverse views about how to 
appropriately delegate their efforts between the material world and the supernatural 
realm. 
  Clarence, a student at a local technical school, spoke directly and critically about 
this matter of delegation seeing Christianity as a force for progress that was often 
misinterpreted and over-relied on by church-goers.  He noted that, “the church is a nice 
place to build the economy.  Europe and America was built by the missionaries….  
Church was used to build, they contributed so much to the civilization of this world.”  
Clarence saw the historical role and the future potential of churches as forces for 
modernization.  He expressed admiration for Mensah Otabil, founder of the International 
Central Gospel Church, whose pragmatic sermons address economic problems and 
underdevelopment focusing on, what Clarence describes as, “the real facts of life.”  Yet, 
Clarence was critical of the way church-goers in Accra placed all their energy in church 
to the neglect of work and school observing that, “Monday morning you’re supposed to 
be at work or reading something, as early as 8 o’clock somebody is at the church praying 
that he wants to be rich.  It’s not magic like that.  God doesn’t work that way.  That’s a 
very big stumbling block.  And if examinations are coming, you study, you don’t pray.  
They drop their books, start going to churches, start going to conventions, crusades and 
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they come and they fail their exams because they haven’t learned.  They want God to 
learn for them…So I’m seeing Christianity as a weapon that is destroying us a little bit 
cause of the way people are approaching it for money.  It’s really bad.”  He argued that 
church-goers too often rely on supernatural intervention and neglect to invest in the 
physical realm where Clarence was convinced hard-work would be rewarded.  Clearly 
these church-goers had energy to expend towards their personal development, but were 
delegating it poorly. 
Clarence disputed the efficacy of addressing social and material breakdowns 
solely with adjustments in religious practice.  He argues for the reverse image of 
Alexander’s model of the incompleteness of the Internet.  Clarence asserted that religious 
practice alone was similarly incomplete, but (in keeping with the ‘prosperity gospel’) that 
it was connected to worldly prosperity – through its capacity to contribute to civilization.  
Alexander, perhaps a prime example of the behaviour Clarence critiques, committed 
much of his time to prayer retreats and fasting rituals and he had gathered a group of 
individuals he called his ‘prayer warriors.’  He treated prayer as a force, one operating 
between humans through the mediation of the divine.  He had established many contacts 
online who were the focus of prayer and his healing ministry.  They had prayed for the 
father of a man he had met online who had cancer and were later told that the father had 
gone into remission.  This notion of prayer as force is reflected in the encouragement he 
expressed in one sermon to, “pray until something happens.”  This practice was seen as a 
way an individual might have an influence on both worldly and otherworldly planes. 
Alexander recognized a separate matter of delegation, not between the 
supernatural and the socio-material realm, but between virtual and physical spaces.  
Users, like Alexander, who were exploring this intersection between religious and 
technological practice held conflicting views about whether a distinction ought to be 
made between forms of human interaction: face to face, mediated by phone, or mediated 
by chat room.  Some distinguished between the impact of synchronous vs. asynchronous 
communication on the effectiveness of spiritual practice while others did not.  Alexander 
recognized that the effectiveness of prayer had a limited reach, that one can only pray for 
known individuals with known problems.  The Internet greatly expanded his ability to 
collect known individuals.  Alexander also sometimes conducted prayers with chat 
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partners via keyboard but did not assert that there was an effect of this synchronous 
prayer between distant individuals beyond providing social support.  Yet there was value 
attached to simultaneity itself and he implicitly attributed an importance to the timing and 
location of these prayers commonly conducting them late at night and in more sacred 
places outside of the urban centre.  According to Alexander the simultaneity of ritual 
between the one praying and the one that is being prayed for facilitated shared access to a 
virtual space – not cyberspace, but rather the ‘realm of the spirit.’  As he instructed, “I 
just say well I’ll be praying for you today.  Sometimes I do give them directions, pray 
tonight around eleven o’clock and I’ll be meeting you in the realms of the spirit.  So by 
eleven o’clock I will also be praying, so together we will be praying.”  Much like other 
Internet users who hoped to progress from online introductions to phone calls to in-
person meetings, for Alexander, the Internet did not serve as an equally sufficient space 
for spiritual practice, but rather as a launching point for more authentic, effective, and 
dedicated spiritual practice.  His offline activities – giving church sermons, fasting, and 
prayer rituals – remained a necessary and vital part of his faith and a mechanism for 
effectively directing spiritual energies.  
The practice of addressing pragmatic material and social problems with appeals 
for supernatural intervention is indicative of an ontological perspective in which the 
socio-material and spiritual are closely intertwined.  Related to this perceived intimacy 
between the worldly and otherworldly, Piot argues for an African conception of the self 
as fundamentally relational.  Sounding very much like an Actor-Network theorist he 
describes, “…the person as composed of, or constituted by, relationships, rather than as 
situated in them.  Persons here do not ‘have’ relations; they ‘are’ relations” (Piot 1999, 
pp. 18).  Piot adds, “not only is the self in these societies tied to other human beings; it is 
also diffusely spread into the nonhuman world of spirits and ancestors” (Piot 1999, pp. 
19).  This closeness between the human and nonhuman was reflected in the way spiritual 
entities were accounted for by some Internet users in the systems they built to realize 
economic and social gains such as education, migration or business opportunities.  The 
Internet (or the social networks it facilitated) were subject to the forces of these spiritual 
entities, good and bad. 
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One example of the way spiritual entities were accounted for was Gabby’s 
attempt to enrol the help of a ‘Malam’ from Nima to improve his ability to gain money 
from chat partners.  At the time of our first meeting in late January of 2005 he had 
already spent several months in chat rooms posing as a woman trying to lure a foreign 
boyfriend into a relationship.  He had made no financial gains with this strategy and was 
growing frustrated.  Gabby noted that many of his friends who were doing Internet scams 
had been aided by Malams (a role described as a healer or teacher who practices a 
syncretic blend of Muslim and animist practices) and so he sought this aid himself.  He 
treated the religious options available in Accra as a buffet of choices detached from any 
moral framework with each option presenting strengths and weaknesses.  He commented 
that he sought the use of fetish to gain money from chat partners because he was in a 
hurry and, “God answers prayers slowly.”  He compared the Koran and Bible matter-of-
factly noting that, “I don’t know why they are able to use the Koran to retrieve 
monies…because you cannot use the Bible for that.”  He describes these sacred texts in 
much the same way as one would expect technologies to be depicted; as mechanisms for 
instrumental gain. 
One Malam explained in an interview that he had adapted rituals taught to him by 
his grandfather to meet the demand for solutions to contemporary concerns such as 
obtaining travel visas, getting goods shipped from ecommerce sites (ordered with stolen 
credit cards), and gaining money from Internet chat partners.  In Gabby’s particular case, 
the Malam told him that he was suffering from a spiritual block that was preventing him 
from making money off of his chat partners.  Gabby identified his girlfriend (whom he 
subsequently broke up with) and an aunt as the figures responsible for this spiritual block.  
Drawing on traditional witchcraft narratives Gabby and the Malam blamed closely 
connected female individuals for monopolizing a finite supply of ‘life force’ thereby 
preventing his success.  He noted, suspiciously, that the aunt had travelled abroad twice 
already despite having only a minimal education suggesting a disproportionate reward for 
her position in life.  Therefore Gabby located his problems with operating the Internet 
successfully in another part of the broader system of social and spiritual relations.  What 
in a disenchanted world seemed to be a technical or social breakdown ultimately was 
identified as spiritual. 
 - 162 - 
To address Gabby’s ineffectual attempts to gain money from chat partners the 
Malam provided his services at a cost of 350,000 cedis (approximately $38 or £20).  The 
Malam gave him a talisman that he was instructed to bury under a large stone as well as a 
potion to drink and bathe with twice a day for seven days.  He also instructed Gabby to 
give ‘salaka’ (alms) of 60,000 cedis to the poor who line up in front of a local mosque.  
He was to drink the potion just before he talked to his chat partners.  He was warned that 
the potion would take effect only once he had verbally relayed the request for money to 
the chat partner by phone.  For several months after visiting the Malam, Gabby had no 
luck in gaining money from chat partners so he sought the assistance of a second Malam 
also recommended by a friend.  This Malam gave him a potion that he was instructed to 
spray on his hands just before he began chatting so that the effect would operate through 
his hands and the keyboard. 
The two solutions provided by two different Malams indicated a lack of 
consensus about how to configure an engagement with the supernatural realm where the 
Internet was involved.  One Malam expressed a sceptical view about the capacity for 
religious practice to be carried out efficaciously via the Internet, although the telephone 
had become transparent enough as a mediator that it would suffice.  There was an implicit 
understanding in this instruction that the ‘realness’ of voice conversations took 
precedence over typed conversations, despite the fact that both conversations were 
mediated by technology and both were synchronous.  The phone had become more 
transparent while the Internet remained opaque.  A second Malam recognized no such 
precedence assuming that supernatural forces could be mediated effectively through the 
keyboard.  In this alternate practice chat conversations had a similar enough status to 
phone conversations or face to face conversations for a supernatural force to operate 
between those conversing.  Like these two Malams, religious followers who are already 
accustomed to considering matters of mediation between the worldly and otherworldly 
realms are also likely to engage in a more careful and sophisticated consideration of the 
mediation between real and virtual provided by new technologies (Miller and Slater 
2000). 
While Gabby was by no means typical of Internet users, his experience with the 
Malam is an example of the broad range of forces and entities that Internet users account 
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for in Ghana.  It is another example of how culturally situated meaning-making and 
ordering processes are applied to new challenges.  This sometimes includes entities (like 
spirits and ancestors) that do not exist in Western ontologies.  When isolated to the 
technology itself, the practices of users may look stubborn, when all the while users are 
actively manipulating other components of what they see as a much broader, 
interconnected system.  This was the case with Gabby’s unrelenting chat room scam 
strategies and failures that he addressed through a series of changes to his local social 
relations and spiritual affiliations that he believed would improve his interactions with 
foreign chat partners.   
Not only in Accra, but in the broader West Africa region there is evidence that these 
hybridized material-supernatural systems are expanding their sphere of influence.  This 
expansion was reflected in the way the Malam adapted rituals to the contemporary 
demand for travel visas and for obtaining products from ecommerce sites.  These spiritual 
systems were perceived as extending far beyond the kinship networks that previously 
circumscribed their effective force.  Alexander, who prayed for his chat partners, 
envisioned his prayers as having an unlimited operating terrain.  He and his prayer 
warriors could aid anyone in any place around the world.  Supporting this extension as a 
regional trend, Smith noted a change in ritual practice pointed out to him by a Nigerian 
Presbyterian minister.  The minister noted that ritual killings (viewed as both traditional 
and satanic) were beginning to be used effectively against strangers whereas before they 
could be committed only against kin (Smith 2001).  This expansion of terrain has 
accompanied a growth in connections with the wider world through migration trends, 
broadcast media, and technological advances such as the Internet.  This was not only true 
of Islam and Christianity that were already internationally networked religions widely 
practiced in Ghana, it was also true of traditional practices.   
The symbolic significance of places like ‘London’ and ‘America’ was such that 
local gods could no longer be so local if they were to address the aspirations and 
imaginations of their potential clients.  Parish in her article on anti-witchcraft cults 
described fetish priests who advertise the gods who possess them in terms of their 
contemporary capabilities.  She commented: 
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“Other priests bragged that their gods knew all about world affairs, and they 
often competed with each other over how many countries their gods had 
visited. One priest said, "I am possessed by a god who speaks many 
languages including French and German. He has been to these countries and 
flew like a jet,... an army plane.... He flies around the world and has been to 
London many times.... Ask me questions about London.... he will know the 
directions to your home.... " According to another, "The god visits many 
different places.... He is very rarely at home.... he may be in Holland or 
America. I ring a bell here and he will come to the shrine immediately. he 
spies things everywhere .... he sees a lot in different countries.... In London 
he tells me it rains with cats and dogs" (laughter).” (Parish 2003) 
 
Like these fetish priests, the Malam in Mamobi described his influential role in a 
supernatural system whose efficacy was not circumscribed by kinship networks, location, 
or nationality.  His brother who was living in Spain had requested help in getting a 
Spanish woman to fall in love with him.  To do so the Malam created a diagram in sugar 
ink on paper divided into 9 sections and containing Arabic references from the Koran.  
He then mailed the diagram to his brother by Post who upon receiving it washed the ink 
off with water and drank this watery sugar ink as a love potion.  The Malam noted that he 
had a number of clients living abroad in Spain and the US, a situation made more feasible 
by new communication technologies.  He noted that he was in regular contact with his 
brother via e-mail. 
The Malam made no distinction between the effect of these practices on 
foreigners vs. locals.  A Spanish woman could be won over with a love potion just as a 
Ghanaian woman could.  Furthermore, the love potion would still have its effect even 
when the ritual was bifurcated considerably in time and space.  The expansion of terrain 
on which supernatural forces operate constitutes a globalisation of animist-syncretic 
traditions.  It can be interpreted as a response to the ever-increasing migration of 
Ghanaians out of Africa along with the improvement of communication technologies 
linking those abroad with the homeland facilitating these transnational rituals.  As 
Ghanaians living abroad continue to have problems with work and love there is likely to 
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be some demand for the services provided by Malams, prophets, and others in similar 
quasi-traditional roles.  This expansion of terrain calls into question interpretations of 
local religious rituals as immutable carriers of tradition, as opposed to modernity and to 
globalization.  In certain domains, particularly where religious services were embedded 
in the money economy and transnational networks, religious innovation flourishes. 
The embedding of religious ritual in the market in Ghana has therefore involved a 
religious entrepreneurship.  Traditional practitioners rather than sitting by as new forms 
of Christianity lay claim to their clientele have flexibly redirected and reframed their 
services to challenge religious interlopers.  It is a further example of how, “the practice of 
mystical arts in postcolonial Africa…is often a mode…of retooling culturally familiar 
technologies as new means for new ends” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, pp. 284).  The 
underground, informal circulation of fetish objects and animist rituals emerges as a new 
World Religion surreptitiously piggy-backing on diasporic movements rather than 
arriving front-door style through proselytizing missionaries and televangelists.  These 
practices insinuate themselves in the gaps between reality and aspiration.  The 
supernatural realm is conceived of as a force field impossible for anyone the world over 
to escape.  The travels of these migrant groups thereby effect a re-enchantment of the 
industrialized world. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Inside and outside of Ghana, growing empirical evidence has shown that religious 
organizations, religious leaders, and committed followers find that old as well as new 
media technologies like the Internet offer unique capabilities that help them to better 
follow religious edicts and to fulfil religious missions (Miller and Slater 2000; Hoover 
and Clark 2002; de Witte 2003; Gueye 2003; Meyer and Moors 2006; Woodruff et al. 
2007).  But what of these religious edicts and missions?  Meyer notes that the tendency in 
past anthropological research to view religion as ‘false consciousness’ has proven to be 
an “inadequate” explanation for the existence of these practices and beliefs.  Instead, 
these ontological views represent, “people’s attempts to understand their situation and 
grapple with changing conditions” (Meyer 1995, pp. 237).  Following from this assertion, 
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she analyzes these rituals and beliefs in terms of the local concerns and priorities they 
illuminate.  This chapter has argued that while religion does indeed serve as an analytical 
process that shapes behaviour and models technology’s efficacy as well as its threat, the 
two realms are more intimately connected as compatible force fields that have many 
points of intersection. 
In Accra, religious rituals and their accompanying ontologies drew the attention 
of their practitioners in particular directions and therefore cemented a way of relating to 
both other people and to material culture.  There was an ongoing concern with 
individuals who may be blocking one’s prosperity via witchcraft and with seeking divine 
assistance to make connections with those who can provide opportunities.  This 
highlighted the local reality that one’s wealth was deeply intertwined with one’s social 
network intensifying the drive to make contacts and build social capital, activities that 
were prevalent in the Internet cafés of Accra.  Therefore the functionality of technology 
and the way it was ultimately used was structured by a religious framing. 
The compatibility of religion and technology in Accra was tied to the way both 
domains helped users work toward some of the same desired outcomes.  In a sense, the 
Internet was merely the newest religion, competing with churches, mosques, and shrines 
for followers and offering some of the same tangible rewards.  These rewards included 
migration opportunities, healing, monetary wealth, business success as well as the 
opportunity for fellowship - to make friends, find a spouse, and develop a network of 
social support.  Gabby who sought assistance in scamming chat partners through the 
traditional services of a Malam represented how far this mechanistic view of religion 
could be taken.  His comparisons - that prayer was slower than the use of fetish objects, 
that the Koran could be used for getting money while the Bible could not, reflect a totally 
de-mysticized and profane calculation of forces.  While not the norm, Gabby openly 
admitted to pursuing practices that others felt compelled to conceal.  Public discourse in 
Accra was such that there was great pressure among modern urban Ghanaians to be 
perceived publicly as a pious Christian.  Yet, private behaviour indicated a continuing 
belief in the efficacy and importance of traditional practices and a widespread interest in 
employing religious practices for tangible solutions to worldly problems. 
 - 167 - 
The mechanistic view of religious practice was controversial.  Ghanaians like 
Clarence as well as many religious leaders viewed a disproportionate focus on money as 
a misappropriation of faith.  Similarly, where religious leaders focused on money it was 
sometimes perceived as an irreligious desire for profit with the church serving principally 
as an entrepreneurial venture.  The embedding of religious institutions in the money 
economy in Ghana was an important influence on the way these institutions operated.  
The title of pastor was simultaneously considered high status and potentially quite 
profitable in Accra.  The relationship between religious leaders and followers was often 
one of patron and client with money being paid by the client for services rendered, 
sometimes even in proportion to how effective these services were4.  Therefore these 
religious leaders were always under pressure to deliver results, to meet the requests (often 
financial) of their followers with the threat that they may turn to other churches, shrines, 
and rituals if these needs were not met. 
Most Internet users were not as actively engaged in religious practices as pastor 
Alexander or Gabby who was in consultation with a Malam.  Yet, these cases 
demonstrated a rich counter-argument to the notion that technology by its nature 
produces a break with tradition and thereby religion.  What was broadly true of the 
religious orientation of Internet users in Accra was their shared view that a multitude of 
connections exist between religion and technology and, more generally, between religion 
and other aspects of the worldly domain.  Religious Internet users found the Internet 
useful for receiving e-mails from church or for religious education.  The particulars of 
this configuration between the spiritual and technological realms varied between the 
highly religious and the weakly pious, but within these various configurations was a 
conviction that the mechanical and physical world alone was incomplete and that the 
supernatural realm could always undermine or facilitate its operation.  Technology alone 
could not effect genuine social and economic transformation if it was against God’s will 
and moral law or was interfered with by demonic forces. 
The discussion of technology and religion caps off three chapters addressing local 
practices of Internet appropriation in Ghana through narrative detail and analysis.  This 
examination has demonstrated, importantly, that the Internet café cannot be sufficiently 
understood by studying it as an isolated space.  Internet users built connections to relate 
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new technological forms with established social formations such as the religious rituals 
addressed in this chapter.  The interaction between user and machine was not the only or 
even the main point where the technology was worked out and rendered functional by 
users.  The circulations that made their way from the café to other institutions like the 
church and back again were extended spheres of user agency and material constraint.  
Travelling along with these depictions, we are now far removed from a straight-forward 
instrumentalist version of the Internet’s role in a place like Ghana.  Uses of the Internet 
were guided not simply by efficacy or subsistence needs, but by a complex of motives 
related to reducing unpredictability and threat, reconciling local social relations, 
redressing global inequalities, and engaging the imagination.  Thus far, this account has 
challenged many Development truisms as they relate to technology, but not core 
institutional models of technology’s relationship to socio-economic development.  This 
work will be done in the next chapter where institutional accounts of this relationship are 
considered as they are constituted in the discursive stew of a World Summit.  While this 
chapter and the two preceding chapters focused on the connections made by users where 
none were expected, the next will focus on surprising disconnections.  A key 
disconnection exists between a UN institutional perspective on technology for 
development and local conceptualizations of development among Internet users.  An 
analysis of this disconnection provides insights into the origins and evolution of 
development thinking on new technologies.  The formation of this thinking can be 
attributed to an intra-institutional logic, one that in many ways is unrelated to or even in 
active conflict with the way technology users perceive themselves, their personal 
development, and the Internet. 
 
 
1 Coastal communities have a disproportionate number of orthodox church members (Catholic, 
Presbyterian, Methodist, Anglican) as these denominations arrived with European traders, explorers, and 
colonists via the coast and mostly remained there.  Muslim traders came to Ghana from the north and 
therefore disproportionately attracted northerners to the faith.  Newer Pentecostal faiths have a 
disproportionate number of followers in Accra and the airplane and mass media (as delivery modes that are 
most easily accessed in the urban centre) play a role in this. 
2 It is also possible to hear the Muslim call to prayers in particular neighbourhoods and to witness 
traditional festivals such as the Ga Homowo festival at certain times of year.  However, these tend to be 
more localized than Christian sermons and music that are ubiquitous throughout the city and on television 
and radio. 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Related to the danger of modern possessions is the story of Mami Water that is pervasive along the West 
Coast of Africa.  This goddess who lives at the bottom of the sea is known for her fascination with and 
accumulation of modern electronics, autos, and jewelry.  These material riches can be obtained from her 
oceanic stash, but only through occult means and at a price.  For women, the consequence of attaining 
material possessions through occult means is infertility (Meyer 1998). 
4 Part of Gabby’s agreement with his ‘Malam’ was that he would share any of the profits he gained from 
his online scamming. 
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Chapter 6 Disconnection and Development 
 
An interest in the link between ICTs and socio-economic development has grown 
rapidly within governments, international organizations, aid agencies, and high-tech 
corporations since 2000.  At the United Nations this issue has found an increasingly 
central and entrenched position in institutional agendas and recommendations.  The 
creation of a World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) is evidence of a 
concerted effort within the UN to elevate this theme to a central position in contemporary 
development thinking.  WSIS places the ‘information society’ alongside other World 
Summit themes including ‘human rights,’ ‘gender equality’ and ‘ecological 
sustainability’ as topics with substantial cachet and widespread public interest both inside 
and outside of development circles.  The summit processes that validate these themes are 
produced, “in an atmosphere in which international institutions struggle to defend their 
legitimacy on many fronts” (Riles 2001, pp. 7) and partly serve to publicly demonstrate 
the institution’s reform efforts in response to critics. 
In February of 2005 the WSIS regional conference for Africa was held at the 
Accra International Conference Centre.  The summit was a gathering of representatives 
from participating African states in preparation for the final global WSIS meeting that 
was held in Tunis, Tunisia in November of 2005.  A diverse mixture of politicians, aid 
workers, NGO representatives, journalists, students, academics, entrepreneurs, and 
business executives were present at the conference.  While the proceedings were marked 
by calls for inclusiveness and diversity, in various ways these ideals were incompletely 
and ambivalently expressed by the practices that unfolded over the course of the 
conference.  In this way, the proceedings serve as an allegory for the relationship between 
development institutions and technology users in Accra and other parts of the developing 
world.  No groups or individuals were explicitly barred from the proceedings and gaining 
access I found was a simple matter of filling out and faxing a form, although awareness 
of the conference circulated primarily within certain elite social networks.  Furthermore, 
the setting communicated itself visually as a space for elites.  The Accra International 
Conference Centre is a large, showplace facility complete with air-conditioning and 
tinted windows.  The centre sits regally atop a hill on a sprawling piece of land lined by a 
tall fence, a view of the building obscured by large trees.  Behind the large gates the 
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driveway circles up to the entrance shaded by a carport.  The property is landscaped with 
a green lawn, quite unusual for dusty Accra, and dotted with carefully pruned, topiary-
like foliage.  My arrival by local taxi was somehow controversial, the guards at the gate 
did not want to allow the taxi driver inside and signs barred pick ups and drop offs on the 
street in front so that I had to make a bit of a trek to pick up a taxi on my way out.  The 
circular driveway and apparent lack of a car park indicates the expectation that visitors 
will arrive by chauffeured private vehicle. 
During the 3 days of the WSIS conference, participants circulated and mingled 
outside the entrance to the main auditorium which was set up as a space for NGOs, 
businesses, and UN agencies to display information about their projects and advertise 
their services.  In one hallway a makeshift computer lab had been set up where 
participants could check e-mail.  In the main auditorium each African UN member-state 
was allocated seating front and centre, while on the right side local chiefs in traditional 
dress were seated as observers.  Behind these seats were sections allocated to civil 
society, to journalists, and other groups.  In the main auditorium high-status speakers 
including President Paul Kagame, of Rwanda, as well as President J.A. Kuffour of Ghana 
made appeals for an inclusive information society.  Smaller conference rooms held 
workshops where special topics such as: ‘ICT and socio-economic development’, and 
‘access and infrastructure’ were debated. 
The official line on the World Summit series of conferences is that they have an 
impact by, “serving as a forum where new proposals can be debated and consensus 
sought.” (‘UN Conferences: what have they accomplished?’ 1999).  But how exactly is 
consensus-building and debate acted out in this context?  One could find an element of 
conflict (and therefore possibly debate) in relation to the caucuses present at WSIS 
championing the causes of youth, women, and civil society.  These caucuses positioned 
themselves as minority groups fighting to have their voices heard.  For example, on the 
second day, an organization identifying itself as the ‘African Civil Society for the 
Information Society’ issued a statement critical of what they perceived as exclusion 
employing UN linguistic conventions to state that: 
… 
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Considering the goal of the international community in building an 
inclusive information society in a multi-stakeholder framework; 
Government, Private Sector, International Organizations, and the Civil 
Society. 
 
We, the African Civil Society, deeply regret our exclusion from the 
opening ceremony.  Not only did we find it difficult to gain access to the 
main hall, we were denied a speech slot, thereby barring us from 
bringing the grassroots’ message to the conference.  
… 
 
Yet it was clear not only from the UN resolution style format of this statement, but the 
use of certain terminology -- ‘information society’ and ‘multi-stakeholder framework’ in 
particular -- that this debate was taking place on the pre-established discursive grounds of 
the United Nations.  In this sense the ‘grassroots message’ of these caucuses and special 
interest groups did not challenge the orientation of the UN and WSIS organizers towards 
technology on any fundamental level, but ultimately reinforced its claims.  These 
caucuses confirmed that indeed, the information society was a reality and its importance 
was reasserted through their demands for inclusion.  As a newsletter published by the 
youth caucus stated, “sessions after sessions have been passionate about the powerful 
effect of ICT in addressing our socio-economic challenges, circumstances and 
aspirations.  ICT is inspiring; isn’t it?  Indeed ICT has come to stay and for our 
generation or the youth to effectively use and fully participate in the information society, 
it is imperative to talk back over and over again on the inclusion solution - Access.”  
Both the youth newsletter and African Civil Society memo employed language that 
portrayed the groups role as adversarial to conference organizers and participating 
governments.  And yet the message from these groups was far from controversial.  
Despite official claims for diversity and debate, these documents demonstrate how 
participants at WSIS spoke in one voice on certain core subjects regarding the Internet, 
development, information, and the information society. 
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A mere ten minute taxi ride from the conference centre to any of Accra’s local 
Internet cafés would put conference participants in touch with a more truly counter-
discursive, ‘grassroots’ message about the Internet.  In these spaces Ghanaian Internet 
users relied on entirely different linguistic conventions and conceptual models to explain 
the Internet and its significance in their lives.  In 76 interviews with Internet café owners, 
operators and users I have no record of the phrase “information society” ever being 
uttered.  None were aware that a conference was taking place to argue on their behalf for 
the importance of Internet access and use.  None had yet had direct contact with any of 
the technology for development programmes associated with large development 
institutions such as the UN.  Similarly, at WSIS the pervasive concern with the digital 
divide and of identifying and aiding ‘have-nots’ obscured an awareness of an existing 
culture of technology practice in Ghana or elsewhere on the African continent.  These 
two spheres of thought co-existed, side by side with almost no knowledge of or 
engagement with one another. 
The intent of this chapter is to highlight the processes that produced a disconnect 
between the participants at WSIS and Internet users in Accra in spite of the shared 
interests of the two groups.  Divergent definitions of the link between technology and 
socio-economic development are one result of this disconnect.  The argument in this 
chapter will focus, in particular, on similarities in the strategies of consensus building and 
sense-making in both the formal, expert domain of WSIS and the informal, non-expert 
domain of the Internet café.  By highlighting these parallels, the discursive orderings and 
material practices in these two domains are placed side by side.  These differences reflect 
alternate perspectives and divergent purposes rather than hierarchies of knowledge or 
degrees of ‘truthfulness’.  This equivalence impedes an interpretation of the religious 
rituals and rumours of Internet users (discussed in chapters 4 and 5) as exotic forms of 
pre-modern and pre-scientific ‘folk’ reasoning.  With this equivalence established, a 
‘grassroots’ message and its implications for Development practices will be provisionally 
pieced together later in the chapter drawing on the statements, practices, and experiences 
of Internet users.  The momentum of this emergent technology practice is something 
development institutions could usefully build upon once it is acknowledged as legitimate. 
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Ventriloquism and Alliance Building at WSIS 
 
This illustration of the disconnection between elite processes and the everyday lives 
of citizens in the previous example is contradicted by organizers who claimed that WSIS 
accomplished distinct progress towards the democratization of UN processes through the 
greater inclusiveness of its proceedings.  This involved a new procedural innovation at 
WSIS labelled the ‘multi-stakeholder approach’ that invited members of civil society (as 
well as other previously absent groups) into the process.  The move towards inclusiveness 
was a component of WSIS from its conception.  It was included in the UN Resolution 
that initiated the Summit which encouraged “NGOs, civil society and the private sector to 
contribute to, and actively participate in, the intergovernmental preparatory process of the 
Summit and the Summit itself”  (UN General Assembly Resolution 56/183).  Yoshio 
Utsumi, the secretary general of WSIS, highlights this innovation in a preface to the 
WSIS outcome documents where he asserts: “The Summit has been notable in its 
adoption of a multi-stakeholder approach, and this is now carried forward in the 
implementation phase with the direct involvement of civil society and the private sector 
alongside governments and international organizations” (Utsumi 2005).  Utsumi asserts 
that ordinary citizens were themselves present at the proceedings roaming the conference 
halls, no longer reliant on representatives to speak on their behalf. 
What explains this disjuncture between the observed exclusivity of the WSIS 
process and WSIS organizers claims for inclusiveness?  What prevented this 
inclusiveness from being fully realized?  Why were the claims of inclusiveness made at 
all?  As Riles notes while participants gain from inclusion in UN summits, so do UN 
institutions whose legitimacy is broadened in scope as the number and diversity of 
participants grows (Riles 2001).  Yet, the individuals and groups that identified 
themselves as ‘civil society’ at the WSIS regional conference used linguistic conventions 
and terminology that clearly identified them as speaking from within a development 
discourse on technology.  Their ‘grassroots’ message was therefore limited, framed as it 
was by this institutional discourse.  This linguistic performance was the price of their 
participation.  Riles also notes that NGOs treat their inclusion in UN summits as 
validation of their organizations and causes (Riles 2001).  Therefore, these groups must 
always balance the sense that their role is to challenge authority with the desire to 
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maintain access and inclusion.  A formal WSIS accreditation process put this at stake for 
‘civil society’ groups as well as NGOs.  This process was not required for attendance, but 
illustrated that there were varying degrees of inclusion at the conference.  Accreditation 
involved an evaluation of “the relevance of the work of the applicants on the basis of 
their background and involvement in information society issues,” (“Accreditation of 
NGOs, Civil Society and Business Sector”, 2003) demonstrating formal pressure to 
conform to an institutional framing of the issues. 
Beyond linguistic conventions, the individuals that were grouped under the term 
civil society in practice turned out to be an unwieldy and diverse collective.  I myself was 
brought under this label at WSIS regional conference in Accra.  Which segments of civil 
society were present and which were not remains in question.  Certain seemingly 
important ‘stakeholders’ such as the Internet café users in Accra were not in attendance.  
Efforts were made to distinguish organized NGOs from the informal masses of the civil 
society, but in practice these groups were indistinct.  Those who employed the personal 
pronoun ‘we’ in speaking as the civil society often turned out to be savvy and 
experienced activists familiar with the inner workings of such institutional processes1.  
This is not to suggest that their participation was invalid, but to indicate that rather than 
‘direct involvement,’ civil society was still working through representatives, ones who 
were well acquainted with institutional rules and strategies. 
This form of speaking whereby ordinary citizens, beneficiaries of development 
efforts are invited to speak, but do so in the voice of the development expert can best be 
described as ventriloquism.  It served the aim of reinforcing the significance of an 
‘information society’ and of ICTs for development in a voice that seemed to emanate 
from the potential beneficiaries themselves.  Therefore this new, yet more sophisticated 
rhetorical form that was part of the ‘multi-stakeholder approach’ while perhaps a 
rhetorical innovation, did not provoke any profound institutional change in the processes 
of setting development priorities, building consensus, and identifying solutions at WSIS, 
it offered no space for counter-discursive debate.   
That WSIS participants (including the ‘civil society’) on the one hand and Internet 
users at a grassroots level on the other literally speak a different language about 
technology reflects Castells’ argument for the existence of multiple networks that are 
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distinguished from one another via their “communication codes.”  He notes how the logic 
of the network is such that a failure to conform to these codes results in an immediate 
exclusion from the network.  Therefore, it is a logical effort on the part of groups such as 
the ‘African Civil Society for the Information Society’ to perform these codes in order to 
maintain membership, be relevant, and have an impact, however limited, on the 
proceedings.  However, Castells warns that the “presence or absence in the network and 
the dynamics of each network vis-à-vis others are critical sources of domination and 
change in our society” (Castells 1996, pp. 500).  Therefore the disconnect between WSIS 
participants and Internet users in Accra amounts not just to wastefulness and missed 
opportunities for collaboration, but has the potential to be realized as a competition in 
which one network (likely the one composed by powerful development institutions and 
the state) undermines, in various ways, the other.  This conflict between modernist 
institutions and the populations they hope to impact is illustrated by a conversation I had 
with an official at the Ghana High Commission in London.  He described Internet cafés 
as “a very important development” in Ghana, but qualified this statement by expressing 
concerns about the shoddy service some provided and mentioned a desire to bring them 
into the domain of the state by forcing equipment upgrades and installing an accreditation 
process.  These cafés therefore represented a disorderly and possibly threatening trend in 
Ghana from the perspective of the state.  The solution was regulation - a way of creating 
a connection between the state and emergent technology trends, but an adversarial rather 
than collaborative connection. 
New institutional practices at WSIS such as the ‘multi-stakeholder approach’ can 
be viewed as a response to critics of the UN and of development processes in the ‘high 
modernist’ tradition (Scott 1998) more generally.  Among the most damning arguments is 
that development processes are elitist and exclusionary, that they perpetuate gender 
inequality and prize Western knowledge and norms above all else and have consequently 
done more harm than good2.  The ‘multi-stakeholder approach’ is one response to this 
particular type of condemnation and concomitant calls for a more participatory process.  
However, this particular strategy ought to be examined with scepticism.  Responses to 
criticism should be acknowledged as varying in terms of how soft or hard they are.  Soft 
responses seek to dispel criticism while maintaining the status quo by constructing a 
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superficial performance of change.  Hard responses take on more substantive actions.  
The ventriloquism of ‘civil society’ and other groups at WSIS is, so far, a very soft 
response.  The participatory approach that emerged during WSIS employed the voices of 
seemingly ‘ordinary citizens’ themselves making it that much harder to criticise 
institutional elitism.  Critics who argue against the institutional discourse on behalf of 
marginalized groups now appear to also argue against the groups they mean to champion.  
This is potentially a set back rather than progress on efforts to push for more truly 
bottom-up processes for development innovation. 
The ‘multi-stakeholder approach’ was meant to bring civil society into the WSIS 
process as an ally in efforts to promote the ‘information society’ as a key development 
theme.  During the WSIS process, the practice of referencing allies served as a way of 
underlining the facticity and importance of claims made about technology and its link to 
development.  This is a point of parallel with the practices Internet users employed when 
telling rumours about Internet fraud and scams (see chapter 4) which were often prefixed 
by references to allies such as, “a friend told me…” or “I heard it on the radio.”  At 
WSIS, allies were often created out of authority figures (a traditional ethos form of 
rhetoric) or in lieu of the powerful by pointing to large numbers of allies with specific 
numbers or more abstractly using phrases such as ‘universally acknowledged’ or ‘widely 
recognized’. 
Several documents produced in conjunction with the WSIS process benefited 
from a preface written by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan himself (Stauffacher et al. 
2005; Stauffacher and Kleinwächter 2005).  This was done as a lead-in placing the 
powerful alliance at the front of the document where it is difficult for readers to miss.  
Conferences like WSIS use the same approach putting powerful leaders (presidents, 
ambassadors, etc.) on stage in the main auditorium, the most visible location possible.  
Combining strategies, using both references to authority and to large numbers of allies 
multiplies the rhetorical effect as in the statement from the WSIS website that, “Nearly 
50 Heads of state/government and Vice-Presidents and 197 Ministers, Vice Ministers and 
Deputy Ministers from 174 countries as well as high-level representatives from 
international organizations, private sector, and civil society attended the Tunis Phase of 
WSIS and gave political support to the Tunis Commitment and Tunis Agenda for the 
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Information Society that were adopted on 18 November 2005. More than 19,000 
participants from 174 countries attended the Summit and related events [original 
emphasis]” (‘About WSIS: overview’ 2006).  In the same way that the persuasive power 
of rumours relies on a reference to sources (i.e. a friend told me), these alliances produce 
a powerful argument for the factuality of documents/conditions/claims that is difficult for 
a witness to counter (Latour 1987).  To challenge them means countering each of these 
alliances, in the case of WSIS this involves the daunting task of challenging 50 heads of 
state and vice-presidents, 197 ministers, and 19,000 participants. 
 As Latour observes and as is also evident in these examples from WSIS, non-
personified references can be made and alliances built with texts as is the case with 
any document that has footnotes and a bibliography.  As the above quote notes 50 
heads of state and vice-presidents, etc. put their weight behind a document – the 
‘Tunis Commitment and Tunis Agenda for the Information Society.’  Texts 
themselves were also sometimes described as acting, as in the statement that, “The 
UN General Assembly Resolution 56/183 (21 December 2001) endorsed the holding 
of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) [added emphasis]” (‘About 
WSIS: overview’ 2006).  A common textual reference in WSIS documents links ICTs 
and/or the Information Society to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as in 
the statement about, “…the role of ICTs, not only as a medium of communication, 
but also as a development enabler, and as a tool for the achievement of the 
internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium 
Development Goals.” (‘Tunis Agenda for the Information Society’ 2005).  These 
documents were heavily intra-referential, justifying priorities through an alignment 
with other institutional documents rather than referencing entities outside of the 
institution.  Besides the MDGs, there are also references frequently made to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Vienna Declaration, and the Monterrey Consensus.  This was a common trait of the 
linguistic practices that related ICTs to development in the WSIS process. 
Alliances built with individuals and documents internal to the institution had the 
effect of reinforcing the institution itself asserting the legitimacy and relevance of various 
entities (from the Charter of the UN to Kofi Annan) and borrowing legitimacy already 
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accumulated by these entities through association.  Furthermore these links tie distinct 
pieces of the institution together – events, documents, people - creating a sense of 
wholeness and coherence (Riles 2001).  These various documents form a tight web that 
one can traverse following chains of textual references from resolution to resolution.  Yet 
it was precisely through these efforts to maintain the institution that a disconnect was 
produced between the institution and the populations it serves by building up internal 
connections while neglecting external ones.  A disconnect is further reinforced by the 
ubiquitous use of acronyms in documents, also elements of the UN’s distinctive 
communication code.  The obfuscation introduced by acronyms requires a greater 
investment on the part of outsiders to realize inclusion.  While references to other UN 
documents and the use of acronyms were part of the communication code, a resource that 
participants could employ to perform membership, at the same time they put what is not 
of the network into high relief.  The WSIS process lacked connections that traversed the 
border from the inside out and furthermore erected barriers that made it difficult for 
connections to be established from the outside in.  Ultimately participation required a 
conversion process realized as participants moved across the institutional border thereby 
making them suitable for linking.  This conversion was enacted for the sake of coherence 
of the event and to accomplish some semblance of consensus. 
Despite claims that the WSIS process was a space where “new proposals” could 
be “debated” the diversity of participants and the drive to reach consensus necessarily 
muted efforts to bring anything fundamentally new to light.  Two unenviable and 
arguably incompatible tasks were set for WSIS as for all UN summits – to be as broadly 
inclusive as possible while at the same time reaching a unified consensus at the end.  As 
Riles notes, these tasks accomplish two important aims, broadening the legitimacy of UN 
institutions as well as creating a high impact discourse that while not legally binding will 
achieve an unquestioned veracity powerful enough to shape future policy and practice 
worldwide (Riles 2001).  In this context it is quite an accomplishment that the WSIS 
outcome documents run to only 97 pages.  The reality of an event involving 19,000 
participants from 174 countries is that much of what goes on within the event is intra-
institutional maintenance and negotiation; linking and alliance building.  This leaves little 
room for convoluting matters by introducing too many new, non sequitur concerns from 
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the external world.  Civil society groups in their self-defined role as adversaries to 
government and institutional power focused on more manageable goals, such as getting 
the phrase “human rights” (a term already well known to the institution and the subject of 
its own world summit) incorporated into outcome documents (Bloem 2005, pp. 101).  
Given these conditions, the structure of WSIS prevented the airing of radically counter-
discursive grassroots messages about technology and development such as, for example, 
challenging the relevance of the ‘information society’ concept to development concerns.  
A truly bottom-up process, without an overarching framework for organizing the 
concerns of participants simply would not function at an event of this size and scope.  In 
the drive towards consensus the institution must disconnect. 
 
An Alternate Grassroots Message 
 
The disconnection between development institutional processes at WSIS and 
emergent technology trends in Accra meant that knowledge, people, ideas, structures, and 
meanings were in limited circulation between the two bodies.  It is notable in light of 
claims about the inclusiveness and ubiquity3 of the UN that Internet users and other 
inhabitants of Accra had experienced so little exposure to the institution and its 
programmes.  The separate conversations taking place at WSIS and at the Internet cafés 
in Accra resulted in two distinct definitions of development and of technology’s role in 
bringing about development outcomes.  In this section, these divergent definitions are 
clarified in order to piece together a sense of what would constitute the ‘grassroots 
message’ of Internet users in Accra and to draw some conclusions about potential new 
directions for development efforts.  This message fundamentally questions the relevance 
of the ‘information society’ concept as a way of framing technology and development 
issues. 
Many Internet users in Accra clearly and explicitly identified the Internet as 
conducive to an improvement in quality of life in economic and social terms and 
therefore (in a general sense) to development.  A sense of improved prospects and new 
life opportunities was a prominent theme that framed even the playful, non-instrumental 
activities of youth (discussed in chapter 3) in the Internet café.  To this extent Internet 
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users and WSIS participants were in agreement.  However, the question of what is 
responsible for a lack of development in Ghana and other developing nations was 
answered quite differently by the two groups.  The message from WSIS was that 
underdevelopment was due to a lack of information.  This information could increase the 
productivity and efficiency of business, government, and agricultural processes.  It could 
contribute to processes of democratization by improving transparency and thereby 
reducing corruption.  From this perspective once a technological infrastructure was in 
place, information could create capital without any additional input.  And furthermore 
information could improve quality of life on matters of health, education, and 
government.  Yet, rarely was it clear that the problems Ghanaians faced could be resolved 
by information and they certainly did not frame their problems in this way.  Instead 
Internet users often argued that they suffered from a lack of capital – financial, 
educational, and social and a consequent narrowing of opportunities.  Health problems 
stemmed from not being able to pay the doctor, not from a lack of health information or a 
shortage of doctors.  A lack of education stemmed from not being able to pay for 
schooling.  Internet users recognized an unequal distribution of wealth around the world 
with massive accumulations located primarily in the North.  Their development strategies 
therefore were oriented towards gaining access to these accumulations. 
Internet users typically described development in personal or kinship terms 
whereas at WSIS the subject of development was the larger society.  Internet users 
identified the individual or the family as the subject of development and focused on fairly 
immediate returns.  This made sense for those who faced daily concerns about getting by 
and paying for basic necessities.  Therefore importing Western goods such as clothing or 
shoes and selling them in local markets was suggested as a good business opportunity by 
several young Ghanaians in interviews since it would generate a certain amount of daily 
revenue.  Yet its impact on Ghanaian society would likely be negative or negligible.  The 
diagram below illustrates different perceptions of technology’s role in development 
between Internet users and development institutions according to the subject or target of 
development, the theory of how development occurs, the technology practice that follows 
from this theory, the scope of activities/spheres where development is considered 
relevant, and the particular Internet technologies favored following from this model. 
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   Internet users model of 
ICT for development 
Institutional model of ICT 
for development at WSIS 
Subject Individual/family (survival 
mode) 
Society (long-term planning) 
Theory Wealth redistribution – 
getting access to massive 
capital accumulation in the 
North 
Generation of wealth 
internally through greater 
efficiency or e-commerce 
access to global markets 
Practice Communication: making 
contacts, building social 
capital 
Information: make local 
processes work better, 
improving quality of life – 
gov, agriculture, health 
Scope Narrow: capital 
acquisition expanding into 
diverse opportunities 
Broad: socio-economic, 
health, gov, edu, etc. 
Technologies e-mail, chat clients, 
matchmaking websites, 
webcams, mobile phones 
World wide web, databases, 
e-commerce services 
 
Table 3 - conflicting models of development 
 
Overall, emerging ICT for development efforts are diverse and cannot be easily 
encapsulated in a table.  The above table represents one segment of this movement.  
Drawing from my participation in the World Summit on the Information Society process, 
the comparison of development models in this chapter focuses on what is taking place in 
the UN through processes such as WSIS.  It is not the whole of the institution that is 
being evaluated, but rather several distinct trajectories of thought on the relationship 
between technology and development drawing on observations and documents produced 
through WSIS.  On a general level there are some common themes that can be 
ascertained.  The relentless attention to technologies as distributors of ‘information’ and 
information (or alternately ‘knowledge’) as a solution for development problems is 
asserted again and again in the speeches and documents coming from these sources.  It is 
centrally positioned even in the very name given to the World Summit.  
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A set of grassroots responses to current Development trajectories can be 
extrapolated from the local logic of development represented in the above table and the 
variety of stories of personal success and failure told by Ghanaian Internet users and 
others.  The particular trajectories examined in this section include, first, the central 
emphasis in an institutional perspective on neutral, depersonalized information by 
contrast to Internet users focus on representations and the complexity of online cross-
cultural social interactions.  Second, mobility and migration as a trajectory that is largely 
disconnected from technology for development movements will be highlighted.  Internet 
users alternately interpreted matters of mobility as intimately tied to the use of ICTs.  A 
third development trajectory can be considered a continuation of the appropriate 
technologies movement begun in the 1970s.  This movement focused on building 
localized technologies for settings with limited supporting infrastructure and for 
populations that lacked certain skills and literacies.  The open source software movement 
and MIT’s $100 PC/one laptop per child programme are representative of new efforts in 
the recent revival of this movement.  The issue of localization first discussed in chapter 3 
will be returned to underlining Internet users’ efforts to participate in global processes 
and the desirability of what is foreign apart from questions of appropriateness and 
efficacy.  This raises questions about how notions of ‘appropriateness’ are variably 
constructed by foreign developers versus Third World users. 
It is useful to begin with some examples of very ‘successful’ Ghanaians and how 
they depicted their pathways of personal development (sometimes out of extreme 
poverty).  Successful lives in Ghana generally stemmed from savvy sociability rather 
than heroic individualism.  The focus among Internet users in Accra on using the Internet 
to build social capital followed from the theory that one gains access to resources and 
prosperity through social links and that foreigners, particularly Americans, were far better 
resourced and prosperous than most Ghanaians.  This stemmed from the situation within 
the country where wealth is commonly distributed (through gifts, investments, and 
opportunities) through prosperous members of society via their personal social networks.  
I encountered many success stories in Ghana that reflected a lived reality to this logic.  
For example, Arthur, a young man whose family I lived with for several weeks had 
started out learning body fabrication for trucks, cars, and buses as his trade.  He found 
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that this work that he was formally trained for was not at all lucrative.  Luckily he made a 
fortuitous connection at his church.  He was invited by this church friend to join a multi-
level marketing4 programme selling Chinese herbal remedies.  This friend was the first in 
Ghana to join the programme and so, as early joiners for their region they were able to 
build an extensive network of buyers and re-sellers and became extraordinarily wealthy 
from the profits trickling up to them through this network.  That their wealth arrived from 
the bottom up was an inversion of the local template of wealth redistribution from above, 
but similarly relied on making connections, knowing people, and skills of persuasion for 
their success.   
Another example of paths to personal development was the story of an affluent 
neighbour whose journey started with an invitation to stay in London at the home of a 
wealthy family friend.  This opportunity led to a stay of 20 years in the country where she 
acquired training in interior design, married, and had two children (who have the 
privilege of access to the British education system).  On her return to Ghana she had been 
financially and culturally transformed, benefiting from a better standard of living than the 
average inhabitant of Accra and circulating within a privileged social network of highly 
mobile Ghanaians, return migrants, and Western expatriates who served as the customer 
base for her interior design business.  Her custom designs drew from both African and 
European aesthetic influences.  Through her families social capital she was able to 
acquire a complex of additional resources. 
Perhaps the most dramatic of transformations related to me in an interview was 
that of Kelvin, a Liberian refugee who, as a child, ended up alone in a refugee camp in 
Ghana.  Seeking money to pay school fees he joined the Seventh Day Adventist church in 
order to get involved in a programme selling books on health topics through the church5.  
He sought out managing directors and other executives at area businesses as his clientele 
for these pricey books.  With time, he developed a sense of rapport and affinity with his 
repeat buyers.  He recalled an instance where, “…[the customer] invited me to his house.  
Now I’m going to his house.  Now he is offering me beer, now we are clashing glasses.  
Now I know him, I have different kinds of contacts.  Shipping line managers, presidents of 
this and that and all of that.”  After finishing school, he went back to one of these ‘Big 
Men’ to request a loan to open a computer school.  He was granted the loan and some 
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advice on business.  Eventually the profits of his computer school allowed him to 
purchase a car and establish a stable income and good lifestyle.  After several years he 
was able to migrate to the U.S. with the help of family ties and his refugee status.  
Nowadays he returns to Ghana to check in on his business and he has also gone into 
importing computers purchased second hand from computer labs at community colleges 
and other facilities in the U.S.   
The success stories described here are examples of total life transformations 
realized via personal social networks and catalyzed through the assistance of a single key 
contact.  In all cases, success was realized with little or no upfront financial investment.  
With widespread awareness of such cases, it is no surprise that Internet users directed 
their energies towards similar strategies, seeking to make contacts and build rapport 
online.  In this model, information (as something apart from social relations) had no clear 
role and provides no added benefit.  These examples underline the significance of 
rapport, trust, even sympathy, forces that energize informal economies and business 
transactions throughout the Third World (Geertz 1978; Fafchamps 1996; Humphrey and 
Schmitz 1998; DeSoto 2000; Lyon 2000; Molony 2007).  In a study of how mobile phone 
use impacted the livelihoods of market traders in Accra and Tema, Overa similarly 
observed that these traders could not, “operate according to an individualistic ‘market 
logic.’”  Partly to reduce economic risk, they formed deep, often lifelong friendships with 
colleagues.  Mobile phone use enhanced the traders’ capacity to negotiate prices, 
transport goods, and cope with contingencies, but furthermore the frequent contact 
facilitated by the mobile phone also improved trust with partners (Overa 2005).  In that 
study as well as the success stories described above, the key contacts were fellow 
Ghanaians.  Yet, Internet users in Accra often made the assumption that the same 
principles were in operation in their mediated interactions with non-Ghanaians via the 
Internet, an assumption that often did not play out in experience.  The translation of this 
local idiom of success into a universal model applicable to cross-cultural interactions was 
not itself successful. 
A model of technology for development focused centrally on ‘information’ 
typically focuses on problems of connectivity and access, data provisioning and 
circulation.  It does not, however, address the problematic nature of the cross-cultural 
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interactions that are facilitated by global connectivity.  The problems experienced by 
Ghanaian Internet users faced in relating to their foreign chat partners were issues of 
communication that went well beyond the technical problems of bandwidth and 
equipment access.  Many users were operating with a different set of expectations about 
the intent of these interactions and with different norms of behaviour than their chat 
partners sometimes resulting in strained exchanges and avoidance.  Stephen, a young man 
who used the Internet primarily to seek invitations from foreign chat partners to help him 
get a travel visa, described a typical scenario, “sometimes when you go online…and you 
say hi…you tell them that ‘I was the one who chat with you last’ they will tell you ‘I don’t 
know you’ and they will go offline.  For sometime, like 30 minutes they will come back to 
check if you are online.  When they see that you are online, they will go back offline.”  
Internet users also expressed concern about racial prejudice and related this to the skewed 
and homogenous representations of Africa and Africans they encountered online and in 
various other media formats.  Internet users sometimes interpreted their failure to acquire 
reliable contacts, capital, or opportunities to the inherent prejudice of Western contacts.  
A young software developer working for a U.S. based off-shoring company asserted that 
his success was dependent upon the fact that his employer concealed his ethnicity and 
location from customers noting, “[the customers] just don’t even believe we [Africans] 
should be able to do anything of that sort…if we had gone there to tell them ‘oh this is 
what we’ve done’ they will just take it and flip it over the wall without even taking a look 
at it.”  Experiences of misrepresentation and prejudice online were described in chapter 4 
in the way that Internet scammers simultaneously manipulated and exacerbated Western 
stereotypes of Africa and Africans.  They sought ways of turning these 
misrepresentations against their Western adversaries, but ultimately struggled and usually 
failed to best their scam targets.  This perspective on communication and its difficulties, 
was entirely absent from the WSIS process, but would likely be part of the message 
Internet café users in Accra would hope to deliver to the WSIS collective.  In support of 
this claim, a formal study of foreign investment in Africa demonstrated that negative and 
exaggerated perceptions of the continent play a role in the lack of interest amongst 
investors described as a, “vicious circle of poor information, low expectations, and low 
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investment” (Bhinda et al 1999, pp. 49).  Internet users astutely observed such a 
connection between issues of representation and barriers to material gain. 
Internet café users would almost certainly devote a great deal of attention to the 
desire and difficulty of migration in their grassroots message about technology and 
development.  Much of the use of the Internet in Accra was focused on the maintenance 
of diasporic connections and on cultivating migration opportunities.  Less privileged 
Ghanaians often viewed the Internet as a tool for routing around the formal political and 
economic infrastructure that kept them from realizing their migratory aspirations.  Yet, 
even the most dedicated efforts to realize this outcome rarely seemed to succeed.  
University students at the prestigious University of Ghana at Legon were the exception to 
this rule.  In light of cross-cultural communication troubles, Internet users in Accra 
whose uses of the Internet centred on building or maintaining diasporic ties (rather than 
seeking foreign contacts) seemed to fare better in terms of building social capital, 
realizing ‘serious’ long-lasting relationships, and gaining opportunities for migration, 
education, or marriage.  Two young women, Regina and Gladys, had both met well-
employed Ghanaian men living abroad on the Internet who later returned to meet these 
women, their families, and in both cases resulted in an engagement.  New networking 
technologies, the mobile phone in particular, have proven useful for maintaining 
diasporic ties and negotiating remittances in a number of other developing countries 
(Miller et al 2005).  In interviews with Ghanaians living in London I found that many 
expatriates felt the impact of the growing availability of new information and 
communication technologies in Ghana.  These technologies played a role in holding those 
living abroad accountable to their families and friends.  ICTs cemented social ties 
sometimes even against the will of those who migrated. 
The barriers to migration faced by young Ghanaians were a policy issue 
frequently brought up in interviews.  Many young Ghanaians had stories about applying 
for and being denied a travel visa or of obtaining a visa but lacking the funds for an 
airplane ticket.  Visa denials were based not on any actual misbehaviour, but on the 
presumption that the applicant was likely to break the law.  This presumption generated 
great resentment among young people who aspired to migrate.  Many Ghanaians have 
been able to find ways to leave the country and their migration abroad is one of the most 
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significant grassroots ‘development’ movements currently impacting the country.  It is 
one arising largely through the impetus of citizens rather than through high level 
planning.  The impact of this process extends beyond the lives of those who migrate 
affecting those they leave behind and Ghanaian society as a whole.  An analysis by an 
economist at the Bank of Ghana found that $1 billion in remittances were channelled into 
the country in 2003 and that the rate of remitting had been increasing substantially every 
year for the past few years.  He observed that this was a larger and more stable source of 
funds than either foreign direct investment (FDI) or overseas development assistance 
(ODA) (Addison 2004).  In relation to an institutional model of development, the impact 
of migration (in terms of an internal improvement of the functioning of society and 
governing bodies) is unclear.  Remitted monies may go largely towards base level 
subsistence rather than investment and internal capacity building although this research 
uncovered examples of both.  However, from the alternate local model of development, 
the possibility for raising the standard of living for an individual and family is in many 
cases realized.  Migration and remittances follow logically from the theory that 
development is about gaining access to accumulations of capital outside of the African 
continent.  Migrants open new channels, funnelling money and other resources from host 
countries to their homeland.   
The channels migrants open up provide more than unidirectional flows of money.  
Those who migrate build up many forms of capital: social, educational, and cultural in 
addition to financial.  Return migrants often make use of these forms of capital to do 
some of the internal capacity building work that an institutional model defines as ‘true’ 
development.  This was particularly true of the nascent high-tech sector in Ghana.  Dr. 
Nii Quaynor, who was educated at prestigious schools in the U.S. and had professional 
experience as a software engineer and manager, returned to Ghana to start the first 
Internet Service Provider – Network Computer Systems (NCS).  In a short survey project 
of computing sector companies on Ring Road, a central business district in Accra, my 
collaborators and I heard several stories of migrants who had returned around 1992, the 
time when the government transferred to a more democratic regime.  The services 
provided by the businesses of these return migrants included technology training, 
computer sales, and Internet cafés.  Additionally, most of the Internet café owners I 
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interviewed mentioned stints abroad6 or were partnered with someone who had spent 
time abroad.  One cannot definitively conclude from this information that migration is 
responsible for the development of the high-tech sector in Ghana.  Migrants may gain 
resources while abroad, or their ability to migrate may simply indicate their already 
privileged backgrounds, a distinction that could be parsed out through further research.  
What can be stated is that return migrants seem better positioned to start businesses 
providing technology equipment and services in Ghana and sometimes point to specific 
resources acquired while abroad for this advantageous position. 
Alongside the migrant success stories (real and mythic) and the stories of failed or 
thwarted migration, were also stories of disillusionment told by those who had migrated 
and returned.  A taxi driver once told me the tale of how he had lived for a time in 
London.  Before leaving, he had already been fairly successful in Ghana.  He owned two 
taxis and some land.  He cashed in his assets and paid £4500 to a ‘connection man’ to 
obtain visa papers and a plane ticket to get to London thinking that it was the next step 
for him to further improve his financial situation.  This investment secured his entry into 
the country, but did not provide him with papers for legally remaining there.  As soon as 
he arrived he realized that it was a bad idea.  The lucrative opportunities he expected to 
find did not materialize.  He spent three years stuck in London doing manual-labour 
work, positions he described as ‘donkey jobs.’  For a time, he held an exhausting job 
washing 48 double-decker buses a night at Stamford Hill station.  He also worked in a 
warehouse loading and unloading freight for Morrisons supermarkets.  Eventually he and 
his roommate were discovered and arrested by the police and sent back to Ghana.  Being 
caught by immigration was a great relief to him.  Although his bank account in London 
was seized, he had managed to send some money to his grandmother in Ghana totalling 
£3000.  After 3 years in London he had realized a net loss of £1500 from his initial 
investment.  Now living in Ghana he is slightly worse off than when he left.  He owns 
only one taxi and no land.  He commented that life is much easier for him in his 
homeland than it ever was for him in the U.K.  Certainly what this indicates is that 
migration experiences are highly variable and depend upon the destination country, the 
conditions of migration, and the skills and resources (social and financial) migrants bring 
with them or have access to in the host country.   
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The issue of migration has come to the attention of development institutions 
involving a discussion of both negative and positive impacts.  This discussion has 
progressed beyond simplistic notions of ‘brain drain’ acknowledging that migration has a 
multi-faceted impact and involves both problems with labour and skill shortages in 
developing nations as well as new flows of resources into the country (Adams 2003; 
OECD 2005; Page and Plaza 2006).  However, debates around this issue are occurring 
wholly outside of UN efforts to realize an ‘information society’ and promote ICT use in 
the developing world.  At WSIS, participants carried on an already established argument 
for the circulation of information and goods (particularly technology goods) without 
regulatory restraints in the global market.  A focus on telecommunications liberalization 
and on more favourable import taxation regimes are dimensions of this argument.  
However, labour was not treated similarly.  The experiences of Ghanaians who have 
migrated or aspire to migrate highlight how individuals worldwide are granted vastly 
different privileges of mobility in relation to their citizenship.  Ghanaians are typically 
kept in a particularly immobile position relative to the developed world. 
That the worldwide network of expatriates is a valuable resource that could be 
better enrolled in national development efforts is something the Ghanaian government 
has already recognized.  In 2001 a ‘homecoming summit’ was organized to bring 
migrants back to Ghana encouraging them to pursue investment opportunities in the 
country.  There are many services that could be built to make use of this interest: easier 
and cheaper online money transfers, forums for discussing investment opportunities or 
organizing philanthropic projects, Ghanaian matchmaking services, and e-commerce sites 
for remitting gifts to loved ones in the homeland.  As developing nations work to 
transform their economies, governments, and social services the impact of migration will 
be a component in this process, one whose positive effects could be amplified through 
ICTs.  New thought on the matter depicts migration as an intermediate phase in 
transitioning economies.  In the aftermath of the spectacular failure of ‘all at once’ 
structural adjustment programmes (Escobar 1995; Easterly 2001; Ferguson 2006), 
particularly in Africa, this concern with the process of integration is an improvement over 
arguments such as Castells depiction of ‘switched-on’ and ‘switched-off’ regions evoking 
the inapt metaphor of a light switch (Castells 2001).  Migration is a process of 
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information and labour circulation.  Acts of migration are embodied in human migrants 
and thereby serve as an alternate method for addressing geographic marginality than that 
suggested by a bodiless and ephemeral ‘information society.’ 
Another trajectory of technology for development thinking problematized by on-
the-ground technology practice in Accra is the recent re-visitation of ‘appropriate 
technology’ ideals.  This trajectory has re-emerged not only in institutional discourse, but 
also in academic work and NGO efforts.  ‘Appropriate’ technologies are those that better 
match their settings of use and the pragmatic needs and existing capabilities of users in 
the developing world.  Yet, the interest among Internet users in migration and the 
idealization of abroad also says something less explicitly instrumental about the ethos of 
Internet café users in Accra.  Ferguson observes that many appropriations of Western 
commodities serve as a way that citizens of African nations make, “claims to membership 
within modern society, and negotiations of the rights proper to such membership” 
(Ferguson 2006, pp.  164).  The declining prosperity and upheaval within many African 
nations after independence was experienced as a painful disconnection from global 
economic and political processes (Ferguson 2006).  Through their current technology 
adoption efforts, citizens seek to remedy this disconnection.  Mercer relates this directly 
to Internet café use in Tanzania finding that users are drawn to these technologies as a 
way to demonstrate affinity with the outside world and to distinguish themselves as more 
‘developed’ than peers who do not use technology (Mercer 2005).  These interests 
provide an alternate commentary on the ‘appropriate technologies’ movement that 
emerged in the 1970s (Schumacher 1973) and is carried forward in projects such as 
MIT’s $100 PC programme7 and open source software movements directed at developing 
nations.  While theoretically sound and in many ways sensible, the drive towards this 
form of localization is divorced from the technology’s appeal as a symbol of the foreign 
in places like Ghana.  The same is true of the call for local content development to 
distribute agricultural or market information for farmers or provide customers for craft 
makers.  These efforts seek to respect and facilitate the continuation of the existing 
livelihoods of Third World citizens.  At the same time they do not serve the technological 
needs of that segment of society in developing nations that desires the transformative 
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potential of technology and that craves inclusion and partnership on an equal footing in 
global cultural processes. 
Along these lines, while almost none of the Internet users I interviewed had 
sought formal training in Internet use, it was common for young people to pay for courses 
on how to use Microsoft Office, a skill that was desired due to the worldwide 
pervasiveness of Microsoft products.  Those who pursued this training reasoned that the 
skill would be applicable if they ever got the opportunity to go abroad.  This is an 
interesting challenge to the open source software development that received significant 
attention at WSIS as a ‘grassroots’ movement.  Open source proponents frequently place 
themselves in opposition to Microsoft as a too powerful corporate monopoly and as an 
undesirable model of software development and distribution.  Arguments for open source 
at WSIS were about the importance of customized local solutions that could be created 
and maintained by and for groups (such as speakers of an obscure language) that are too 
small or too poor to be considered a promising market for mainstream proprietary 
software.  This was apparent in the statement from the WSIS Tunis Agenda for the 
Information Society that asserts the need for, “development of software that renders itself 
easily to localization, and enables users to choose appropriate solutions from different 
software models including open-source, free and proprietary software” (Tunis Agenda 
2005, pp.  77).  Yet, as a model for developing appropriate technology solutions, the open 
source process relies on the untenable assumption that openness in participation means 
that there is no significant distinction between developers and users eschewing the need 
for formal user feedback and usability testing processes (i.e. Raymond 1998).  This 
assumption explains why successful open source projects have typically been designed 
by and for the technologically proficient (software developers and network 
administrators) often resulting in extraordinarily powerful systems with inaccessible user 
interfaces.  Yet, an encouraging sign of possible things to come are more recent open 
source projects, such as the Ubuntu Linux-based operating system that have been able to 
successfully prioritize and incorporate the needs of ordinary users. 
Open source software development is promoted as a good model for building 
better, more appropriate software solutions at reasonable expense.  They are also 
considered to be a possible mechanism for cultivating technical talent locally in 
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developing nations.  That this process could produce local software developers is 
certainly desirable, but to assume that those who pursue this route will be able to design 
for the needs and capabilities of their less privileged compatriots is debatable and negates 
the heterogeneity, hierarchy, and conflict amongst different segments of society in 
developing nations.  The exclusionary practices and territorial claims of young men in 
Internet cafés (see chapter 3) is an example of how new technologies attracted young 
people in Ghana as a tool for social differentiation and displays of status.  Furthermore, 
open source development processes are centrally concerned with quality control and 
therefore with recognizing and rewarding technical talent and skill sometimes resulting in 
exclusionary and elitist social practices among participants (Bergquist and Ljungberg 
2001; Nafus et al. 2006).  It is therefore limited in what it offers to the general population 
in terms of technical education.  The drive towards custom software and hardware 
solutions for developing nations must walk a fine line.  Open source movements often 
seem to reach only a very narrow segment of society, those individuals determined to 
become virtuoso techie-programmers.  Alternately, technologies homogeneously 
designed for the lowest common denominator of society will likely be received by 
literate, multi-lingual citizens and their governments in the developing world as further 
evidence of low expectations and, ironically, exclusion of these societies from global 
trends. 
 
Purifying Technology 
 
The definition of technology emerging at WSIS served to mediate a relationship 
between development programmes, donors, and recipients of development aid.  
Technology as a tool for delivering information, primarily from north to south, for 
improving the efficiency of business, governmental, and social processes in the 
developing world was a product of ‘casting.’  As argued in the introduction, the perceived 
boundaries of technological objects are constructed socially to serve purposes of 
cognitive order and to negotiate social relations.  Arguments made in WSIS documents 
attributed processes and effects as generated by the technology itself or alternately to 
external sources.  This was work done to police the boundaries of the technological 
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object, to maintain it as harmless and helpful and also to maintain a role for development 
interventions.  There is a parallel here to the efforts among Internet scammers and their 
peers to neutralize the relationship between technology and user through rumours that 
cast the user as effective and moral in relation to the Internet (see chapter 4).  Similarly, 
casting practices at WSIS purified technology as part of an argument for its 
unquestionable and inevitable benefit to developing nations and the role of the UN and 
related agencies in bringing about this important technology transfer. 
The purification of technology followed from a dynamic of absorption and 
displacement, absorption of successes into the development sphere where they were 
attributed to development initiatives and displacement of failures and problems away 
from development institutions and the new technologies themselves.  Absorption is 
evident in credit-taking comments by development aid providers such as, “initiatives 
within the continent point the way to a different future. North Africa is the most advanced 
of all regions in Africa because universities in these countries have just recently become 
members of the EU MED Connect project, which links them to high-speed undersea fibre 
networks”  (Steiner et al. 2005, pp. 34).  An example of the displacement is illustrated in 
the assertion, “Throughout discussions at Mozambique and elsewhere, there was a (near) 
universal consensus that the challenges in bringing data connectivity to Africa have less 
to do with technology than with market and regulatory structure [added emphasis]” 
(Tongia 2005, pp. 17).  This claim shifts the blame for difficulties in provisioning 
technology access to inadequacies in national government.  It draws the focus away from 
potential problems adapting the technology itself to various African settings.  The 
technology is consequently characterized as universally beneficial. 
Technology as an innocent and beneficial force is particularly apparent in the way 
risk is treated in WSIS documents.  For example travel on bad roads is described as a risk 
but that, “with the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) this risk can 
be diminished substantially” (Dufborg 2005, pp. iii).  There is also the acknowledged 
financial risk on the part of donors and a risk on entering anti-competitive telecomm 
markets of being subject to unpredictable Third World governments.  Risk is primarily 
characterized as a consequence of not having access to new technologies thus 
exacerbating and widening the gap between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots.’  ICTs therefore are 
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cast as tools for reducing risk by the argument that there is, ‘no harm trying.’  Exposure 
to new ICTs is never defined as posing new risks or vulnerabilities for citizens of 
developing nations.  By contrast, Internet users expressed an understanding that the 
Internet can indeed pose a threat to one’s morality (through access to pornography or the 
temptation of fraud for example) and to one’s finances through the loss of money to 
scammers. 
Cyber-crime was handled in a particular way during the WSIS process in relation to 
the issue of risk.  Sections 40-42 of the WSIS Tunis Agenda deal specifically with the 
issue8.  While it is quite common for technology to be described as a determinist force 
that causes positive development effects, by contrast, on the issue of cyber-crime this 
problem is displaced away from the technology attributed instead to human fallibility.  
Cyber-crime is defined as a perversion of the technology’s more natural tendencies.  For 
example, the Geneva Declaration references a United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 55/63 titled, “combating the criminal misuse of information technologies 
[added emphasis].”  The answer is defined as legislation and cooperation among law-
enforcement authorities, but never by managing technology access or providing 
education on the joys as well as the dangers of these technologies.  Technology was cast 
in WSIS documents to alleviate suspicion that it might pose a threat to the societies it was 
intended to aid thereby paving the way for unencumbered technological interventions. 
Where Africa was considered in documents connected to WSIS it was 
portrayed as a continent with severe infrastructure problems that made existing 
Internet access essentially useless, negating the value of what Internet users in Accra 
were already managing to do with the technology.  For example, in relation to a 
specific survey on Internet access at Universities in Africa the authors argue that, 
“Internet connectivity in tertiary education institutions in Africa is in general too 
expensive, poorly managed and inadequate to meet even basic requirements… the 
average African university has bandwidth capacity equivalent to a broadband 
residential connection available in Europe, pays 50 times more for their bandwidth 
than their educational counterparts in the rest of the world, and fails to monitor, let 
alone manage, the existing bandwidth (ATICS 2005). As a result, what little 
bandwidth that is available becomes even less useful for research and education 
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purposes [added emphasis]” (Steiner et al. 2005, pp. 34).  This statement not only 
argues that what exists is lacking, but also that local management of the resource is 
incapable, implying a need for external intervention.  It is yet another example of 
‘casting’ practices that preserve a role for development interventions. 
By contrast, an opposing narrative was produced among Internet users at one such 
African University, the University of Ghana at Legon.  While not stunningly fast, this 
group certainly perceived Internet access to be adequate emphasizing what they were 
newly able to accomplish rather than the limitations to connectivity that they faced.  It is 
notable that contradictory conclusions emerged from these two perspectives.  Even 
among Internet café owners (who were closely tied into issues of bandwidth provisioning 
and cost) the problems they identified did not reflect dominant Development priorities.  
Complaints about infrastructure were typically targeted at ISPs identifying cost and 
unreliability of service as problems, but never bandwidth.  The depiction of inadequate 
and poorly managed bandwidth is ultimately about defining problem/solution pairings 
where existing ‘conditions’ are presented as a set-up for arguments about particular 
development intervention that are put forward as solutions. 
The formation of a particular institutional model of technology for development at 
WSIS involved the occasional depiction of ‘on-the-ground’ conditions, but these rarely 
resembled and sometimes directly contradicted the experiences of Internet users in Accra.  
Instead these conditions were props supporting arguments about solutions.  This form of 
argumentation is an example of what Ferguson defines as ‘development-think’ where 
premises are defined in relation to the necessary conclusions (Ferguson 1990).  In the 
case of technology and development, the conclusion is that external development 
interventions and high-level policy-making are necessary to bring about technology 
access in Africa and other parts of the developing world.  This illustrates how practices of 
institutional self-perpetuation, while certainly a necessary part of the life of any 
institution, can create blind spots that obscure the discursive spaces where citizens of 
developing nations express their priorities and concerns. 
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Socio-Technological Momentum 
 
 The model of development held by Internet users and consequent technology 
practices emerging in Internet cafés constitute a socio-technological momentum with its 
own distinctive characteristics and orientation in Accra.  Internet café use, as well as 
mobile phone adoption, independent radio and newspapers, local video-film production, 
videography services, and music production and dissemination are all interconnected 
technology trends that contribute to this momentum.  The need for policy-makers, 
entrepreneurs, and institutional agents to contend with the force of technology in practice 
has been examined before in the concepts of path dependency and Hughes’ systems 
theory of “technological momentum” (Hughes 1994).  Both focus on increasingly locked 
in technology processes anchored in everyday life through their inter-linkages with 
diverse entities.  The focus on technology in practice rather than technology’s ‘promise’ 
is key to both theories.  Similarly, both address technology adoption and diffusion as a 
matter of pragmatism, that is, the inarguable reality of what technology actors believe and 
do, rather than utopianism, or what technology actors should ideally do.  Path 
dependency is primarily an economic concept used to explain how technological 
development is limited by the entrenchment of certain inferior technologies (such as the 
inefficient QWERTY keyboard) in light of the availability of improved versions of the 
technology (David 2001).  In a similar concept, Hughes locates momentum in imposing, 
physical structures such as dams, in organizational bureaucracies that deal with 
technologies, but also in the mastery and development of complex skills and knowledge 
(Hughes 1994).  In both concepts something consequential is constituted through the 
practices that employ technologies, something greater than the material properties of the 
technology alone. 
The Internet café scene in Accra, while lacking the type of formality and 
complexity documented by Hughes, had a consequential momentum in a populist sense 
through the sheer aggregate number of individuals who shared a similar interpretation of 
the technology.  This momentum was composed of business models, facilities, as well as 
the informally developed knowledge and meaning that came to be associated with the 
Internet.  There is not yet clear evidence that this momentum exhibits the attribute of 
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irreversibility that characterizes path-dependent processes.  In Accra, Internet cafés 
seemed to rapidly come and go.  What it does mirror from the concept of path-
dependency was a consequential and distinctive existence realized not just through the 
materiality of technology, but through technology practice and through the 
interdependence of the Internet, other commodities, and social processes.  This 
momentum can be treated for development purposes as a useful resource to cultivate and 
build upon.  It is a pre-existing local engagement with new technologies that can inform 
development ideas and programmes.  
There are three ways that the socio-technological momentum of emergent 
technology practice in developing nations like Ghana could become useful to 
development interests.  The first is by highlighting on the ground realities and concerns 
that receive little attention in the hegemonic ICT and development discourse.  One of 
these issues in Accra was the interest in making contacts abroad and the use of the 
Internet and other technologies to build or maintain diasporic links.  An example of a 
technological implementation that engages this issue is the website thamel.com, an 
ecommerce site for Nepalese expatriates built by an entrepreneurial Nepalese man 
currently living in the U.S.  The site allows expatriates to purchase goods as gifts for 
family and friends in Nepal.  A sensible verification method is built into the process.  
Upon delivery a photo is taken of the recipient receiving the gift and is sent by e-mail to 
the sender.  While senders may purchase Western imported goods such as mobile phones 
as gifts, they can also purchase food, flowers, and other perishable goods that are 
provisioned from local businesses thereby supporting these small enterprises in Nepal.  
An infrastructure for e-commerce is set up within Nepal that effectively puts many local 
businesses ‘online’ by employing runners as intermediaries to handle monetary 
transactions between the web site and these businesses.  This is an example of how 
projects can have a greater effect by amplifying and improving specific practices (such as 
remittances), rather than putting money into generic technology access initiatives with 
unclear and overly broad presumed benefit to recipient communities. 
 A second way development efforts could engage with existing socio-
technological momentum is by supporting and collaborating with technology-based small 
businesses, such as the Internet cafés in Accra, in order to aid their effectiveness and 
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impact.  The multipurpose community centre programme in Ghana is an example of an 
intervention that makes almost no use of existing socio-technological momentum 
(beyond general local interest in technology) and even worse, has the potential to conflict 
with and undermine local entrepreneurial efforts.  These stand-alone information centres, 
funded by government and donor sources, function much like Internet cafés.  While many 
are located in rural areas that lack any form of Internet access, some are also located in 
Accra in the vicinity of existing Internet cafés and will potentially compete with these 
local businesses for customers.  Why aren’t these services being provided through the 
existing Internet cafés instead of stand-alone centres9?  Development agencies could 
work in partnership with Internet cafés to improve the quality of information and 
education about technology provided in these spaces.  This could be as simple and 
inexpensive as producing informational posters about ‘how to use a search engine’ and 
providing these to existing Internet cafés.  This notion of collaboration through public-
private partnership would avoid undermining existing businesses and at the same time 
would be a much more efficient use of funds. 
 It is appropriate here to highlight the conditions in Accra that make a 
collaborative public-private model appealing and why private Internet cafés did not alone 
solve the problem of technology access and use in this particular case.  Over the course of 
my research I encountered a number of Internet users who had difficulties in using the 
technology effectively in accordance with their own plans and projects due to inaccurate 
models of how the technologies work.  These difficulties highlight the need to support 
technology access with training and demonstrate limits to explorative self-education as a 
learning model.  This issue is not about the alternate models of the Internet that derive 
from differences in values and world-views, but about mental models of how technology 
works that were fundamentally inaccurate.  For example, in chapter 2 I described the 
efforts of a young man named Frank to find customers for locally produced glass beads.  
His ineffectiveness with this strategy stemmed from a misunderstanding about search 
engines.  Firstly, he presumed that a search engine functioned as a vetted business 
directory and that businesses applied to be included.  Secondly, he presumed that all 
search results were accurate, and therefore never bothered to read and evaluate the text on 
web pages, but simply extracted any e-mail addresses these pages contained.  
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Consequently he sent a huge number of e-mails one-by-one to unpromising addresses.  A 
misunderstanding of how Internet technologies work also left some Internet users more 
vulnerable to scams.  For example, Gabby, a young marginally employed man in his 
twenties received an e-mail notifying him that he had won a lottery in Amsterdam.  In 
order to gain access to his winnings he was instructed to send several hundred dollars to a 
regional office in Nigeria.  Gabby was suspicious, but when he contacted someone about 
the e-mail he was given a web address.  The existence of a web page suggested to him 
that the lottery was legitimate.  He did not understand that web sites could be set up for 
free and that the Internet functioned as a largely unregulated system without a process for 
scrutinizing information posted online or organizations with a web presence for 
legitimacy. 
Ultimately, collaboration between development agencies and private small 
technology businesses makes sense in Accra for several reasons.  First because the 
customers at these cafés were not the wealthy elite and were often members of 
communities, such as the impoverished neighbourhood of Mamobi, that were the target 
of development aid.  Secondly, because many Internet users in Accra needed assistance 
in understanding how these technologies work in order to use them more effectively and 
with less risk.  And many needed assistance in learning ways of using the technology 
more broadly beyond the narrow confines of e-mail and chat.  Finally, Internet cafés were 
not visited by all segments of society equally and efforts to encourage underrepresented 
groups, women, middle-aged, and elderly people could be a cause taken up by 
development initiatives by funding special training courses and Internet café vouchers for 
these groups, or, for example, by sponsoring women-only cafés or women-only nights at 
existing Internet cafés.  These issues altogether are a problem of the underutilization of 
the Internet in Accra - a worthy topic for development initiatives concerned ideologically 
with equality and with promoting the widespread diffusion of technology access and 
skills to marginalized groups. 
A third and final use of the existing socio-technological momentum in Accra is as 
a source of information and insight for known development programme implementation 
problems.  Internet café owners have been coming up with solutions to the same 
questions that have troubled development agencies pursuing technology access initiatives 
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(Roman and Colle 2002).  These include concerns over the economic sustainability of 
technology services, the acquisition of necessary equipment, and of promoting local 
interest and engagement.  Development projects are frequently unsustainable due to 
donor dependency and, in relation to technology specifically, often assume that it is 
necessary or preferable to acquire new state-of-the-art equipment and provide a 
completely free service.  Local entrepreneurs in Accra employ a different model charging 
a reasonable hourly rate that even young people without incomes in underprivileged areas 
of the city can manage to pull together.  They purchase older, second-hand computers 
from local resellers at cut-rate prices and these machines adequately serve the needs of 
their clientele for text-based communication that requires little bandwidth or computing 
power.  While development efforts will identify areas where this business model does not 
work (i.e. to provide access to rural communities), the base line information about what 
does work and under what conditions is a useful resource. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The processes that produced a disconnect between institutional actors at WSIS 
and Internet café users in Accra resulted in the failure of ideas, concerns, priorities, and 
practices to circulate between the two groups.  These two spheres represented distinct 
networks with very few points of interconnectivity and without a commonly shared 
language.  As a consequence, distinct technological trajectories (of thought and practice) 
have developed in these spaces that often contradict or neglect one another rather than  
building upon a shared momentum.  The resulting conceptualizations of technology and 
its link to development produced from the perspective of the development institution vs. 
that of technology users in a developing nation were widely divergent.  However, the 
processes that produced these conceptualizations, as this chapter has demonstrated, were 
in many ways the same.  Parallel practices of sense-making and ordering existed amongst 
Internet users in Accra as well as among WSIS participants.  In both cases 
representations of technology (in formal documents and casual conversation) served not 
only to clarify functionality and utility, but also as a way to maintain the integrity 
(morality, legitimacy, effectiveness, coherence) of the self in relation to technology 
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whether that self was institutional, collective, or individual.  This meant that technology 
was defined in a way that justified the values and practices of the group, practices ranging 
from Internet scams to donor-funded development interventions.  In both settings 
computing and networking technologies were defined away from the computer interface 
itself through collective processes of speech and embodied performance: through 
rumours in the street, sermons in church, in workshops with development experts, and on 
the stage of an auditorium among many other locales. 
While the institutional perspective exhibited at WSIS argued for a model of 
development through information, Internet users in Accra suggested a model of 
development via social connections.  These differences in definition did not fall along the 
standard binary of modern developmentalists vs. traditional locals.  Many Internet users, 
in their dreams of migration and desired forms of material consumption, clearly aspired 
(while often with a degree of ambivalence) to modern, cosmopolitan lifestyles and 
involvement in global processes.  In the mean time, the UN has begun to place more 
credence in calls for cultural preservation.  The result is an apparent reversal where 
citizens argue for modernization and to a certain degree ‘mimicry’ of the prosperous 
West (Ferguson 2006) while institutions at times suggest that new technologies have the 
potential to facilitate village life, by reducing the need for rural-urban or international 
migration and by making traditional pursuits (such as craft-making) more lucrative.  It is 
becoming increasingly clear that the binary of traditional and modern is inadequate in 
understanding the lives of citizens in the developing world.  Escobar argues that, the 
Third World should not be seen as a “reservoir of traditions” and that, “Third 
World…selves are illegible to any idiom of modernity” (Escobar 1995).  Addressing 
local perspectives on development issues does not mean simply insulating societies from 
global forces in order to preserve local traditions.  Citizens of developing nations are 
engaging in some of the major modern debates, whether or not anyone is listening, about 
the causes of underdevelopment, the impact of technology, and pathways out of poverty. 
As the UN institutional discourse evolves in response to external criticism it has 
become unacceptable, in an official sense, to point to local cultures as something that 
needs to be overcome, merely as barriers to development processes (Crewe and Harrison 
1998).  Local inadequacies are instead termed as a lack of education, lack of knowledge, 
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or lack of skills still preserving room for the external interventions of development 
institutions.  Yet, attempts to embrace culture in the WSIS process were two-dimensional 
following the old binary of modern developmentalists and traditional locals.  In the 
official outcome documents produced at WSIS, culture is equated with local languages 
focusing on the need to develop language support on all new technologies.  Technology 
is also referred to as a tool for documenting culture by capturing it in databases, museum-
like, for the enrichment of future generations10.  Culture is thereby treated as an external 
thing, a novelty, something apart from global debates and the essential practices of 
knowledge management, information distribution, and communication.  It is instead 
costumes and food and exotic rituals.  A more fully integrated engagement with issues of 
localization and culture would recognize the contributions those truly external to 
institutional debates have to discussions of modernization, globalization, and migration.  
A number of scholarly fields – anthropology, cultural studies, information studies, or 
organizational behaviour – all provide models for a more central and all encompassing 
notion of culture as constituting unique and potentially insightful and innovative 
information and communication practices.  To address the technology cultures emerging 
in developing nations as well as the pre-existing information and communication 
practices in these contexts would make culture part of the ICT debate on a more 
fundamental level. 
Perhaps the fact that the doors have been opened to ‘civil society’ groups will 
with time provide this opportunity.  Observers, scholars, and other participants should 
take note of the presence of these groups of ‘ordinary citizens’ at future World Summit 
events and other development institutional gatherings focusing on technology issues.  
Who are these individuals and groups who use the collective, first-person ‘we’ to identify 
themselves as outsiders to the development industry?  Are there occasions where the 
debate is successfully reframed to bring some of the previously invisible perspectives and 
priorities of ‘civil society’ to the attention of those gathered?  Outside the walls of the 
Accra conference centre, Internet users raised a number of issues that were not aired in 
the WSIS process.  Issues of central import to many Ghanaian Internet users included the 
politically-charged matters of international migration especially by non-elite Africans, 
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access to universally adopted technologies, inclusion in global processes, and problems 
with skewed representations of Africa and more blatantly racist behaviour online. 
Development experts, often trapped in the vestiges of a modernist paradigm may 
recognize shortcomings to past approaches, but still lack established alternatives.  The 
unidirectional nature of technology transfer projects in the modernist tradition sometimes 
renders proponents deaf to local interests instead making assertions about the need for, 
“local ‘champions’…who can mobilize others…to accept the vision of an ICT telecentre 
program” (Roman and Colle 2002, pp. 6) without seeking to understand why interest 
might be lacking in targeted populations.  Substantial energy has already been expended 
by Internet users in Accra to transform the technology into something of local relevance.  
To make use of this energy development institutions must gain a greater awareness of the 
existence of technology practices in the developing world, they must acknowledge 
technology’s unpredictable impact on new societies and even its potential to facilitate 
harm, and they must consider the legitimacy of alternate trajectories of use that do not 
readily conform to development categories.
 
1  see the articles by Bloem (2005) and Banks (2005) and the WSIS document WSIS/CSCG/5 titled “Civil 
Society Statement to Prepcom 2” for a list of agencies and individuals identifying themselves as civil 
society.  The distinction between NGOs and Civil Society in particular was unclear. 
2 this criticism is expressed from several directions by external individuals and groups – activist 
organizations, NGOs, and national governments.  It is also represented in scholarly debate – see Crewe and 
Harrison 1998, Easterly 2001, Easterly 2006, Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1990, and Scott 1998 on the 
inadequacies of development planning and top-down institutional social engineering more generally.  
Government actions, such as the rejection of UN decision-making processes by the U.S. government on 
international matters are also serious and public indictments on the legitimacy of the UN as a governing 
body.  Activist events that touch on development issues such as the WTO protests in Seattle in 1999 and 
several waves of protests after have received substantial media coverage making them difficult to ignore. 
3 For example, former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali depicts the UNs ubiquity in an article 
where he asserts that, “Nothing can match the United Nations' global network of information-gathering and 
constructive activity, which reaches from modern world centers of power down to the villages and families 
where people carry out the irreducible responsibilities of their lives” (Boutros-Ghali 1992).  He defends the 
role for UN involvement in matters requiring international cooperation by arguing that the UN is already 
everywhere. 
4 Multi-level marketing is a business model where products are sold through a hierarchical network and 
sellers make money both through the products they sell and through the people they enroll as sellers.  It is a 
legal business model.  However a multi-level marketing system becomes a pyramid scheme when money is 
made primarily by enrolling new sellers rather than from the sale of goods. 
5 Kelvin’s decision to join a church whose teachings he has no interest in is an example of strategic, 
disingenuous business practices often described as hustling (Chernoff 2003, Hall 1978).  When a friend told 
him, “You have to join the church and be baptized with the church before you will have this kind of 
privilege,” he responded, “well, we are on the hustle.”  Similarly, his persuasive sales pitch involved 
references to his foreign ties.  When asked about his non-Ghanaian accent he noted he had an “America, 
Liberia connection.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 In two cases I was unable to interview the owner of an Internet café because they lived more or less 
permanently abroad.  One was in New York the other in Arizona. 
7 The $100 PC programme seeks to distribute custom-designed laptop computers to children in developing 
nations.  These devices are sold in large quantities to the government who is responsible for distributing 
them to young people.  The hope is that these devices will teach young people to adopt an ‘explorers 
model’ of learning suited to developing technical knowledge and problem solving skills. 
8 Sections 40-42 of the WSIS Tunis Agenda state: 
40. We underline the importance of the prosecution of cybercrime, including cybercrime 
committed in one jurisdiction, but having effects in another. We further underline the 
necessity of effective and efficient tools and actions, at national and international levels, to 
promote international cooperation among, inter alia, law enforcement agencies on 
cybercrime. We call upon governments in cooperation with other stakeholders to develop 
necessary legislation for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime, noting existing 
frameworks, for example, UNGA Resolutions 55/63 and 56/121 on Combating the criminal 
misuse of information technologies and regional initiatives including, but not limited to, the 
Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. 
41. We resolve to deal effectively with the significant and growing problem posed by spam. 
We take note of current multilateral, multi-stakeholder frameworks for regional and 
international cooperation on spam, for example, the APEC Anti-Spam Strategy, the London 
Action Plan, the Seoul-Melbourne Anti-Spam Memorandum of Understanding and the 
relevant activities of OECD and ITU. We call upon all stakeholders, to adopt a multi 
pronged approach to counter spam that includes, inter alia, consumer and business 
education; appropriate legislation, law-enforcement authorities and tools; the continued 
development of technical and self-regulatory measures; best practices; and international 
cooperation. 
42. We reaffirm our commitment to the freedom to seek, receive, impart and use 
information, in particular, for the creation, accumulation and dissemination of knowledge. 
We affi rm that measures undertaken to ensure Internet stability and security, to fi ght 
cybercrime and to counter spam, must protect and respect the provisions for privacy and 
freedom of expression as contained in the relevant parts of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Geneva Declaration of Principles. 
9 A lack of collaboration between the state and Internet cafés is not due simply to ignorance.  Scott (1998) 
illustrates the compulsive need of state actors to account for and make legible their activities to higher ups 
and to their constituency.  A stand-alone facility that can be photographed, located on a map, etc. goes 
further towards this goal, than passing out informational posters. 
10 In the WSIS declaration of principles, ‘culture’ is listed alongside agriculture, employment, and 
education as entities that ICT applications can benefit in the statement: “ICT applications are potentially 
important in government operations and services, health care and health information, education and 
training, employment, job creation, business, agriculture, transport, protection of environment and 
management of natural resources, disaster prevention, and culture, and to promote eradication of poverty 
and other agreed development goals…”  Number 52-54 of these principles address the issue of ‘culture’ 
highlighting culture as a form of ‘content’ that needs to be digitized and valued as heritage.  These 
principles are listed below in full: 
“52. Cultural diversity is the common heritage of humankind. The Information Society should 
be founded on and stimulate respect for cultural identity, cultural and linguistic diversity, 
traditions and religions, and foster dialogue among cultures and civilizations. The promotion, 
affirmation and preservation of diverse cultural identities and languages as reflected in relevant 
agreed United Nations documents including UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity, will further enrich the Information Society. 
 
53. The creation, dissemination and preservation of content in diverse languages and formats 
must be accorded high priority in building an inclusive Information Society, paying particular 
attention to the diversity of supply of creative work and due recognition of the rights of authors 
and artists. It is essential to promote the production of and accessibility to all content—
educational, scientific, cultural or recreational—in diverse languages and formats. The 
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development of local content suited to domestic or regional needs will encourage social and 
economic development and will stimulate participation of all stakeholders, including people 
living in rural, remote and marginal areas 
 
54. The preservation of cultural heritage is a crucial component of identity and self 
understanding of individuals that links a community to its past. The Information Society should 
harness and preserve cultural heritage for the future by all appropriate methods, including 
digitisation.” 
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Conclusion  Technology Cultures 
 
Citizens of a Developing Nation as Agents of Technological Change 
 
In the introduction, I worked towards a broader definition of technological change 
that permitted a wide range of activities to be considered forms of user agency.  
Technology, I argued, is fundamentally realized in use.  The capabilities provided in the 
design of the technology were some, but not all of what defines the technological object.  
These capabilities are engaged with and understood by users selectively and extended 
through their practices of use as would follow from Sahlins assertion that, “the nature of 
material effects depends upon their cultural encompassment” (Sahlins pg. 206).  These 
effects can go in many directions or nowhere at all.  A technology that people refuse to 
use is a non-entity.  It is relevant to bring up the iconic figure of the rusting tractor, an 
image that looms large in development circles.  The rusting tractor is employed as an 
example of failed technology transfer, an object provided without the necessary 
supporting structure to ensure that it continued to be operational.  The tractor does not 
exist in any consequential sense, except perhaps as a reminder of failed development 
programmes.  Expanding out from this notion that technologies are not self-sustaining, 
that they require infrastructure, technologies also do not have self-evident utility.  Lack of 
interest is as likely to kill some technology-based aid interventions as mechanical 
breakdowns that go unrepaired. 
The agency of Internet café users has consequently been depicted in two primary 
forms in this thesis.  First, in terms of the programmes users devised and carried out 
directly with the keyboard and mouse.  These activities left traces in virtual space that are 
part of their construction of the Internet.  Such was the case with Internet scam e-mails as 
well as the preponderance of Ghanaian Internet users in Yahoo chat rooms that altered 
the conversational dynamics of those spaces.  Second, user agency was demonstrated in 
the way users talked about technology in the course of various social rituals thereby 
informing and directing their own actions at the computer interface as well as inspiring 
certain patterns of use in the actions of others.  This work away from the human-machine 
interface ultimately had consequences for the way users manipulated that interface 
 - 208 - 
directly.  Agency was explored through themes and examples in each chapter to 
demonstrate how the technology was brought into being in Accra.  Users changed the 
technology by creating it anew drawing from local structures of understanding such as 
rumours and religious rituals.  Consequently it did not emerge as the same Internet that 
users are familiar with in the U.S., Europe, and other parts of the world. 
It should be clear by now, however, that this emphasis on user agency does not 
indicate a ‘heroic’ agency whereby users are able to constitute any desired reality at will.  
In fact, one primary finding was that there was a great distance between users’ 
expectations about the Internet and what they were able to realize through an engagement 
with the technology.  An inability to close this distance was a source of frustration for 
some users.  Previous chapters demonstrated that, in certain ways, the Internet in Accra 
was fundamentally misunderstood and patterns of use often became narrowly entrenched 
in practices that were easily analogous to familiar tasks such as making a phone call or 
corresponding with a foreign pen pal.  The transformative potential of a technology like 
the Internet is called into question by users’ ability to arrive at a satisfying appropriation 
of the Internet without acknowledging or utilizing some of its core capabilities and tools, 
such as search engines.  Answering a question posed in the introduction, what the 
technology became through the efforts of users was, in certain ways, much less than it 
might have.  For many users, despite their best efforts, it fell far short of the 
transformative tool for self-improvement that a, ‘technology for development’ rhetoric 
holds up as the ideal. 
The point of considering the agency of these users in defining and changing the 
technology was not to argue for a native engineering instinct that renders development 
interventions unnecessary.  The purpose of conceiving of users activities as constructive, 
as capable of technological change in a very broad sense was so that we might come up 
against the very hard limits of this agency.  The activities of users at the Internet café 
were no more empirically-grounded or effective than most human behaviour and were 
similarly subject to misinformation and convenient logic.  Perhaps most significantly, 
users simply did not know that there was more they could or should know.  In many cases 
users were hindered by a lack of literacies (in the plural) and little training.  English 
language skills varied widely among Internet users.  However, issues getting less 
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attention in the debate about a ‘Digital Divide’ that were at play included a lack of media 
literacy that would promote scepticism about sources and data accuracy and a lack of 
technical literacy to understand underlying mechanisms in a way that would guide more 
effective use of these systems.  
A sense of ‘self’ (individual and collective) is altered by the arrival of a new 
technology.  To address another question posed in the introduction, what the ‘user’ 
became in the process of appropriating the Internet in Accra was partly a restoration and 
partly an extension of a pre-Internet self.  This sense of self, as narrated by Internet users, 
was understood in particular racially embodied ways and shaped via postcolonial 
relations with the West.  The models about how the Internet ‘works’ that were developed 
collectively by users helped them to filter the capabilities of the technology and arrive at 
their own selective understanding of functionality.  These models were not sustained 
because they effectively predicted the outcome of human-machine interactions.  They 
were sustained, in part, by the role they played in restoring a morally sound sense of self 
and society, particularly in relation to the confronting and threatening images of Internet 
fraud and other transgressive activities.  Therefore the demands of keeping the self intact 
shaped how functionality was understood and the practices carried out at the human-
machine interface.  A sense of self was not only restored but also changed and expanded 
in the ways users engaged with the Internet that helped these young, aspirational Internet 
users richly imagine and act out a more connected and cosmopolitan self.  Particularly 
among Internet users in very poor areas such as Mamobi, for whom opportunities of any 
sort were extremely limited and actual travel experiences unlikely, the Internet filled a 
need for a kind of self-realization.  It was this dimension of the appropriation of the 
Internet that was possibly the most successful outcome for young Internet users. 
One of the limitations that users struggled with had to do with forming 
relationships online with foreigners, relationships they often expected to yield 
opportunities such as foreign travel, help with education, and/or material gifts.  The delay 
in the diffusion of the Internet to Ghana meant that Internet café users in Accra who were 
going online for the first time were meeting a well-established communicative 
environment set upon norms that they did not yet know and did not have the opportunity 
to participate in defining.  Ghanaian Internet users’ efforts to engage with foreign chat 
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partners were shaped by locally understood social norms (about gender relations in 
particular), a sometimes exaggerated understanding about the financial capabilities of 
foreigners, as well as financial constraints that motivated them to not waste time in their 
online conversations.  In the best case their interaction style might be read as social 
ineptness (by Western standards of online interaction).  In the worst, they could be read 
as attempted criminal activity.  Warnings circulating in the media about Nigerian Internet 
fraud have created suspicion in online forums such as chat rooms and in dating sites 
against those who identify themselves as citizens of an African nation.  While the 
proliferation of multiple cyberspaces for widely dispersed communities who seek intra-
group sociability and solidarity has been the subject of recent accounts (i.e. Miller and 
Slater 2000), this problem of cross-cultural interaction online indicates that there should 
still be some concern over a ‘hegemonic’ Cyberspace.  Members of marginalized 
societies sometimes seek inclusion in what they perceive as The Cyberspace, but are for 
many reasons excluded by majority members.  This exclusion can be the result of nothing 
more than non-normative social behaviour and giving off the wrong identity cues (such 
as accurately identifying one’s nationality as Ghanaian or Nigerian).  This social 
exclusion is not one of technology access as in the classic notion of the ‘Digital Divide,’ 
but is taking place within new connections established by the Internet. 
The limits to the agency of these Internet café users suggest opportunities for 
careful and well-informed intervention.  First and foremost, they provide convincing 
evidence of the significant role that could be played by technical education.  They 
suggest a degree of scepticism would be warranted about the notion that young people 
have an inherent capacity to understand technologies through only free exploration and 
without guidance.  A balance between the two is likely to have a greater effect.  In 
chapter 6, I described established patterns of technology appropriation in Accra, Ghana as 
a socio-technical momentum that could be used by development practitioners.  The 
practices, effective or not, of Internet users provide insights into motivation suggesting 
how programmes might be designed to appeal to them.  One way to address this issue is 
to look at the issue of efficacy noting the distance between the technological aspirations 
of users and what they are able to accomplish with the technology.  Are there ways to 
close this gap? 
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Helping existing technology users to accomplish the outcomes they define 
themselves through training and resource-building is an easy and appealing target.  A 
more tricky problem is where the aspirations and on-the-ground technology practices 
appear counterproductive or ethically unsound.  The distance between Internet scammers 
aspirations and realizations is not a gap that development interventions ought to resolve, 
at least not in the way that the scammers would resolve it.  At the same time, where 
external bodies determine priorities and institute practices to meet these priorities there is 
an inherent inequality in the process.  There are emerging methodologies meant to effect 
such a reconciliation between organizers of aid and those who are meant to benefit (i.e. 
Tacchi et al. 2003).  Additional efforts at developing and testing such tools are needed. 
Another direction for approaching an existing technology momentum, is to look at 
the ‘negative space’ to see when, where, and why non-use endures.  How is a ‘lack of 
access’ socially produced?  Patterns of exclusion can be acted out by participants through 
processes of technology appropriation that impose a shared understanding of the type of 
person who uses a particular technology and how it is to be used.  A momentum of 
technology practice can build unevenly where interest maps differently across 
demographic groups or where the relations between groups is such that one group (i.e. the 
rowdy young men in the cafés) can claim ownership and exert power over others 
inserting themselves as gatekeepers to a desirable resource.  It is significant to note that in 
Accra, this exclusion was enacted by young, often disadvantaged men seizing upon and 
guarding one of the few new and compelling resources that they had access to.  By 
understanding the processes that result in uneven access, ways to restore a balance can be 
determined. 
A close evaluation of the proceedings and publications of the World Summit on 
the Information Society in the previous chapter highlighted a process of institutional self-
perpetuation that was, by necessity, disconnected from the disorderly reality of on-the-
ground technology practices.  For the sake of symmetry, a principle guiding the analysis 
throughout this thesis, development institutional processes ought to be put under the 
microscope alongside the citizens of developing societies.  The analysis of WSIS 
indicated that global institutions may not be in the best position to do the work of 
reconciling development ideas with the specific momentum of on the ground technology 
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practice.  Small-scale organizations, NGOs, and/or small businesses may be better 
configured to realize a compatible alignment of resources and motives between 
benefactors and beneficiaries.  Ultimately, it is not only the technology practices and 
information and communication processes in the developing world that need to be better 
understood.  The way organizations that seek to promote technology for development 
solutions must be better understood as well. 
 
Collectives, Communities, and Social Movements 
 
The approach to addressing user agency carried out in this thesis was meant to 
avoid an idiosyncratic individualism and to, instead, explore the capacity for humans 
alone or in groups to act in a way that employs and reorganizes existing socio-material 
orderings.  However, many past studies have centred narrowly on human-machine 
manipulations creating a privileged role for the individual.  It is the personal ownership 
of computers in private residences or office spaces that has been studied most often in the 
West (i.e. Bakardjieva 2001; Lally 2002; Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002).  The 
individualistic perspective of technology possession was much less prominent at Internet 
cafés where a shared model of technology use could not be defined by conventional 
notions of ownership.  In Accra, when individuals entered an Internet café for the first 
time, the interaction that initially defined the technology was not only with the keyboard, 
mouse and screen.  A social interaction with a more experienced peer or an Internet café 
attendant structured their formative understanding of the technology.  Many made their 
first visit to an Internet café with a group.  When users were asked about this first visit, 
they often reported that they were told they could use the Internet to find foreign pen-
pals.  In many cases, a café attendant walked them through the process of setting up an e-
mail account or getting started with chat rooms.  While many users spent time 
independently exploring the computer interface, these explorations often stayed within 
the initial description they had been given of the Internet’s utility. 
The interpretation of the Internet in Accra was shaped by collective processes.  
The specificity of their interpretations of the technology did not derive solely from the 
individual.  They also followed from the structures of meaning shared and instantiated by 
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groups.  This analysis of the practices that defined the Internet away from the computer 
interface also suggests another way of looking at the relationship between social groups 
and communication technologies.  A question was raised in the introduction asking 
‘through what processes the Internet was ‘realized’ in Accra?’  To give a partial answer, 
it was through collective activities that included Internet users and non-users, but the 
nature of these collectives can be further explicated.  These social groups were not 
defined as a ‘community’ made possible by technology and existing primarily inside its 
virtual boundaries.  It was also not defined as a ‘social movement’ outside of the 
technology presenting an organized, populist challenge to certain trajectories of 
technological development.  Both ‘communities’ and ‘social movements’ are key 
formations studied by researchers in the past to understand how collectives relate to 
technologies.  Studies of virtual communities often emphasize the affective benefits, the 
role of these communities in providing social support, belonging and identity definition.  
Studies of social movements – from open source proponents and bloggers to anti-WTO 
activists and refugees – are currently popular with social scientists who study the Internet 
and other new technologies.  Early theories of technological change also highlighted, for 
example, community groups that challenged the safety of the bicycle through newspaper 
editorials (Bijker 1995).  Yet, there are other forms of resistance and reinterpretation, as 
evidenced in Ghana, that are less conscious and intentional.  In the context of Internet 
café use in Ghana, users’ activities were guided by an agency that was in part automatic, 
dispositional, and did not emerge entirely at the level of conscious effort.  It was an 
expression of agency rather than activism.  Nonetheless it had a transformative effect on 
the realization of the technology in Accra.  When juxtaposed to the more dominant 
Western narratives about the coming technological revolution these alternate 
interpretations can also serve as a ‘grassroots’ critique without being explicitly 
politicized. 
In this thesis collectives have been understood alternately as mechanisms for 
information sharing and sense-making that are culturally embedded and not explicitly 
linked to political movements.  The evidence on Internet café use in Accra demonstrates 
that technology can be appropriated away from the imaginings of its developers without 
this being a movement that seeks to undermine or redirect the technology’s established 
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purposes.  Overt resistance requires awareness of a dominant or intended interpretation of 
a technology.  However, Internet appropriation in Accra took place at a great social and 
geographic distance from those who masterminded the Internet’s architecture.  The 
alternate interpretations of Internet users in Accra emerged out of a perspective that was 
disconnected from many of the dominant discourses of meaning about the Internet that 
circulate in the West. 
 
Technology Cultures 
 
A particular concept of culture has been employed throughout this thesis drawing 
from evolving theory in anthropology and sociology.  This ‘culture’ was not something 
belonging to the original tribes and societies who happened to live within Ghana’s 
national borders at independence.  It was not a distinct factor apart from economic, 
political, natural and material forces.  It was neither local nor global.  What made it 
singular was the particular intersection of global and local influences and the sequence of 
historical and contemporary events in the region.  Therefore it was not bounded by 
geography, ideology, or history.  It was shaped by traditional norms of reciprocity, 
witchcraft narratives, Pentecostal church practices, colonial era bureaucratic procedures, 
British and American migration policy, and American hip-hop all intermingling within 
one spectacularly distinctive, heterogeneous, and unbounded society.  These intersections 
framed the way individuals engaged with the Internet.  A new technology culture 
emerged out of this material engagement. 
Previous research has established how as technology diffuses in new societies it 
can be appropriated in novel ways (Hughes 1987; Howes 1996; Wilhite et al. 1996; 
Miller and Slater 2000).  Positivist approaches to the social study of technology 
sometimes refer to ‘cultural factors’ to explain this difference.  This is particularly 
evident within user-interface design research traditions (i.e. Honold 2000; Choi et al. 
2005).  Yet, this is an approach that treats culture as something external to the process 
taking place.  It also fails to explain differences in use among people who ostensibly 
share the same culture.  Technology users, like the rest of humanity, exist in overlapping 
and entangled cultures of nation, race, class, gender, religion, etc. to which unitary 
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‘factors’ can be isolated and assigned at great risk of arbitrariness and for no great gain.  
Furthermore the unique attitudes of individuals, their subjective culture (Simmel 1997) 
generates variations in use that should be acknowledged. 
With caution, I proceed with the use of the term ‘culture’ maintaining an 
awareness of some of these bad tendencies in the way it is often deployed, but with a 
belief in the immense utility of the term, especially for research on technology adoption 
and use.  On the down side, references to ‘culture’ have a way of homogenizing members 
of a group, silencing unsettled and conflicting dimensions.  It can also be used to sideline 
a certain set of responses to technology as a separate, inexplicable (possibly unnecessary) 
elaboration apart from the pragmatic directions of human activity.  Appadurai critiques 
the way ‘culture’ comes to seem as a substance, a “biologism” such as race.  Yet 
academics continue to find value in the term in increasingly diverse fieldsites.  Appadurai 
attempts to revitalize the term by limiting its use to that of an, “heuristic device that we 
can use to talk about difference….especially difference in the realm of group identity” 
(Appadurai 1991, pp. 13).  In Epistemic Cultures, Knorr-Cetina attempts to extend the 
term ‘culture’ towards understanding knowledge-production and the development of 
expertise in the sciences.  In a study of knowledge production in two fields of science 
describes the way culture may refer to “different technologies of knowing” (Knorr-Cetina 
1999, pp. 10).  Her choice of subject matter is the groups of scientists in disciplines that 
form through professional affiliation and educational processes.  These affiliations are a 
matter of choice, much like the expert culture of the WSIS event discussed in Chapter 6, 
and in this way evade accusations of promoting a naturalized difference through the 
concept of culture. 
Rumours, religious rituals, youth clubs and other social phenomena seemingly on 
the periphery of the Internet café scene were among the many sense-making structures 
that Internet users relied on in their engagements with the technology.  These structures 
of meaning were articulated with the new technological forms of the Internet to generate 
a distinctive technology culture.  Some of this work was representational; technology was 
manipulated and connected to other ideas and objects in speech.  Much of this work 
happened collectively; in church sermons and in schoolyards among other spaces.  This 
ethnography looked at two technology cultures – the planful, expert culture of the UN 
 - 216 - 
sponsored World Summit on the Information Society and the aspirational culture of 
Internet users in Accra that was simultaneously animistic and cosmopolitan, mystical and 
modern.  The divergent views of the Internet in these settings demonstrated how societies 
and institutions can arrive at different interpretations and practices from some of the same 
material prompts. 
This account of Internet use in Accra documented some of the processes that 
generate technology cultures.  Generally speaking, technology cultures are produced 
when existing structures of meaning intersect with the novel material properties of a new 
technology.  These intersections may happen accidentally or purposefully, consciously or 
unconsciously.  The technology cultures that rise up around a particular technological 
artefact promote particular beliefs about who can and should use the technology, what it 
is useful for, what processes are involved in using it effectively, and what desirable or 
undesirable outcomes it can be expected to produce.  This is not a simple equation of 
‘culture’ + ‘technology’ = ‘technology culture.’  The existing structures of meaning users 
relied on were not ephemeral abstractions of belief and value.  They were held in place 
by established socio-material orderings predating the Internet.  These structures were 
instantiated and made durable through ongoing and sometimes ritualistic practices such 
as the regular meetings of youth clubs and the prescriptions of a traditional healer. 
Belief in a particular rumour marks out a group of insiders from outsiders.  It 
exists and has material consequences to all who enroll in its status as truth.  The unifying 
notion of a ‘technology culture’ aggregates several practices depicted in previous 
chapters including rumours.  The conceptualization of ‘technology cultures’ is a way of 
answering the question raised in the introduction about the ‘scope’ of technological 
change effected by users.  A change to technology effected by users was never 
considered to be universal.  A ‘technology culture’ reflects the alterations made to a 
technological artefact as it is situated in society, alterations effected through use.  The 
changes made by users may go no further than the extent of their persuasive power in 
rumour and other forms.  Nonetheless through this persuasion, an understanding of 
functionality and consequently practice is formed. 
By drawing on existing structures of meaning, users were able to accommodate a 
novel technology through reconfigurations and recombinations rather than through a 
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response to pure material prompts.  These framings, however, brought forward finite 
possibilities while cropping out alternatives.  Therefore, the assistance provided by 
understanding a technology relationally (i.e. through metaphor) meant losses to 
interpretive flexibility.  Many interviewees described the Internet through analogies to 
other technologies.  The Internet was like a telephone that allowed users to make 
international calls but at much lower cost.  The Internet was like mail, but much faster.  
These analogies suggested ways of incorporating the Internet into old communication 
practices but did not shed light on information searching and other functions that did not 
map to these older technologies.  Through these structures – metaphors, rumours, and the 
like – users made a much smaller shift in their perspective than advocates of a digital 
revolution might have expected or hoped.  A complete transformation in worldview is 
extremely unsettling and presents the possibility of obliterating an established sense of 
self.  Users approached the Internet through rehearsed and internalized responses that 
required fewer cognitive demands than a totally disordered response purely to material 
prompts.  This act of ‘recycling’ meanings to accommodate new realities served the 
process of making new material forms less alien and more familiar, meaningful and 
useful. 
The same process of accommodation applied to the role of ICTs in institutional 
self-preservation at the UN through events like WSIS.  New technologies like the Internet 
were employed in a ‘retooling’ of the institution.  These technologies were 
accommodated through a process of change that muted and restructured their 
revolutionary possibilities to be compatible with the institution’s established operating 
procedures.  As much of this thesis has demonstrated, when a technology arrives in a new 
setting, it is appropriated and changed relying on the resources at hand.  Similarly within 
the UN these new technologies have been accommodated to a version of the ‘Information 
Society1’ that fits neatly into a spot once filled by modernization and industrialization 
that defined the development industry at its founding (Escobar 1995).  Around this 
former teleology the United Nations and related development institutions built a quite 
massive bureaucracy and set of practices and values.  The notion of an Information 
Society allows these global institutions to repurpose their practices using the same 
 - 218 - 
metaphors, the same system of expert intervention, high-level planning, and technology 
transfer, but with new (ostensibly improved) tools. 
The accommodation of new technologies into old processes of communication 
and information distribution, while perhaps less than revolutionary is not a refutation of 
the Internet’s consequential materiality.  There is no doubt that the Internet combines an 
array of distinctive properties in an entirely novel way and on a global scale.  The 
Internet enables anonymous and disembodied interactions and both synchronous and 
asynchronous communication.  It is much more interactive and customizable than older 
media forms like television.  It facilitates limitless reproduction and the organization of 
data into unique hypertext structures.  It offers inexpensive and easy authoring and 
distribution.  Yet, while theorists often address the expansive possibilities, often they 
have not considered the cultural frameworks that make these properties meaningful, 
desirable and useful.  Past studies have focused disproportionately on just one side of the 
process of socio-material articulation.  The studies in this vein do not go so far as to 
invoke a simplistic technological determinism to explain this process, but they have 
neglected to study much of the framing work that was taking place offline and away from 
the computer interface.  Often, research focusing on intensive, individual engagements 
with technology artefacts has attributed the primary force shaping styles of use to 
individual personality and life situation (i.e. Turkle 1984; 1996; Bakardjieva 2001).  
Technology practice has been frequently depicted as the result of an individual process of 
direct experimentation and online social interactions.  Methodological choices in early 
research also played a role as virtual fieldsites were observed detached from offline 
contexts.  Furthermore, in the very early years of Internet diffusion when many 
foundational studies were conducted, users had a similar profile.  Most were Americans, 
well-educated, technically-inclined, and male (Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002) and 
it is perhaps no surprise that they had a common view of the technology.  These early 
users had access, time, money, and the inclination to explore this unclear, complex, and 
sometimes unreliable new technology.  Researchers shared a similar cultural positioning 
and many of the presumptions framing the use of the Internet were difficult to recognize 
from this embedded position. 
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Beyond considering the processes that generate technology cultures, the 
relationships that connect divergent technology cultures have political, social, and 
economic implications.  Mobile individuals and ideas circulate between them.  How 
members of a technology culture perceive and relate to outsiders is a major issue 
addressed in this thesis.  Many treat their vision of technology as a mission that ought to 
be expanded to encompass outsiders.  The efforts of development agencies to bring 
technology for development programmes into Third World locales is a concerted effort 
not just to transfer technologies, but to expand an institutional culture about technology’s 
value and purpose.  By relying on the notion of a ‘digital divide’ to justify Third World 
technology interventions, these agencies put themselves in a position to determine proper 
technology appropriation.  This is guided by the assumption that they are targeting 
societies that lack technologies and an interpretation of their purposes.  This study 
provides evidence that at least in Ghana (a heavily aid-targeted country) this assumption 
is simply not accurate. 
Whether insiders see themselves as representing situated or universal truths about 
technology also has implications.  Part of belonging to a culture is absorbing a shared 
response to what is common-sense, that which is self-evident and require no further 
justification.  Common-sense is a component of culture that is not recognized as such.  
Any sufficiently insular community that is not subject to constant intrusion from external 
challengers develops a degree of blindness to certain shared assumptions and to the 
possible alternatives.  Chapter 6 documented the way language conventions and 
referencing patterns in speech and text at the World Summit on the Information Society 
accomplished this insularity.  These strategies were used to both lend and borrow 
legitimacy from other parts of the institution.  Procedures that regulated access to WSIS 
converted outside organizations such as NGOs into champions of the institution.  Both 
WSIS participants and Internet café users in Accra inevitably were guided by common-
sense views.  Their aspirations and expectations about technology shaped interactions 
with outsiders.  For Internet café users these included the people they were connected to 
through the Internet.  Network technologies like the Internet facilitated an unprecedented 
degree of intercultural contact, between different national cultures, technology cultures, 
and transnational subcultures. 
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While UN events like WSIS include participants from every continent, its 
ideologically roots are in the Western Enlightenment project founded upon modernist 
ideals (Escobar 1995).  The hegemony of such global institutions over the governments 
and citizens of developing nations and their self reinforcement strategies make it possible 
for the claim to universality to be maintained.  Denial of culture is a charge levelled at 
Western society in general, not just the elite communities of powerful scientists, 
diplomats, and decision-makers.  The concept of culture circulates in the public discourse 
as shorthand for otherness and a situated perspective.  In popular thinking, culture is in 
the realm of opinion and value rather than irrefutable truth.  Successful denial of culture 
indicates an absence of scrutiny and an absence of effective challengers.  It follows that 
the culture of the UN will be acknowledged by insiders when under pressure to address 
external critics (i.e. Boutros-Ghali 1992).  Ghanaians were constantly reminded of their 
non-normative positioning in relation to the rest of the world through the media, aid 
programs, and diasporic communication.  The perceived absence of culture in the West is 
shared by both those inside and outside of Western society.  In a recent interview with a 
well-educated, middle-upper class family in Accra, their perception of themselves as 
situated was clear.  The eldest son noted that, “for Africa, for this part of the world,  our 
culture is centred on…a certain pattern of living….If you think on the world platform, 
you can see that our culture doesn’t necessarily mean anything to somebody else.”  He 
expressed a clear sense that what counts for truth and meaning in his society does not 
extend to outsiders, that his positioning is relative.  After a short debate between the 
young man and his mother, his aunt turned to me and asked, “So the Europeans, do they 
have a culture?”  Anthropologists and sociologists have considered this very question 
over the years.  The elaborate exoticism of societies throughout the southern hemisphere 
is contrasted with the seemingly plain, utilitarian, and disenchanted West.  One 
convincing argument that is also particularly applicable to technology use is Marshall 
Sahlins critique of materialist interpretations of culture and his assertions about the 
constitution of Western culture. 
Sahlins asserts that Western culture does not “escape symbolic determination” 
and that the economy itself is “the main site of symbolic production” (Sahlins 1976, pp. 
211).  He describes what makes Western culture distinctive as the shared illusion that it is 
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guided pragmatically by material laws alone.  He critiques earlier theorists who treated 
culture as though it were merely, “nature expressed in another form” (209) entirely 
reducible to the logic of subsistence and survival.  He notes how this approach 
historically has had explanatory power for only certain domains of cultural practice and 
failed to generate insights into those practices (such as witchcraft and magic) that do not 
map coherently to some natural imperative.  His claim is supported by an analysis of 
Western styles of eating and dressing as the symbolic demarcation of economic and non-
economic practice such as Sunday dinner, ‘Happy hour,’ and gendered, casual, and work 
styles of dress.  He takes this argument further by observing that culture does not arise 
from utilitarian needs, but neither are these needs a separate domain.  Sahlins argues for a 
fundamental connection between utility and the symbolic orderings of culture.  It is 
through a cultural framing, through the patterns and priorities of everyday life defined by 
culture, that it is possible to perceive the utility of an object in a way that inspires and 
guides instrumental action.  
Following from Sahlins insights, one aim of this ethnography was to challenge the 
tendency to treat the functionality of a technology as separate from symbolic work that is 
about or makes use of the artefact.  Where the two are treated as distinct, function is the 
realization of consequences that derive from material properties and direct interaction 
alone.  Symbolism, by contrast, is primarily the domain of aesthetics and identity display.  
Symbolism is the way a mobile phone is made visible to signify class, gender, and style 
(Monteiro 2004).  Through this division function escapes from culture and becomes 
something entirely defined by a universal rationality and unimpeachable physical laws.  
In technology studies, notions of symbolic display have been used to demonstrate a 
richer, more affective, more aesthetic, and more social role for technology in society, but 
this has had the perhaps unintended consequence of reinforcing the division between 
utility and symbolism. 
At the root of the developmentalist interpretation of technology at WSIS exists 
just such a separation between utility/functionality and the cultural dimension.  It is a way 
of thinking about processes as composed of layers and compartments.  Utilitarian 
universals are at the base level and the cultural/symbolic consists of destabilizing 
contingencies that must be contended with in the instrumental drive towards socio-
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economic progress.  The symbolic is irrelevant to material forces, it is an add-on that may 
be either helpful or destructive.  Alternately, culture is treated as a matter of heritage that 
can be encompassed and preserved by technology, but has no bearing at all on the 
machine itself.  A utilitarian relationship to tools is presumed to be applicable in all 
settings.  What this fails to recognize is that utility itself is discerned through a cultural 
frame that foregrounds certain material possibilities while obscuring or neglecting others. 
This account of Internet café use in Ghana has looked at symbolic work in 
relation to technology beyond notions of symbolic display.  The separation of function 
from symbolism treats function as if it were self-evident and beyond human control.  
However, Gell makes the important point that technology is defined, in part, by its 
inscrutability.  A technology is something that accomplishes a desired outcome in a 
roundabout and indirect way requiring some specialized instruction and consequent skill 
to make use of it (Gell 1988).  By this definition, technological function is never self-
evident and a social and symbolic process of sense-making is involved in employing it 
materially and effectively.  This is particularly applicable in the case of an extraordinarily 
complex technology like the Internet that builds on a set of discoveries stretching back to 
the invention of the integrated circuit.  As Sahlins argues, “no functional explanation is 
ever sufficient by itself; for functional value is always relative to the given cultural 
scheme” (Sahlins 1976, pp. 206).  This means that no function that can be discerned from 
the Internet without involving symbolic work.  Sahlins argument acknowledges but does 
not theorize in any way the role of materiality.  However, importantly he establishes a 
connection between material function and symbolic understanding that is often missing 
from the way technology appropriation is understood.   
 As for the materiality of the Internet, certainly the obduracy of the technology was 
something users had to contend with.  The reality of seeing an American chat room 
partner on a webcam reinforced certain understandings of the Internet through a tactile 
and multi-sensory experience.  Latour, Law and others argue for the durability of social 
order across time and space as dependent upon material objects whose particular physical 
qualities shape the particularities of an ordering (Latour 1991; Law 1994).  Drawing on 
this theory of social order I argue that the structures of meaning that users brought to bear 
on the Internet obtained this structure through a socio-material realization and were 
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instantiated through rehearsed and embodied practice.  The materials that make up the 
Internet and the materials involved in making sense of the Internet were not ciphers that 
any meaning could be projected onto.  These artefacts exerted an agency of their own. 
 What made the Internet different from the other commodities and technologies 
that came before it in a steady stream from the Western world was the way that it 
facilitated feedback and direct contact with people outside of the African continent.  This 
technology created a profound sense of co-presence by enabling frequent, synchronous 
and multi-sensory communication through text conversations and the use of webcams.  
Unlike the telephone, chat rooms and matchmaking services on the Internet were 
designed to facilitate connections between strangers.  Unlike the airplane and air travel 
infrastructure, access to the Internet was not restricted by the international infrastructure 
of immigration policy.  This co-presence allowed Internet users to recreate themselves 
legitimately as more cosmopolitan and connected.  Unlike the ongoing process of 
importation through which foreign commodities confronted Ghanaians who could only 
respond to these material prompts locally, the Internet provided a link back to its source.  
Through this newly affordable connectivity, the Internet provided opportunities to 
challenge for a more central positioning in the global order. 
It was not just the Internet, but the unique way that the technology was situated 
within the space of the Internet café that was seized upon by Internet users.  Young 
people with less than a University education who made up the majority of Internet café 
users in Accra faced an additional sense of marginalization in a society still largely 
ordered on gerontocratic principles.  The Internet café served as a space outside the 
surveillance of their elders since they were predominantly visited and staffed by young 
people.  Some used this opportunity for transgressive behaviour such as porn viewing.  
The café became a territory young people claimed as their own.  At BusyInternet, the 
territorial claims of youth were so insistent and disruptive that actions to regulate café 
behaviour were instated to maintain the openness of this space to diverse segments of 
society. 
Internet users believed the Internet would allow them to develop an expanded 
social network.  This proved true in their online encounters.  They believed that this 
would lead to improved access to financial, educational, and employment resources.  This 
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second level of belief was transported by other structures like rumours and church 
sermons and was not directly experienced by most Internet users.  The Internet was a 
source for desirable contacts, ones that by virtue of living outside of the African continent 
had more resources at their disposal.  Their expectation was that establishing these 
contacts would unlock the flows of resources within privileged social networks so that 
they would begin to flow from the West to Ghana.  Through their strategies to meet 
patrons, father-figures, philanthropists, boyfriends, girlfriends, and spouses on the 
Internet they expressed the conviction that above all else they lacked the money and 
connections required to succeed in life.  Based on their own experiences and the 
experiences of certain peers and family members this was indeed how getting ahead 
happened. 
 The Internet users I interviewed and observed rarely made any reference to 
‘information’.  There is limited research into the social concept of information, how it is 
culturally specified, and how different cultures manage and distribute it.  Notably, in 
Accra there was a striking difference in the way university-educated Internet users in 
Accra approached the Internet.  For these users the notion of ‘information’ was much 
more central.  They saw problems as having solutions that were perhaps detached from 
human sources.  What this suggests is that ways of thinking about ‘information’ may be 
produced by a certain style of education.  An education that stresses scepticism and self-
reliance rather than embodied knowledge imparted by authority figures.  The analysis of 
these observations are speculative at this point, but suggest a promising research direction 
into a cross-cultural analysis of the concept of information in education processes. 
 
Cross-Cultural Comparisons 
 
The purpose of talking about 'technology cultures’ was to highlight how multiple 
possibilities are present in technological forms and are activated differently by each new 
set of users.  Early research on the Internet’s social impact suggested that the anonymity 
and synchronicity of Internet mediated communication facilitated experiments with 
gender and other aspects of identity for self-development (Rheingold 1993; Turkle 1996; 
Markoff 2005; Turner 2006).  By contrast, the same capabilities of anonymity and 
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synchronous communication have been employed in Ghanaian Internet cafés to open up 
new, lucrative possibilities for favourable (if illegal) economic transactions, such as chat 
room scams.  Technological properties were certainly consequential, both activities 
depended upon unique features of the Internet for their realization.  Yet neither possibility 
could be extrapolated from the material properties of the Internet alone. 
The Internet along with mobile phones are remarkable for their rapid diffusion 
from the U.S. to the rest of the world, much more rapid than any of the technologies that 
have come before including television, telephone, and radio.  Less than two decades after 
Internet service became available to consumers in the U.S., Africa is now identified as 
the continent where adoption of the Internet is happening most rapidly.  With widespread 
global diffusion underway, researchers are in a better position to look critically and 
comparatively at technology cultures and cybercultures. 
Comparative research can also be used reflexively to re-examine technology 
appropriation in the West and to ask questions about the structures of meaning that 
technology users rely on to make sense of the Internet.  As in Ghana, this includes 
informal conversations and story-telling, and various other activities conducted away 
from the computer interface that inform technological practice.  The moral panics 
surrounding paedophilia on the Internet are a good example of beliefs about technology 
practice that exist apart from direct experience.  Few experience this phenomenon first 
hand, but the circulation of stories informally and in the media has a material effect on 
the relationship between young people, their guardians, and the technology itself.  By 
examining Western convictions about technology, both popular and academic, and 
finding the disconnects between these convictions and direct experience researchers can 
develop a better understanding of their role beyond mere explanation of the phenomenon 
at hand.  It is not the direct experience with a technology that is the final word on how the 
materiality of the technology is operated and interpreted. 
There is a future in research on technology cultures documenting the various ways 
that the Internet is appropriated around the world.  A cross-cultural perspective can shed 
light on widespread presumptions about technology’s destiny in developing and other 
non-Western societies.  There is a weird and wonderful reality to what happens to new 
technologies as they become situated in different societies.  The alternative 
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interpretations of technology emerging in many parts of the world provide a commentary 
on the way these societies confront modernity and globalization.  Users and their 
adoption or rejection of technologies along with the particular configurations of 
technology that they create are a crucial component of the way technology’s ‘promise’ is 
realized. 
 
 
1 There is no single agreed-upon definition of the ‘Information Society’ in scholarly work.  For a summary 
of the different kinds of evidence scholars point to support the reality of this new social world order see 
Webster 2002. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - a small Internet café in the La Paz neighborhood 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - BusyInternet, the largest Internet café in Ghana 
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Figure 3 - the café at BusyInternet 
 
 
Figure 4 - Isaac's political campaign website 
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Figure 5 - Charles constructs a cosmopolitan identity 
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